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What is the ontological status of novels? Are they inscriptions (i.e., concrete
texts typically written or printed on something or displayed on the screen of some
electronic device)? Sets of inscriptions? Mental representations of some semantic
content? Structures of meanings? Syntactic sequences? Or something else? Fur-
thermore, what is the ontological status of instances of a novel (i.e., entities that
manifest all the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate this
novel)? Are they readings (i.e., sequences of sounds generated as a result of reading
aloud)? Inscriptions? Both readings and inscriptions? Or some other entities?
My goal in this dissertation is to answer these questions.
The dissertation is structured as follows. In Part I, I provide some termino-
logical clarifications that must be made before addressing the issues concerning the
ontological status of novels and their instances. In particular, in Chapter 1 (“Defin-
ing ’a Novel’”), I define “a novel,” and in Chapter 2 (“Defining ’an Instance of an
Artwork’”), I define “an instance of an artwork.”
Part II is aimed at clarifying the ontological status of instances of novels. I be-
gin, in Chapter 3 (“Against Inscriptions as Instances of Novels”), by arguing against
the most widely endorsed ontology of instances of novels—the ontology according
to which the paradigmatic, or most typical, entities that serve as such instances are
inscriptions. Next, in Chapter 4 (“An Ontology of Instances of Novels”), I put for-
ward and defend an alternative ontology—the one according to which instances of
novels are readings and mereological sums of readings and graphic elements. Finally,
in Chapter 5 (“The Novel as a Performing Art”), I examine a peculiar consequence
of the foregoing ontology—that the novel is a performing art.
The purpose of Part III is to clarify the ontological status of novels. I begin,
in Chapter 6 (“What a Novel Is Not”), with a critical overview of the most promis-
ing existing ontologies of novels, arguing that none of these ontologies stands up
completely to criticism. Then, in Chapter 7 (“An Ontology of Novels”), I expound
and defend a new ontology of novels. According to this ontology, novels are a pecu-
liar kind of concreta—namely, concrete types composed of certain sonic, semantic,
syntactic, contextualist, and visual elements.
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Introduction to PART I
The main focus of this dissertation is the question “What is the ontological status of
novels and their instances?” Before tackling this question, however, it is necessary to
clarify what is meant by the expressions “a novel” and “an instance of an artwork.”
Given this, my goal in PART I is to define these expressions.
2
Chapter 1: Defining “a Novel”
Introduction
In this chapter, I aim to define “a novel.” I begin by arguing that there is
no real reason to consider “a novel” indefinable (Section 1.1). Next, I define “a
novel” in the restricted sense, or, in other words, “a novel” that refers to any novels
except the so-called nonfiction novels, novels in verse, and graphic novels (Section
1.2). Then I provide definitions of “a nonfiction novel,” “a novel in verse,” and “a
graphic novel”—and, with the help of these definitions as well as the definition of “a
novel” in the restricted sense, define “a novel” (Section 1.3). After that, I examine
potential objections to the definition of “a novel” provided in the previous section,
arguing that none of them stands up completely to criticism (Section 1.4). Finally, I
make some remarks concerning the foregoing definition and suggest that “a novella”
and “a short story” can be defined in a similar way (Section 1.5).
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1.1 Is It Possible to Define “a Novel”?
As is clear from what has been said, the goal of this chapter is to define
“a novel.”1 Can this goal be achieved? There are a number of potential reasons
to answer this question in the negative. Let us have a look at these reasons and
determine whether any of them is successful.
Here is one potential reason against the possibility of defining “a novel.” There
have been a considerable number of serious attempts to define “a novel.” Yet none
of these attempts can be considered successful. Meanwhile, if there have been a
considerable number of serious attempts to do x, all of which have failed, then doing
x is likely to be impossible.
Another potential reason against the definability of “a novel” can be formu-
lated in the following way. Defining “a novel” is possible only if the concept ex-
pressed by “a novel” is structured according to conditions satisfied by all entities
that actually fall under “a novel” and only by such entities (hereafter: “necessary
and sufficient conditions”). However, there are at least two strong considerations
against the idea that this concept is structured that way. First, if this idea were
1As is generally agreed, to define x (where x is some expression) is to explicate the meaning of x
by specifying a set of conditions that are (a) satisfied by all entities that actually fall under x and
only by such entities and (b) sufficiently informative—in particular, (1) are not enumerative, or, in
other words, do not amount to a (disjunctive) list of objects that fall under x ; (2) do not involve a
vicious circle, or, in other words, do not explicitly or implicitly contain the concept expressed by x ;
(3) do not contain meaningless expressions or expressions whose meanings cannot be understood;
etc.
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true, then it would be relatively easy to come up with a satisfactory definition of
“a novel.” However, given that, as mentioned in the previous paragraph, none of
the attempts to define “a novel” has been successful, defining “a novel” is hard, if
possible at all.2
Second, if the concept of “a novel” were structured according to necessary
and sufficient conditions, then we would use such conditions when categorizing ob-
jects as “novels.” But, in fact, when we categorize objects as “novels,” we do not
use necessary and sufficient conditions; we use other, non-definitional classifica-
tory means—such as prototypes3 (mental representations of a novel in general) and
2It is worth noting that in this respect, “a novel” is not unique. Defining other artistic
expressions—such as “art,” “poetry,” “music,” and “literature”—seems very hard, if not impossi-
ble. Moreover, it is often hard to define even “ordinary” expressions. Consider, for example, “a
bachelor.” According to a common definition—call it Db1—a bachelor is an unmarried man of a
marriageable age. But this definition is problematic. If it is true, then the Pope is a bachelor. But
he is not a bachelor—or so it seems.
According to another possible definition—call it Db2—a bachelor is an unmarried man of a
marriageable age who has a right to marry. This definition is also problematic. Although Db2
avoids the problem of Db1 (the Pope does not have a right to marry and so, according to Db2,
cannot be a bachelor), it faces another problem. Consider an unmarried man who has lived with his
girlfriend for 20 years. Is he a bachelor? Db2 entails that he is. But this result is counterintuitive. It
seems wrong to call someone who has lived with his or her sexual partner for 20 years “a bachelor.”
Perhaps there is a way to modify Db1 and Db2 so that the foregoing problems could not arise.
But it is not easy to figure out what this way is. And there seems to be no other potentially
acceptable definition of “a bachelor.” As a result, it is unclear how this expression can be defined.
3See Rosch (1978).
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exemplars4 (mental representations of some particular novel or novels considered
paradigmatic or most typical).5
Here is yet another potential reason against the possibility to define “a novel.”
As Weitz (1956) points out, if a concept is open—that is, if the application conditions
of this concept are emendable and corrigible—then the expression corresponding to
this concept is indefinable. For suppose an expression that corresponds to a concept
is definable. Then the application conditions of this concept are necessary and
sufficient. But such conditions are neither emendable nor corrigible, since there
can be no entity x that would legitimately require us to modify the concept being
discussed by adding a condition that either prevents x from falling under this concept
or ensures that x is covered by this concept. Thus, in the case of a definable
expression, the application conditions of the corresponding concept must not be
emendable or corrigible. Meanwhile, as already mentioned, in order for a concept
to be open, its conditions of application must be emendable and corrigible. So the
concept corresponding to a definable expression must be closed.
Thus, the openness of a concept entails that the expression corresponding to
this concept cannot be defined. But if that is the case, then “a novel” is indefinable.
For suppose that the openness of a concept does, in fact, entail that the expression
corresponding to this concept cannot be defined. Then “a novel” can be defined
only if the concept of “a novel” is not open. But this concept is open. Consider
4See Smith and Medin (2002).
5Dean (2003) offers a similar reason to show that the concept of “art” is not structured according
to necessary and sufficient conditions.
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the art of the novel. It is aimed at generating something substantially new and,
hence, is essentially creative. Meanwhile, if a practice is essentially creative, then
the application conditions of the concept corresponding to a product of this practice
are emendable and corrigible.6 Thus, the application conditions of the concept of
“a novel” are emendable and corrigible. But if this is so, then this concept is open.7
Are any of the foregoing reasons against the possibility of defining “a novel”
successful? Consider the first reason. It assumes that if there have been a consid-
erable number of serious attempts to do x, none of which has been successful, then
doing x is likely to be impossible. Yet this assumption is questionable. Further-
more, according to the first reason, there have been a considerable number of serious
attempts to define “a novel.” However, so far as I am aware, there have actually
been no such attempts.8 (This is not to say, of course, that no one has tried to
6Suppose a practice is essentially creative. Then “new cases can always be envisaged or created...
which would call for a decision on someone’s part to extend or to close” (Weitz, 1956, 413) the
concept corresponding to a product of this practice. Put another way, it is always possible to
create or merely imagine an entity x that would legitimately require us to modify the concept
corresponding to a product of this practice by adding a condition that either prevents x from
falling under this concept or ensures that x is covered by this concept. Meanwhile, if creating or
imagining such an entity is possible, then the application conditions of the concept corresponding
to a product of the practice under consideration are emendable and corrigible.
7This objection to the thesis that “a novel” is definable is due to Weitz (1956).
8The lack of interest concerning the definition of “a novel” is puzzling, especially given that
there is considerable interest with regard to some closely related expressions such as “literature”
and “poetry” (for definitions of “literature,” see, e.g., Beardsley (2004), Lamarque (2009), Ohmann
(1971), and Stecker (2004); for a definition of “poetry,” see Ribeiro (2007)).
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specify some characteristic, though non-defining, features of novels: A number of
attempts to do this have been made by philosophers, literary theorists, historians
of literature, literary critics, and authors of dictionary articles concerning the novel.
The point is that no one has tried to define (in the sense specified above) “a novel.”)
In light of what has been said, the first reason against the possibility of defining
“a novel” can hardly be considered successful. What about the second reason? It can
be successful only if at least one of the considerations advanced to support the thesis
that the concept of “a novel” is not structured according to necessary and sufficient
conditions is satisfactory. Is any of these considerations, in fact, satisfactory?
According to the first consideration, the fact that defining “a novel” is hard
shows that the concept of “a novel” is not structured according to necessary and
sufficient conditions. But does this fact really show that? Consider “gold.” Prima
facie, if this expression were easy to define, it would be definable with the help of
“ordinary,” easily available information—that gold is a precious, yellow metal, is
used to create things like rings and necklaces, serves as the monetary standard, etc.
But, as Rey (1999)—following Kripke (1980) and Putnam (1970, 1975)—points out,
such information “is not in any way necessarily tied to [gold]” (291) and, hence,
cannot be used to define “gold.” So defining “gold” is not easy. However, this
does not entail that the concept of “gold” is not structured according to necessary
and sufficient conditions. Consider the following description: “the basic chemical
element with atomic number 79.” According to Rey (1999),
this... description, if true, would appear to provide us with nomologi-
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cally necessary and sufficient conditions for the proper use of the term
[“gold”], those facts in virtue of which something qualifies as being (made
of) gold. And it would also seem to capture our metaphysically modal
intuitions: again, if the description is true, then only something having
atomic number 79 would be gold; even something yellow, mined in the
Sierras, used in wedding bands and as a monetary standard, but lack-
ing that atomic number, would not be. In short, the description would
appear to provide much that has been standardly asked of a definition.
(291–292)
Thus, if Rey (1999) is right—and there seems to be nothing that would suggest
otherwise—there is good reason to hold that the description “the chemical element
with atomic number 79,” if true, can be used to define “gold.” Meanwhile, if “gold”
is definable, then it is reasonable to maintain that the concept of gold is structured
according to certain necessary and sufficient conditions.
Thus, it is highly questionable that the fact that it is hard to define “gold”
shows that the concept of gold is not structured according to necessary and sufficient
conditions. But if this is so, then there is good reason to question the thesis that in
the case of “a novel,” the analogous fact shows that this expression is not structured
according to certain necessary and sufficient conditions.
Let us now turn to the second consideration against the thesis that the concept
of “a novel” is structured according to necessary and sufficient conditions. According
to this consideration, the fact that we do not categorize novels with the help of nec-
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essary and sufficient conditions shows that the concept of “a novel” is not structured
in accordance with such conditions. But does this fact really show that? As Rey
(1999) points out, a concept has two functions: the metaphysical and the epistemo-
logical. The metaphysical function consists in specifying the facts by virtue of which
something is correctly categorized by the concept. The epistemological function, on
the other hand, consists, mainly, in providing “the means by which an agent cate-
gorizes things, decides whether or not something is of a certain kind” (Rey, 1999,
282).9 Taking this into account, suppose that the fact that we do not categorize
novels by means of necessary and sufficient conditions shows that the concept of
“a novel” is not structured according to such conditions. Then the metaphysical
9It is worth noting that the distinction between the metaphysical and the epistemological func-
tions
. . . corresponds to a crucial, if very battered, distinction in philosophy between meta-
physics and epistemology, or between issues surrounding how the world is (what
exists, what is true) and issues surrounding how we know, believe, infer, how the
world is. Although this [latter] distinction is not everywhere perfectly sharp (e.g., in
describing our own cognitions), and despite the fact that some people (e.g., various
sorts of relativists and idealists) are inclined to argue that the distinction is ulti-
mately only apparent, it should seem on its face pretty plausible: there is, after all,
all the difference in the world between the issue of whether there actually is a cow on
the road and the issue of whether anyone knows, believes, has inferred, or even cares
whether there is. Similarly, then, there would seem to be all the difference in the
world between something being a cow and someone knowing, believing, or inferring
that it is. (Rey, 1999, 284)
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function of the concept of “a novel” must coincide with the epistemological function
of this concept. For suppose that is not the case. Then the metaphysical function
can employ the means other than the facts about the way we actually categorize
novels, in particular it can employ certain necessary and sufficient conditions. But
if this is so, then, since this function is performed by the concept of “a novel,” this
concept can be structured according to necessary and sufficient conditions.
Thus, if the fact that we do not categorize novels by means of necessary and
sufficient conditions shows that the concept of “a novel” is not structured according
to such conditions, then the metaphysical function of this concept must coincide with
the epistemological function of this concept. But does the metaphysical function,
in fact, coincide with the epistemological one? If it does, then the concept of “a
novel” is determined by how we actually categorize novels. However, according to
Rey (1999, 288), there is good reason to think that this concept is not determined by
that. The ways people categorize novels (as well as other things) differ from person
to person. One might categorize novels with the help of a particular set of properties,
whereas someone else might do that using a different set of properties or perhaps
something entirely different—say, a mental representation of an “exemplar” novel.
So if the concept of “a novel” is determined by our actual categorization practices,
then each of us has a concept of “a novel” that, in an overwhelming majority of cases,
is different, and sometimes very different, from a concept of “a novel” possessed by
another person. Meanwhile, a genuinely meaningful conversation about x is possible
only if the participants of this conversation have the same, or at least very similar,
concepts of “x.” As a result, if the concept of “a novel” is determined by how we
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categorize novels, then meaningful conversations about novels must be very rare.
But, of course, such conversations are not rare. So the concept of “a novel” is not
determined by how we categorize novels.
Thus, the metaphysical function does not coincide with the epistemological
one. But then, given what has been said above, the fact that we do not categorize
novels using necessary and sufficient conditions does not show that the concept of
“a novel” is not structured according to such conditions.
So neither consideration against the thesis that the concept of “a novel” is
structured according to necessary and sufficient conditions is satisfactory. And
there seems to be no other potentially satisfactory considerations against this thesis.
Given this, the second reason against the possibility of defining “a novel” cannot be
considered successful.
Let us now turn to the third reason against this possibility. This reason as-
sumes that if a practice is creative, then the concept corresponding to a product of
this practice is open. Is this assumption true? Suppose the answer is “Yes.” Then
the game of chess is creative only if the concept of “a game of chess” is open. But
this concept is closed. Given the fact that the game of chess is strictly determined
by certain rules, there can be no x that would legitimately require us to modify
the concept of “a game of chess” by adding a condition that either prevents x from
falling under this concept or ensures that x is covered by this concept. So the
application conditions of the concept of “a game of chess” are neither emendable
nor corrigible. Meanwhile, any concept whose application conditions are neither
emendable nor corrigible is closed.
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Thus, if the assumption being discussed is true, then the game of chess is not
creative. But this consequence is clearly false, as games of chess can be creative—
for example, by virtue of involving particular creative moves, series of moves, or
strategies.10 So the foregoing assumption is false. But then the third reason against
the possibility of defining “a novel” fails.
So none of the foregoing reasons shows that “a novel” is indefinable. Mean-
while, so far as I am aware, there are no other potentially plausible reasons against
the possibility of defining “a novel.” Given this, it is reasonable to hold that “a
novel” can be defined.
1.2 Defining “a Novelr”
Let us now turn to the main task of this chapter—defining “a novel.”
Call any novel that is not a nonfiction novel, a novel in verse, or a graphic
novel “a novel in the restricted sense” (hereafter: “novelr”). How can “a novelr” be
defined?
To answer this question, let us consider the characteristic features of a novelr.
One of these features is that a novelr is a verbal object—that is, an object composed,
for the most part, of linguistic elements, such as words and punctuation marks.
Note that being a verbal object does not require being composed solely of linguistic
elements;11 so the feature being discussed does not presuppose that a novelr cannot
10This objection is due to Davies (1991).
11Thus, W. G. Sebald’s Vertigo is a verbal object, although some of its essential elements—in
particular, drawings and photographs—are non-linguistic.
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involve non-linguistic entities—photographs, maps, diagrams, drawings, and the
like.
Another characteristic feature of a novelr is that such a novel is written, for
the most part, in prose. Note that this feature does not imply that a novelr cannot
contain verse or some other non-prosaic textual elements—for being written, for the
most part, in verse is compatible with not being completely prosaic.12
Yet another characteristic feature of a novelr is that such a novel has an ap-
propriate length. Here, of course, a natural question arises: What exactly is this
length? To answer this question, it is sufficient to answer the following questions:
(a) “What is the maximal number of words a novelr can have?” and (b) “What is
the minimal number of words a novelr can have?”
13 Let us first answer the former
question.
A lot of novelsr have about 100,000 words. At the same time, there are novelsr
that are much longer. Samuel Richardson’s Clarissa has over 950,000 words, Mar-
cel Proust’s À la recherche du temps perdu exceeds a million words, Madeleine de
Scudéry’s Artamène ou le Grand Cyrus contains about 2.1 million words, and Mark
Leach’s Marienbad My Love has approximately 17 million (!) words. Can a novelr be
even longer than that? There seems no reason to think otherwise. It is even possible
12An example of an object that is written, for the most part, in prose but contains verse and,
hence, is not completely prosaic is R. L. Stevenson’s Treasure Island.
13Here and in what follows, a novel’s having x words is understood as (a) the possession of x
words by this novel—if it is written in English, or (b) the possession of x words by its (correct)
English translation—if it is written in a language other than English.
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to conceive of a novelr that contains an infinite loop and, hence, is never-ending.
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Given this, the length of a novelr does not have an upper word limit.
What about the lower word limit? What is the minimal number of words a
novelr can have? Answering this question precisely—by specifying an exact number
of words—is hardly possible. The reason for this is that any attempt to do this
faces the paradox similar to the paradoxes of the heap and the bald man. Suppose
we find out that the shortest novelr ever written
15 has 34,381 words (Julie Otsuka’s
novelr When the Emperor Was Divine is about that long). It seems bizarre to say
that anything that is just one word shorter than this novelr is not a novelr. So a
novelr can contain 34,380 words. But taking one word out of this 34,380 word novel
will not turn it into a non-novelr. So it is possible for a novelr to have 34,379 words.
But, again, if we remove just one word from a 34,379 word novelr, we will not turn
this novel into a non-novelr. Thus, a novelr can have 34,378 words. But, again...
We can continue this reasoning until we reach an absurd claim—that a novelr can
14One might object that a never-ending novel is not really a novel, since (a) it is unreadable
and (b) being a novel presupposes being readable. But this objection fails. It assumes that a
never-ending novel cannot be read. But this assumption is false: Although a never-ending novel
cannot be read completely, it can be read.
One might also object that a never-ending novel is not really a novel, since (a) it cannot be read
in its entirety and (b) something can be a novel only if it can be read in its entirety. But this
objection also fails. It assumes that every novel can be read in its entirety. But there seems no
real reason to accept this assumption. Prima facie, there is nothing wrong with there being novels
that cannot be fully read.
15In this chapter, the word “to write” is used in a broad sense—the sense according to which to
write is to generate a text.
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have just one word. The absurdity of this claim suggests that there must exist a
limit to how short a novelr can be. But it seems that, regardless of what we take
this limit to be, we face the paradox just sketched. So how should we proceed?
I think we should admit that since the limit to how short novelsr can be is (at
least, epistemically) essentially vague, it cannot be precisely identified. At the same
time, we can try to specify it approximately. Consider an object that is identical
to a 10 word sentence. Clearly, such an object cannot be a novelr. Furthermore,
it seems odd to hold that a novelr can have 5000 or fewer words. Likewise, we,
most likely, will not call something that has about 10,000 words “a novelr.” Now,
what about an object that contains 15,000 words? Can it be a novelr? The answer
to this question is less obvious than the answer to the analogous question about a
10,000 or 5000 word object. But it seems that in this case, saying “No” is closer
to the truth than saying “Yes.” An object having approximately 15,000 words can
be a short story or a novella. But it can hardly be “a novelr.” Given what has
been said, the border that separates a novelr from a non-novelr is, I think, in the
30,000 word range. There are objects with a word count in this range that are
widely recognized as novelsr—for instance, Albert Camus’s The Stranger (c. 36,500
words), E. L. Konigsburg’s From the Mixed Up Files of Mrs. Basil E. Frankweiler
(c. 31,300 words), Julie Otsuka’s When the Emperor Was Divine (c. 34,300 words),
and E. B. White’s Charlotte’s Web (c. 33,500 words). At the same time, so far as I
am aware, there is no novelr whose word count is in the 20,000 or some lower word
range.16
16The foregoing substantiation of the thesis that the border separating a novelr from a non-
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Thus, taking into account what has been said, if something is a novelr, it must
(a) be a verbal object, (b) be written, for the most part, in prose, and (c) have at
least n words, where n is a number in the 30,000 word range. The converse, however,
is not true. Being an n or n+ word verbal object written, for the most part, in prose
is not sufficient for being a novel and a fortiori a novelr. Consider, for instance,
historical monographs. They are typically n or n+ word verbal objects written in
prose, but they are not novels. And the same can be said about an overwhelming
majority of dictionaries, collections of short stories, textbooks, and philosophical
treatises. So what property distinguishes novelsr from the foregoing non-novelistic
works?
One possible answer draws upon Monroe Beardsley’s account of “a literary
work.” On this account, “a literary work is a discourse in which an important part
of the meaning is implicit” (Beardsley, 1981, 126), where “implicit meaning” can be
understood as referring to any of the following types of meaning:
• meaning suggested by the use of a word (for example, the idea that a speaker
is a member of a religious group suggested by the fact that she uses the word
“thee” in her speech);
• a connotation of a word, that is, a meaning that is “commonly associated in a
novelr is in the 30,000 word range is doubtless limited (in order for a substantiation of this thesis
to be complete, it must be based on the results of a comprehensive empirical investigation into the
issue of what novels are considered the shortest ones and how many words they have). Because
of this, this thesis should be treated as defeasibly true (not as true simpliciter or absolutely true)
and, hence, as open in principle to revision.
17
particular society with the object referred to by the word in its primary use”
(Lyas, 1969, 86) (for example, the connotation “promise of adventure” of the
word “sea”);
• meaning suggested by the context of an utterance (for example, the idea that
a person is very tall suggested by calling someone who is very tall “little”);
• meaning suggested by the word order of a sentence (for example, the idea that
a person has been sought for suggested by his saying “Here I am,” rather than
“I am here”);
• meaning that depends upon sentential ambiguity (for example, the idea ex-
pressed by the final line of Wilfred Owen’s “Anthem for Doomed Youth”—
“And each slow dusk a drawing down of blinds”—which is ambiguous between
“each dusk householders draw down their blinds in memory of the fallen” and
“each dusk is itself a vast natural drawing down of blinds in mourning for the
fallen” (Lyas, 1969, 86));
• meaning suggested by the content of an utterance (for example, the idea that
a person “believes the door to be open and that he wishes to have the door
shut” (Lyas, 1969, 89) suggested by his saying “Shut the door!”);
• meaning suggested by the way in which a work is written (for example, the
idea that the narrator is concerned about “the plight of the cotton pickers in
the Deep South” (Lyas, 1969, 89) suggested by the fact that his description of
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this plight is very detailed).17
Now, in light of Beardsley’s account of “a literary work,” one could answer the
question posed above by saying that what distinguishes novelsr from non-novelistic
works like historical monographs, dictionaries, collections of short stories, textbooks,
and philosophical treatises (hereafter: “non-novelistic works”) is that unlike such
works, novelsr have a high level of implicit meaning.
Is the foregoing answer satisfactory? In order for it to be satisfactory, two con-
ditions must be satisfied. First, novelsr must have a high level of implicit meaning.
Second, non-novelistic works must have a moderate or low level of such meaning.
Are these conditions satisfied? Consider E. B. White’s novel Charlotte’s Web. It is
quite semantically transparent—at least, the level of its semantic transparency does
not differ much from the level of the semantic transparency of ordinary (day-to-day)
discourse. Given this, it seems wrong to say that Charlotte’s Web has a high level
of implicit meaning. And the same, I think, can be said about many (though, of
course, not all) other children’s novelsr as well as some novels intended for adults.
Thus, the first condition is not satisfied.18 What about the second condition? There
is good reason to think that it is not satisfied either. Consider Kant’s Critique of
17See Lyas (1969).
18Beardsley (2004) seems to, at least partially, agree with this. In his view, the criterion of
having a high level of implicit meaning:
...will cover a great deal of prose fiction, including those novels and short stories that
are most worthy of attention from a literary point of view. But it will not cover all
prose fiction.(Beardsley, 2004, 54)
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Pure Reason. It is not a novel. But since it involves a considerable number of
passages that can have different, often mutually incompatible, interpretations, it
is semantically dense and so may well be characterized as having a high level of
implicit meaning.
Thus, the property of having a high level of implicit meaning cannot be used
to distinguish novelsr from non-novelistic works. So the answer suggested above is
unsatisfactory.
Another possible answer to the question of what distinguishes novelsr from
non-novelistic works is based on the account of “a literary work” offered by Ohmann
(1971). According to Ohmann (1971), in the case of a literary work, the conditions
for performing felicitous (successful) illocutionary speech acts19,20 are not satisfied,
19An illocutionary speech act is, roughly, an act of stating (asserting), asking a question, giving
an order, promising, etc. For a detailed account of such an act, see Austin (1962), Ohmann (1971),
and Searle (2012).
20The nature of the conditions for performing a felicitous speech act depends on the kind of this
act. Here are the conditions that must be satisfied in order for an act of stating to be performed
felicitously:
1. A declarative sentence expressing the statement must be uttered.
2. The utterer must be the right person to make the statement.
3. The statement must be made correctly.
4. The statement must be complete.
5. If the statement is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings, then it
must reflect the beliefs of the utterer.
6. If the statement is designed for the inauguration of certain consequential conduct on the
20
and, as a result:
A literary work is a discourse whose sentences lack the illocutionary
forces that would normally attach to them. Its illocutionary force is
mimetic. . . . A literary work purportedly imitates (or reports) a series of
speech acts, which in fact have no other existence. (Ohmann, 1971, 14)
Put another way, in Ohmann (1971)’s view, a literary work is a discourse in which
none of the sentences expresses illocutionary speech acts that are made felicitously
and, hence, all the sentences have purely mimetic, or imitative, illocutionary forces.
It is worth stressing that Ohmann (1971)’s account does not entail that a
literary work does not contain sentences expressing statements or other illocutionary
speech acts. In his view, literary works can—and in most cases, do—contain such
sentences. His point is that in a literary work, no sentence expresses a felicitous
illocutionary speech act, or a speech act that has any real illocutionary force. Thus,
the first sentence of Pride and Prejudice—“It is a truth universally acknowledged,
that a single man in possession of a good fortune must be in want of a wife”—does
not felicitously state that it is a truth universally acknowledged, that a single man
in possession of a good fortune must be in want of a wife; rather, it merely imitates
(or reports) stating that felicitously.
Now, in light of Ohmann (1971)’s account of a literary work, one could answer
the question being discussed by saying that what distinguishes novelsr from non-
part of any participant (the utterer or the addressee), then the utterer must intend to act
according to this statement. (Ohmann, 1971, 11)
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novelistic works is that unlike the latter, novelsr are composed of sentences that
(a) do not express felicitous speech acts and, hence, (b) lack genuine illocutionary
forces.
Like the previous answer, this answer cannot be accepted. First of all, it
assumes that non-novelistic works are composed of sentences with real illocution-
ary forces. However, this assumption is questionable. Recall that non-novelistic
works include collections of short stories. So if non-novelistic works are composed
of sentences with real illocutionary forces, then collections of short stories must
be composed of such sentences. But this result is false. If novelsr do not involve
sentences that have actual illocutionary forces, then it is reasonable to hold that
the same must be true with regard to collections of short stories. Furthermore, if
Ohmann (1971)’s account is correct, then such collections do not contain sentences
with real illocutionary forces. (Of course, a proponent of the answer being discussed
could respond by restricting this account to novelsr. However, for this response to
be acceptable, it is necessary to explain why this restriction is justified, and there
seems no satisfactory way to do that.)
In addition, contrary to what the answer based on Ohmann (1971)’s account
implies, some novelsr do contain sentences with real illocutionary forces. Consider,
for instance, War and Peace. It involves the following sentences:
Man lives consciously for himself, but serves as an unconscious instru-
ment for the achievement of historical, universally human goals. An
action once committed is irrevocable, and its effect, coinciding in time
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with millions of actions of other people, acquires historical significance.
(Tolstoy, 2007, 605)
These sentences have real illocutionary forces if the illocutionary act corresponding
to them—the act of stating—was performed felicitously. Was this act, in fact, per-
formed felicitously? The answer to this question is “Yes” if the following conditions
are satisfied:
1. A declarative sentence expressing the statement must be uttered.
2. The utterer must be the right person to make the statement.
3. The statement must be made correctly.
4. The statement must be complete.
5. If the statement is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or
feelings, then it must reflect the beliefs of the utterer.
6. If the statement is designed for the inauguration of certain consequential con-
duct on the part of any participant (the utterer or the addressee), then the
utterer must intend to act according to this statement.21
Are these conditions satisfied? The sentences quoted above are declarative, express
a particular statement, and are uttered (by the narrator22). Hence, condition (1)
21See Ohmann (1971, 11).
22A narrator—one who tells a story in a literary work—is not necessarily the author of this
work. Thus, the thesis that the quoted sentences are uttered by the narrator does not necessarily
imply that they are uttered by Tolstoy.
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is satisfied. Condition (2) is also satisfied, as there is no real reason to think that
Tolstoy is not the right person to make the statement being discussed. Furthermore,
since this statement is made correctly and complete, conditions (3) and (4) are
satisfied as well.
Does the statement being discussed satisfy condition (5)? This condition states
that if a statement is designed for use by persons having certain thoughts or feelings,
then it must reflect the beliefs of the utterer. The statement being discussed is clearly
designed for use by persons having certain thoughts. So condition (5) can be satisfied
just in case this statement reflects the beliefs of the utterer. Does it, in fact, reflect
these beliefs? It is made by the narrator, and not one of the characters. Meanwhile,
the consensus is that in War and Peace, the narrator is the author himself. Given
this, there is good reason to think that the statement being discussed is made by
Tolstoy, which, in its turn, suggests that this statement reflects his beliefs. As a
result, it is reasonable to hold that condition (5) is satisfied.
Finally, what about condition (6)? Is it satisfied? There is nothing to suggest
that by making the statement being discussed, Tolstoy intended to cause anyone to
act in some way. Meanwhile, if he did not intend that, then the foregoing condition
is satisfied.
Thus, conditions (1)–(6) are satisfied. As a result, the act of stating corre-
sponding to the sentences quoted above was performed felicitously. But then, given
what has been said above, these sentences have real illocutionary forces.
Yet another possible answer to the question being discussed is this: What
distinguishes novelsr from non-novelistic works is that unlike the latter, novelsr were
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seriously intended, by their authors, to tell a fictional story. This answer seems more
promising than the previous two answers. Yet it is not unproblematic. In order for
it to be satisfactory, there must be no work that (a) is a verbal object, (b) is written
in prose, (c) has at least n words, and (e) was seriously intended to tell a fictional
story, but (f) is not a novelr. However, there can be such a work. Suppose Mary has
written a 50,000 word textbook in biology. Suppose also that, as a result of some
psychological aberration, when working on this textbook, she seriously intended to
tell a fictional story. Now, Mary’s textbook is a verbal object that is written in
prose, has at least n words, and was seriously intended to tell a fictional story. But
this textbook is not a novel and a fortiori not a novelr.
Or suppose John has written a 100,000 word prosaic text that is completely
meaningless (it is just a collection of arbitrarily chosen words). Suppose also that
when working on this text, he seriously intended to tell a fictional story. Is John’s
text a novelr? Prima facie, the answer is “No.” A completely meaningless text is
not a novelr. At the same time, John’s text is a verbal object that is written in
prose, has at least n words, and was seriously intended to tell a fictional story.
Thus, the foregoing answer to the question “What distinguishes novelsr from
non-novelistic works?” cannot be accepted. However, there is a way to modify this
answer so that it would be acceptable. The reason why Mary’s and John’s works are
not novelsr is that these works do not, in fact, tell any fictional stories. If Mary’s
and John’s works did tell such stories at least to some extent, these works could
be considered novelsr. Given this, we can make the foregoing answer acceptable by
adding to it the claim that the author’s intention to tell a fictional story is realized
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at least to some extent. Thus, the acceptable answer to the question being discussed
is as follows: What distinguishes novelsr from non-novelistic works is that unlike the
latter, novelsr (a) were seriously intended (hereafter: “intended”), by their authors,
to tell fictional stories and (b) realize this intention at least to some extent.23
Regarding the foregoing answer, three remarks are worth making. First, it
should be underlined that the mentioned intention is the intention to tell a fictional
story (a unified sequence of events), not stories (several relatively autonomous se-
quences of events). Second, the story that the author intends to tell does not have
to be completely fictional; it may involve real people and objects and describe events
that have actually occurred.24 Finally, the intention to tell a fictional story does not
necessarily involve the intention to present this story as fictional. Put otherwise,
when one intends to tell a fictional story, one does not necessarily intend to make it
explicit that the story is fictional.25
23One might ask: What exactly is meant by “fictional”? Answering this question is beyond the
scope of this dissertation. For possible answers, see, e.g., Currie (1985), Searle (1975), and Walton
(1990).
24This reflects the fact that not all stories of novelsr were intended, by their authors, to be
completely fictional. To see that this fact actually holds, consider, for instance, the story of
War and Peace. Given that this story contains descriptions of real people (Napoleon, Kutuzov,
Alexander I), objects (Moscow, Saint Petersburg, Borodino), and events (the Patriotic War of
1812), it clearly was not intended, by Tolstoy, to be completely fictional.
25This corresponds to the fact that not all stories of novelsr were intended, by their authors, to
be presented as fictional. That this fact actually holds can be shown as follows. Consider the story
of Robinson Crusoe. When Daniel Defoe was working on this story, he doubtless had the intention
to tell a particular story. And there is little doubt that he intended to tell a fictional story, for, of
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Given what has been said, a novelr has the following characteristic features:
(a) being a verbal object, (b) being written, for the most part, in prose, (c) having
at least n words, where n is a number in the 30,000 word range, (d) being intended,
by its author(s), to tell a fictional story, and (e) realizing this intention at least to
some extent. Yet having these features is still not sufficient for being a novelr. For
consider screenplays and theatrical scripts. Of course, they normally have fewer than
20,000 words and, hence, cannot be novels. But nothing stops us from imagining
a screenplay or a theatrical script that has 30,000 or more words. Furthermore,
we can imagine that this screenplay/theatrical script (a) is a verbal object, (b) is
written for the most part, in prose, (c) was intended, by its author, to tell a fictional
story, and (d) realizes this intention to some extent. So if having the mentioned
features were sufficient for being a novelr, then some screenplays/theatrical scripts
would be novelsr. But, surely, neither screenplays nor theatrical scripts are novels
and a fortiori novelsr.
Is there a feature that can be used to distinguish novelsr from screenplays and
theatrical scripts? The function of screenplays and theatrical scripts is to provide
instructions or guidelines on how to create certain works of art (namely, films—
in the case of screenplays; and theatrical performances—in the case of theatrical
course, he realized that the story about Robinson Crusoe does not describe any real events. (This
is not to say, of course, that this story is completely unrelated to real events. As is well known,
it was inspired by what actually happened to Alexander Selkirk.) But in his description, he did
not intend to present the story as a fictional one; he “sought to give the impression of telling the
truth” (Lamarque, 2009, 15), which is evidenced by the absence of an explicit mention that the
story is fictional and the overt realism of the story itself.
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scripts). Thus, neither screenplays nor theatrical scripts are what might be called
“self-standing,” that is, intended to serve as primary foci of appreciation, and not
merely as means to create such foci. But that is not how things are in the case of
novelsr. In light of this, we can say that what distinguishes novelsr from screenplays
and theatrical scripts is that unlike the latter, novelsr are self-standing (in the sense
defined above).
Now, taking into account what has been said, “a novelr” can be defined as
follows:
Novelr: For all x, x is a novelr if and only if x is a verbal object that (a) is written,
for the most part, in prose, (b) has at least n words, where n is a number in the
30,000 word range, (c) was intended, by its author(s), to tell a fictional story,
(d) realizes this intention at least to some extent, and (e) is self-standing.
1.3 Extending the Definition of “a Novelr”
The foregoing definition of “a novelr” is rather powerful—it covers an over-
whelming majority of novels. Yet it does not cover all novels. In particular, it does
not cover graphic novels, novels in verse, and nonfiction novels (hereafter: “non-
standard novels”). So it cannot serve as a definition of “a novel” simpliciter. But
can’t it be modified so that it could serve as such a definition?
Let us begin to answer this question by examining non-standard novels. Con-
sider first novels in verse. Like novelsr, novels in verse are verbal objects. Further-
more, there is good reason to think that novels in verse, similar to novelsr, have at
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least n words. Next, like novelsr, novels in verse are intended, by their authors, to
tell a story. Moreover, like in the case of novelsr, in the case of novels in verse, the
authors’ intention to tell a story is realized at least to some extent. Finally, like
novelsr, novels in verse are self-standing. At the same time, novels in verse differ
from novelsr in that unlike the latter, novels in verse are written in verse, not in
prose. Furthermore, in the case of novelsr, the authors intend to tell a fictional
story, whereas in the case of novels in verse, the authors intend to tell some (not
necessarily fictional) story.26
Consider now nonfiction novels. Like novelsr, nonfiction novels are verbal
objects. Also, similar to novelsr, nonfiction novels have at least n words. Next, like
novelsr, nonfiction novels are intended, by their authors, to tell a story. Furthermore,
like in the case of novelsr, in the case of nonfiction novels, the authors’ intention to
tell a story is realized at least to some extent. Finally, like novelsr, nonfiction novels
are self-standing. At the same time, unlike novelsr, nonfiction novels are intended,
by their authors, to tell a real story. Also, unlike novelsr, nonfiction novels can be
written not only in prose but also in verse.27
Finally, let us have a look at graphic novels. Like novelsr, graphic novels are
intended, by their authors, to tell a story. Also, like in the case of novelsr, in the case
of graphic novels, the authors’ intention to tell a story is realized at least to some
26So far as I am aware, there are currently no novels in verse intended to tell a nonfiction story.
Yet, from an intuitive viewpoint, such novels are possible.
27I am not aware of any nonfiction novels written in verse. However, there seems no reason to
hold that such novels are impossible.
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extent. Furthermore, graphic novels are similar to novelsr with regard to how long
they are: Like novelsr, graphic novels have an appropriate length. Finally, similar
to novelsr, graphic novels are self-standing. At the same time, in the case of novelsr,
the authors intend to tell a fictional story, whereas in the case of graphic novels, the
authors intend to tell some (not necessarily fictional) story.28 Also, unlike novelsr,
graphic novels are not verbal objects; rather, they are objects that are composed
of pictures and/or words organized in a comic-strip format. Finally, graphic novels
differ with regard to the minimal word count: Unlike novels r, graphic novels may
have less than n words.
Given the latter fact, as well as the abovementioned fact that graphic novels
must have an appropriate length, a natural question arises: What exactly is the
appropriate length of a graphic novel? Presumably, the best answer to this ques-
tion is as follows: The length of a graphic novel is that of a book (under normal
printing conditions). Of course, such characterization of the length of a graphic
novel is imprecise. But this should not, I think, be considered a shortcoming. It
would be a shortcoming if a precise characterization of the length of a graphic novel
(that is, a characterization of the form “the length of a graphic novel is at least x
words/pictures/pages,” where x is a particular number) could be given. But such a
characterization cannot be given, since there is no fact of the matter regarding the
exact minimal length of graphic novels. (This, of course, entails that the concept of
“a graphic novel” (and, hence, the concept of “a novel” simpliciter) is vague. But
28I am not aware of any graphic novels intended to tell a nonfiction story. But there seems
nothing to suggest that such novels cannot exist.
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this entailment is unproblematic. As is generally agreed, most, if not all, concepts
that were not introduced by means of strict definitions (for example: “cow,” “chair,”
“bald,” “perception,” “to paint”) are essentially vague.)
Taking into account what has been said, non-standard novels can be charac-
terized as (1) objects that:
• are verbal
• have at least n words
• were intended, by their authors, to tell a story
• realize this intention at least to some extent
• are written in verse or were intended, by their authors, to tell a real story
• are self-standing
—or (2) objects that:
• are composed of pictures and/or words organized in a comic-strip format
• are book-length
• were intended, by their authors, to tell a story
• realize this intention at least to some extent
• are self-standing
However, not only non-standard novels can be characterized this way. Consider a
typical biography. Since it is not a novel, it is not a non-standard novel. But it
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falls under the first disjunct: It is a verbal object that has at least n words, was
intended, by its author, to tell a real story—the story of someone’s life—does, in
fact, tell such a story, and is self-standing. Or imagine a historical monograph that
is book-length, is composed of pictures and/or words organized in a comic-strip
format, was intended, by its author, to tell a story, does, in fact, tell a story, and is
self-standing. Such a monograph is not a non-standard novel, as it is not a novel at
all. But it falls under the second disjunct.
So what distinguishes non-standard novels from biographies, historical mono-
graphs, and similar non-novelistic works? To answer this question, let us first con-
sider Levinson (1989)’s account of “an artwork.” On this account, an artwork is “a
thing (item, object, entity) that has been seriously intended for regard-as-a-work-
of-art, i.e., regard in any way preexisting artworks are or were correctly regarded”
(Levinson, 1989, 21), where “regard” refers to “any mode of interaction with an
object” (Levinson, 1989, 31).29,30 Thus, according to Levinson (1989), an artwork
has the property of having been seriously intended for regard in a way preexisting
artworks were correctly regarded. A similar property, I think, is possessed by a
non-standard novel. Such a novel was seriously intended (hereafter: “intended”),
by its author(s), to be regarded in a way similar to the way novelsr were correctly
regarded. Thus, Alexander Pushkin intended Eugene Onegin to be regarded in a
29Correspondingly, “regard in any way preexisting artworks are or were correctly regarded” refers
to any mode of interaction with an object which was or is proper to some work of art.
30Examples of regards are a regard with close attention to form, a regard with openness to
emotional suggestion, and a regard with awareness of symbolism.
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way similar to the way novelsr were correctly regarded. And an analogous intention
with regard to their non-standard novels was possessed by Truman Capote, Art
Spiegelman, Will Eisner, Rodolfo Walsh, and other “non-standard” novelists.
Here, one might ask: What exactly is a way in which a nonstandard novel must
be intended, by its author(s), to be regarded? Before answering this question, let us
first consider the way novelsr are correctly regarded. This way can be characterized
as a set of regards (approaches, attitudes) that includes regards that presuppose:
• knowledge of the historical context (provided that any such context is relevant
to the story being told)
• sensitivity to the formal structure
• ability to understand the story being told
• sensitivity to the stylistic features
• sensitivity to the sonic techniques (rhythm, alliteration, consonance, disso-
nance, etc.)
• ability to empathize with the characters
• willingness to read (or listen) with proper attention
• willingness to attend to the graphic elements (if there are any)
• awareness of the tradition of novelr writing (that is, the tradition of writing
novels like Don Quixote, Pride and Prejudice, and War and Peace)
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• knowledge of the fact that the story being told is not intended, by the au-
thor(s), to be real
• knowledge of the fact that the main function of a novelr is not merely to inform
—as well as perhaps some other regards. Now, as mentioned above, a way in which
a nonstandard novel must be intended, by its author(s), to be regarded is similar
to the foregoing way. In particular, such a way involves a considerable number of
the regards of the way novelsr are correctly regarded, including the regards that
presuppose at least some knowledge of the historical context (if any such context is
relevant to the story), sensitivity to the formal structure, ability to understand the
story, willingness to read (or listen) with proper attention, awareness of the tradition
of novelr writing, and sensitivity to the stylistic features. At the same time, a way
in which a nonstandard novel must be intended, by its author(s), to be regarded
is not necessarily identical to the way novelsr are correctly regarded. Depending
on the kind of non-standard novel, such a way (a) may not involve some of the
regards of the way novelsr are correctly regarded or (b) can contain some additional
regards. Thus, in the case of a nonfiction novel, the way in which such a novel must
be intended, by its author(s), to be regarded does not presuppose regarding this
novel with awareness of the fact that the story being told is not intended, by the
author(s), to be real. And in the case of a graphic novel, the way in which such
a novel must be intended, by its author(s), to be regarded involves a regard that
is not involved in the way novelsr are correctly regarded—namely, the regard that
presupposes willingness to attend to the comic-strip format as well as at least some
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knowledge of the tradition of comic book writing.
It is important to underline that the fact that x was intended, by its author,
to be regarded in a way similar to the way novelsr were correctly regarded does not
necessarily imply that the author had a thought like “I want x to be regarded with
at least some knowledge of the historical context (if any such context is relevant
to the story), sensitivity to the formal structure, ability to understand the story,
willingness to read (or listen) with proper attention, knowledge of the tradition of
novelr writing, and sensitivity to the stylistic features, and so on.” Of course, if
the author had such a thought, then x was intended by her to be regarded in a
way similar to the way novelsr were correctly regarded. But x can be considered as
having been intended, by x ’s author, to be regarded in such a way even if x ’s author
had a different thought—for instance, the thought “I want x to be regarded in a
way similar to the way novelsr are correctly regarded” or “I want x to be regarded
like novelsr are correctly regarded.”
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Thus, a non-standard novel was intended, by its author(s), to be regarded
in a way similar to the way novelsr were correctly regarded. Now, what about
biographies and other non-novelistic works? Were any of them intended, by their
authors, to be regarded in a way similar to the way novelsr were correctly regarded?
There is no doubt that the answer to this question is “No.” Thus, what distinguishes
non-standard novels from biographies and other non-novelistic works is that unlike
the latter, non-standard novels were intended, by their authors, to be regarded in a
way similar to the way novelsr were correctly regarded.
31Cf. Levinson (1989) (in particular, his idea of extrinsic and intrinsic modes of artmaking).
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Given what has been said, “a non-standard novel” can be defined as follows:
Non-Standard Novel: For all x, x is a non-standard novel just in case x is:
• a novel in verse—a verbal object that (a) is written in verse, (b) has at
least n words, where n is a number in the 30,000 word range, (c) was
intended, by its author(s), to tell a story, (d) realizes this intention at
least to some extent, (e) was intended, by its author(s), to be regarded
in a way similar to the way novelsr were correctly regarded, and (f) is
self-standing;
• a nonfiction novel—a verbal object that (a) has at least n words, where n
is a number in the 30,000 word range, (b) was intended, by its author(s),
to tell a nonfiction story, (c) realizes this intention at least to some extent,
(d) was intended, by its author(s), to be regarded in a way similar to the
way novelsr were correctly regarded, and (e) is self-standing; or
• a graphic novel—an object that (a) is book-length, (b) is composed of
pictures and/or words that are organized in a comic-strip format, (c) was
intended, by its author(s), to tell a story, (d) realizes this intention at
least to some extent, (e) was intended, by its author(s), to be regarded
in a way similar to the way novelsr were correctly regarded, and (f) is
self-standing.
We are now in a position to answer the question posed at the beginning of this
section—namely, the question “Can’t the definition of ‘a novelr’ be modified so that
it could serve as a definition of ‘a novel’ simpliciter?” The answer to this question
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is “Yes”: The definition of “a novelr” can indeed be modified so that it could serve
as a definition of “a novel” simpliciter. To modify it that way, the definiens of “a
non-standard novel” should be added, as a disjunct, to the definiens of the definition
of “a novelr.” The result of this modification is the following definition:
Novel (DN): For all x, x is a novel if and only if x is:
• (1) a novelr—a verbal object that (a) is written, for the most part, in
prose, (b) has at least n words, where n is a number in the 30,000 word
range, (c) was intended, by its author(s), to tell a fictional story, (d)
realizes this intention at least to some extent, and (e) is self-standing; or
• (2) a non-standard novel, that is:
– a novel in verse—a verbal object that (a) is written in verse, (b) has
at least n words, where n is a number in the 30,000 word range,
(c) was intended, by its author(s), to tell a story, (d) realizes this
intention at least to some extent, (e) was intended, by its author(s),
to be regarded in a way similar to the way novelsr were correctly
regarded, and (f) is self-standing;
– a nonfiction novel—a verbal object that (a) has at least n words,
where n is a number in the 30,000 word range, (b) was intended,
by its author(s), to tell a nonfiction story, (c) realizes this intention
at least to some extent, (d) was intended, by its author(s), to be
regarded in a way similar to the way novelsr were correctly regarded,
and (e) is self-standing; or
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– a graphic novel—an object that (a) is book-length, (b) is composed
of pictures and/or words that are organized in a comic-strip format,
(c) was intended, by its author(s), to tell a story, (d) realizes this
intention at least to some extent, (e) was intended, by its author(s),
to be regarded in a way similar to the way novelsr were correctly
regarded, and (f) is self-standing.
Before proceeding further, it is worth making two remarks concerning the
foregoing definition (hereafter: “DN”). First, there is good reason to hold that DN
reflects the actual structure of the concept expressed by “a novel.” One of our
intuitions about novels is that some entities called “novels” are doubtless novels,
whereas other such entities do not seem entirely like novels. Consider novelsr: Pride
and Prejudice, War and Peace, Moby-Dick, etc. There is no doubt that each of
them is a novel. The same, however, cannot be said about non-standard novels.
Consider Eugene Onegin. Although it is categorized as a novel, it does not seem
like a novel (“How can it be a novel, given that it is written in verse? It’s a poem!”).
Or consider Maus. The consensus is that it is a novel. But, intuitively, it is not
(“How can it be a novel, given that it has a comic-strip format? It’s a comic
book!”). What has been said about Eugene Onegin and Maus can be said about
other non-standard novels as well. Thus, from an intuitive viewpoint, novelsr are
clearly novels, whereas the status of non-standard novels qua novels is dubious. In
light of this, there is good reason to hold that the concept expressed by “a novel” is
composed of two sub-concepts: (a) the (core) concept that covers novels like Pride
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and Prejudice, War and Peace, Moby-Dick, etc. and (b) the (peripheral) concept
that covers novels of a less traditional sort, such as Eugene Onegin and Maus. But
if this is so, then a definition of “a novel” reflects the structure of the concept of “a
novel” just in case the definiens of this definition is composed of two disjuncts that
express, respectively, the concept that covers novels like Pride and Prejudice, War
and Peace, Moby-Dick, etc. and the concept that covers novels of a less traditional
sort, such as Eugene Onegin and Maus. Meanwhile, the definiens of DN is, in fact,
composed of these disjuncts.
Second, DN has certain historical implications regarding the novel. One of
these implications is that the first novel came into existence in or before the I century
AD, long before the time when a considerable number of first paradigmatic novels
were written (the XVII–XVIII centuries). Consider Callirhoe—one of the so-called
“ancient Greek novels” that was written in the I century AD. It is a verbal object
that is written in prose, has more than 30,000 words, tells a fictional story, and,
clearly, was intended by its author, Chariton of Aphrodisias, to tell such a story.
So, according to DN, Callirhoe is a novel. As a result, if no entity created before
the I century falls under DN, then DN implies that the first novel was written in
the I century; if, on the other hand, there is an entity that was created before the
I century and falls under DN, then DN implies that the first novel was written
before the I century.
Another historical implication of DN is that non-standard novels—nonfiction
novels, novels in verse, and graphic novels—were not created before the tradition
of novelr writing came into existence. As mentioned above, to regard x in a way
39
similar to the way novelsr were correctly regarded, it is necessary to regard x with
at least some awareness of the tradition of novelr writing. Suppose now that this
tradition does not exist. Then x cannot be regarded in a way similar to the way
novelsr were correctly regarded—and, hence, cannot be intended to be regarded in
such a way.32 Meanwhile, according to DN, having been intended to be regarded in
a way similar to the way novelsr were correctly regarded is a necessary property of a
non-standard novel. Thus, if DN is true, then the creation of the first non-standard
novel took place after the tradition of novelr writing came into existence.
1.4 Objections
Let us now examine potential objections to DN.
As pointed out in Footnote 1, to define x (where x is some expression) is to
provide a sufficiently informative set of conditions that are satisfied by all entities
that fall under x and only by such entities. So a definition of x is satisfactory just in
case it is sufficiently informative and covers all and only those entities that fall under
x. In light of this, possible objections to DN can be divided into two groups: (a)
objections aimed at showing that DN is insufficiently informative and (b) objections
whose purpose is to demonstrate that DN is too broad (that is, covers entities that
are not novels) or too narrow (that is, does not cover some novels). Let us first
consider objections of group (a).
32The expression “can” here is used in the probabilistic (not the absolute) sense.
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1.4.1 Objections of Group (a)
Objection 1. The definiens of DN involves expressions containing the term
“novel”—namely, the expressions “a novelr,” “a non-standard novel,” “a novel in
verse,” “a nonfiction novel,” and “a graphic novel”—and, hence, implicitly contains
the concept of “a novel.” Meanwhile, if the definiens of a definition contains the
concept of the expression being defined, then this definition is insufficiently infor-
mative.
Response. Objection 1 assumes that the fact that the definiens of DN involves
the expressions “a novelr,” “a non-standard novel,” “a novel in verse,” “a nonfiction
novel,” and “a graphic novel” implies that this definiens contains the concept of “a
novel.” But this assumption is false. The foregoing fact implies that the definiens
of DN contains the concept of “a novel” only if at least one of the abovementioned
expressions is defined using the concept of “a novel.” But none of them is, in fact,
defined using this concept.
Objection 2. DN does not define the expressions “a story,” “fictional,” “verse,”
“book-length,” and “a comic-strip format.” Meanwhile, in order for this definition
to be sufficiently informative, it must define these expressions.
Response. Objection 2 assumes that to be sufficiently informative, DN must
define “a story,” “fictional,” “verse,” “book-length,” and “a comic-strip format.”
Why think that this assumption is true? One possible answer is that any sufficiently
informative definition must define all the expressions it involves. However, this
answer is unsatisfactory. Consider the following definition of “water”: For all x, x
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is water just in case x has the molecular structure H2O. This definition is doubtless
acceptable and, hence, is sufficiently informative. However, it does not provide the
definitions of “a molecular structure,” “H,” and “O.”
Furthermore, if a definition defines all the expressions it involves, then there
must be infinite chains of (non-circular) definitions. But such chains do not exist, as
some expressions are basic and, hence, indefinable. Thus, there is no definition that
defines all the expressions it involves. So if the answer being discussed is correct, no
definition is sufficiently informative, which is, of course, absurd.
Another potential answer is that a sufficiently informative definition must de-
fine all definable expressions—that is, expressions that can be defined using solely
basic expressions—and the expressions “a story,” “fictional,” “verse,” “book-length,”
and “a comic-strip format” are definable. But this answer also fails. Consider,
once again, the definition of “water”—“Water is H2O.” As already mentioned, it
is sufficiently informative. But it does not define the definable expressions that it
contains—for instance, the expressions “H2O” and “a molecular structure.”
Thus, neither answer is satisfactory. Meanwhile, there seems no other poten-
tially satisfactory answer to the question being discussed. Therefore, the assump-
tion involved in Objection 2—that to be sufficiently informative, DN must define
“a story,” “fictional,” “verse,” “book-length,” and “a comic-strip format”—can be
rejected.33
33What has been said above does not imply, of course, that the expressions “a story,” “fictional,”
“verse,” “book-length,” and “a comic-strip format” are not worth examining. An examination of
these expressions is doubtless worthwhile. Yet such an examination is beyond the scope of the
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1.4.2 Objections of Group (b)
Having examined the objections of group (a) (the objections aimed at showing
that DN is not sufficiently informative), let us now examine the objections of group
(b) (the objections aimed at showing that DN is too broad or too narrow).
Objection 3. Suppose there is an object O that (a) is verbal, (b) is written in
prose, (c) was intended, by its author, to tell a fictional story, (d) does, in fact, tell
such a story, and (e) is self-standing. Suppose next that O has 27,700 words. Is it
a novelr? An answer to this question depends on whether O ’s word count is in the
30,000 word range. Is O ’s word count, in fact, in this range? Intuition cannot help us
answer this question. It is not obvious that the number of words O has—27,700—is
not in the 30,000 word range; likewise, it is not obvious that this number is in this
range. At the same time, the answer to the foregoing question cannot be found using
some principle that precisely determines the lower bound of the 30,000 word range,
as, given the essential vagueness of this bound, no such principle exists. In light of
what has been said, there is good reason to hold that using DN, it is impossible
to establish whether O is a novelr. Meanwhile, if a definition cannot be used to
establish whether an object falls under the concept being defined, then according
to this definition, it is indeterminate whether this object falls under this concept.
Thus, DN entails that for some objects, their status as novels is indeterminate.
However, in fact, any entity is either clearly a novel or clearly a non-novel. So DN
either excludes from the extension of “a novel” some novels or fails to exclude from
current project.
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this extension some objects that are not novels.
Response. Objection 3 assumes that no entities are indeterminate qua novels.
However, this assumption is false. In fact, besides entities that are clearly novels
and entities that are clearly non-novels, there are also borderline cases—entities that
are neither clearly novels nor clearly non-novels.34
Objection 4. Consider the Iliad. It is a verbal object that has at least n words,
is written in verse, was intended by its author—Homer—to tell a story, and does,
in fact, tell a story. Furthermore, most likely, Homer intended it to be regarded in
a way similar to the way novelsr were correctly regarded. Thus, the Iliad seems to
fall under the definition of “a novel in verse” and, hence, under DN. But the Iliad
is not a novel.
Response. Objection 4 assumes that the Iliad satisfies all the conditions of
the definition of “a novel in verse.” Is this assumption true? The Iliad is doubtless
a verbal object that is written in verse, has at least n words, was intended by its
author to tell a story, and does, in fact, tell a story. But was the Iliad intended by
its author, Homer, to be regarded in a way similar to the way novelsr were correctly
regarded? Given what has been said in the previous section, in order for the Iliad to
have been intended, by Homer, to be regarded in such a way, he had to intend it to
34The same, by the way, can be said about other kinds of entities. Consider, for instance,
artworks in general. Surely, there are entities that are clearly artworks (the Mona Lisa, David,
Beethoven’s Symphony No. 5, Moby-Dick) and entities that are clearly non-art (humans, trees,
planets). But there are also entities that are neither clearly artworks nor clearly non-art—for
example, computer games.
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be regarded in a way that included the regard presupposing at least some awareness
of the tradition of novelr writing. But he could not have intended the Iliad to be
regarded in a way that included this regard—since the tradition of novelr writing did
not exist at that time. Thus, the Iliad was not intended, by Homer, to be regarded
in a way similar to the way novelsr were correctly regarded. But if this is so, then,
contrary to what Objection 4 assumes, the Iliad does not satisfy all the conditions
of the definition of “a novel in verse.”
Objection 5. According to DN, some works written before the XVII century
might be novels. However, the consensus is that the novel qua a genre—and, hence,
works of this genre—did not come into existence until the XVII century.
Response. The objection assumes that there is a generally accepted view
as to when the novel came into existence. Is this assumption true? There are
a considerable number of theorists who believe that the first European novel was
written in the XVII century.35 But there is no consensus as to when the first novel
simpliciter was written. Some theorists argue that it was written in the XVII
century (Cervantes’s Don Quixote). Others claim that it was written in the XI
century (Murasaki Shikibu’s The Tale of Genji). There are also theorists arguing
that the creation of the first novel dates back to the I–III centuries AD (the so-
called “ancient Greek novels”: Chariton’s Callirhoe, Achilles Tatius’s Leucippe and
Clitophon, Longus’s Daphnis and Chloe, Xenophon’s Ephesian Tale, and Heliodorus
35The view that the European novel was invented in the XVII century is not universally accepted,
however. Thus, Watt (1967) argues that the European novel was invented later—in the XVIII
century.
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of Emesa’s Aethiopica.) Thus, the foregoing assumption of Objection 5 is false.
Objection 6. Consider the Harry Potter series of novels. It is composed of
seven books, each of which is an n+ word verbal object written, for the most part,
in prose. Meanwhile, anything that is composed of n+ word verbal objects written,
for the most part, in prose is an n+ word verbal object written, for the most part,
in prose. So the Harry Potter series is such an object. Furthermore, this series
was intended by its author, J. K. Rowling, to tell a fictional story—the story about
Harry Potter—and this intention was successfully realized. Finally, the Harry Potter
series is doubtless a self-standing object. Thus, according to DN, the Harry Potter
series of novels is a novel. But this series is not a novel; it is a collection of novels.
Response. Objection 6 assumes that the Harry Potter series of novels is not
a novel. But this assumption, I think, can be rejected. Indeed, the Harry Potter
series is not normally categorized as a novel. Yet there seems no real reason against
categorizing this series as such.36 Furthermore, it is common for some analogous
series to be categorized as novels. Consider, for instance, Marcel Proust’s À la
recherche du temps perdu. Like the Harry Potter series, it is a series of novels. At
the same time, it is categorized as a novel.
Here, one might ask: Can any series of novels be categorized as a novel? The
answer to this question is “No.” To be categorized as a novel, a series of novels
must satisfy the conditions of DN. Meanwhile, not any series of novels satisfies
these conditions (consider, for instance, a series of novels that was not intended, by
36Note that categorizing the Harry Potter series of novels as a novel does not entail that this
series cannot be characterized as a collection of novels.
46
its author(s), to tell a story or a series of novels that tells several stories, and not a
(unified) story).
Objection 7. If DN is true, then a non-standard novel must be intended,
by its author(s), to be regarded in a way similar to the way novelsr are correctly
regarded. However, there is no real reason to hold that, say, In Cold Blood was, in
fact, intended, by its author, Truman Capote, to be regarded in such a way. So if
DN is true, then In Cold Blood is not a novel. But In Cold Blood is doubtless a
novel.
Response. Objection 7 is based on the idea that there is no real reason to hold
that In Cold Blood was, in fact, intended, by Capote, to be regarded in a way similar
to the way novelsr were correctly regarded. But this idea is highly questionable.
According to Capote, “a nonfiction novel” “employ[s] all the techniques of fictional
art but [is] nevertheless immaculately factual” (Plimpton, 1966). Now, there is little
doubt that by “fictional art” here, he means primarily the art of the traditional
novel, or novelr. So it can be said that according to Capote, a nonfiction novel is
to be regarded qua an entity that possesses the relevant features of a novelr except
the feature of having been intended, by the author(s), to tell a fictional story. But
if this is the case, then it is reasonable to suppose that in his view, a nonfiction
novel should be regarded in a way similar to the way novelsr are correctly regarded.
Meanwhile, if this supposition is true, then, given the fact that In Cold Blood is
explicitly characterized by Capote as a nonfiction novel,37 there is, in fact, a good
reason to think that he intended In Cold Blood to be regarded in a way similar to
37See Plimpton (1966).
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the way novelsr were correctly regarded.
Here, one could ask: Can’t Objection 7 be made successful by replacing In
Cold Blood with some other non-standard novel—in particular, some non-standard
novel that was not intended, by its author, to be regarded in a way similar to the
way novelsr were correctly regarded? I am not aware of any evidence that can be
used to show that there is an entity that (a) is clearly a non-standard novel but
(b) was not intended, by its author, to be regarded in a way similar to the way
novelsr were correctly regarded. At the same time, in an overwhelming majority of
cases, there is evidence suggesting that the author of a non-standard novel did, in
fact, intend this novel to be regarded in such a way.38 Taking this into account, the
foregoing question, I think, should be answered in the negative.
Objection 8. According to DN, a novel must be written. But there can be
unwritten novels—in particular, novels created by pronouncing certain words or in
one’s mind.
Response. As pointed out in Footnote 15, the expression “to write” is used
here in a broad sense—the sense according to which to write is to generate a text.
So, contrary to what Objection 8 implies, any novel created by pronouncing certain
words or in one’s mind is a written novel.
Objection 9. Suppose N is identical in semantic content to some novel—say,
E. B. White’s Charlotte’s Web (c. 33,500 words). Suppose next that N is written
in a language other than English. Finally, suppose that since this language makes it
38The most common piece of such evidence is the fact that the author explicitly characterized
his work as “a novel.”
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possible to communicate meanings in considerably fewer words than English, N has
c. 20,000 words. Then, since N ’s word count is not in the 30,000 word range, DN
entails that N is not a novel. However, given the fact that the semantic content of
N is the same as the semantic content of E. B. White’s Charlotte’s Web, there is
good reason to consider N a novel.
Response. Objection 9 assumes that N has c. 20,000 words. But this assump-
tion is false. As is clear from Footnote 13, a novel has x words just in case this novel
has x English words (it is written in English) or its English translation has x words
(it is written in a language other than English). So if N has c. 20,000 words, then,
given that N is not written in English, N ’s English translation must have c. 20,000
words. But, taking into account the fact that the language in which N is written
makes it possible to communicate meanings in considerably fewer words than the
English language does, as well as the fact that the semantic content of N is the same
as the semantic content of a 33,500 word English novel (E. B. White’s Charlotte’s
Web), N ’s translation must have c. 33,500 English words.
1.5 Final Remarks
Thus, none of the objections discussed in the previous section stands up to
criticism. Meanwhile, there seem to be no other potentially acceptable objections
to DN. In light of this, there is good reason to think that DN is both sufficiently
informative and covers all and only those entities that are, in fact, novels. But if
that is the case, then DN is a satisfactory definition of “a novel.”
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In closing, it is worth noting that the expressions “a novella” and “a short
story” can be defined in a way similar to the way “a novel” has been defined.
Consider first the expression “a novella.” It can be understood as referring to
novellasr (that is, novellas that are not nonfiction novellas, novellas in verse, or
graphic novellas) and non-standard novellas (that is, nonfiction novellas, novellas
in verse, and graphic novellas). Meanwhile, novellasr and non-standard novellas
are not that different from novelsr and non-standard novels, respectively. Novellasr
differ from novelsr in length: While the minimal word count of a novelr is in the
30,000 word range, the minimal word count of a novellar is, most likely, in the
15,000 word range.39 Also, while a novelr does not have a maximal word count (as
mentioned above, a novelr can be infinitely long), a novellar does have such a word
count—prima facie, it is in the 25,000 word range. As regards non-standard novellas,
they differ from non-standard novels in that unlike the latter, they are intended, by
their authors, to be regarded in a way similar to the way novellasr are correctly
regarded. Furthermore, non-standard novellas differ from non-standard novels in
length. Unlike the word count of nonfiction novels and novels in verse, the word
count of nonfiction novellas and novellas in verse seems to be in the 15,000–25,000
word range. And unlike the page count of graphic novels, the page count of graphic
novellas is, most likely, in the 40–70 page range.
Given what have been said, “a novella” could be defined as follows:
Novella: For all x, x is a novella if and only if x is:
39The given word range as well as the word and page ranges mentioned in what follows are
guesstimates and, hence, may well turn out to be inaccurate.
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• (1) a novellar—a verbal object that (a) is written, for the most part, in
prose, (b) has n words, where n is a number in the 15,000–25,000 word
range, (c) was intended, by its author(s), to tell a fictional story, (d)
realizes this intention at least to some extent, and (e) is self-standing; or
• (2) a non-standard novella, that is:
– a novella in verse—a verbal object that (a) is written in verse, (b)
has n words, where n is a number in the 15,000–25,000 word range,
(c) was intended, by its author(s), to tell a story, (d) realizes this
intention at least to some extent, (e) was intended, by its author(s),
to be regarded in a way similar to the way novellasr were correctly
regarded, and (f) is self-standing;
– a nonfiction novella—a verbal object that (a) has n words, where n is
a number in the 15,000–25,000 word range, (b) was intended, by its
author(s), to tell a nonfiction story, (c) realizes this intention at least
to some extent, (d) was intended, by its author(s), to be regarded in
a way similar to the way novellasr were correctly regarded, and (e)
is self-standing; or
– a graphic novella—an object that (a) has at least m pages, where
m is a number in the 40–70 page range, (b) is composed of pictures
and/or words organized in a comic-strip format, (c) was intended,
by its author(s), to tell a story, (d) realizes this intention at least to
some extent, (e) was intended, by its author(s), to be regarded in a
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way similar to the way novellasr were correctly regarded, and (f) is
self-standing.
Consider now the expression “a short story.” It can be understood as referring
to short storiesr (that is, short stories that are not nonfiction short stories, short
stories in verse, or graphic short stories) and non-standard short stories (that is,
nonfiction short stories, short stories in verse, and graphic short stories). Like
novellasr and non-standard novellas, short storiesr and non-standard short stories
do not differ considerably from novelsr and non-standard novels, respectively. Short
storiesr differ from novelsr in length: Unlike the minimal word count of a novelr,
the minimal word count of a short storyr amounts to a few words. Also, while a
novelr does not have a maximal word count, a short storyr does have such a word
count—prima facie, it is in the 15,000 word range. As regards non-standard short
stories, they differ from non-standard novels in the way they are intended, by their
authors, to be regarded: Unlike non-standard novels, non-standard short stories are
intended to be regarded, by their authors, in a way similar to the way short storiesr
are correctly regarded. Furthermore, non-standard short stories differ from non-
standard novels in length. Unlike the word count of nonfiction novels and novels in
verse, the word count of nonfiction short stories and short stories in verse seems to
be in the 2–15,000 word range. And unlike the page count of graphic novels, the
page count of graphic short stories is, most likely, in the 1–40 page range.
In light of what has been said, “a short story” can be defined as follows:
Short story: For all x, x is a short story if and only if x is:
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• (1) a short storyr—a verbal object that (a) is written, for the most part,
in prose, (b) has n words, where n is a number in the 2–15,000 word
range, (c) was intended, by its author(s), to tell a fictional story, (d)
realizes this intention at least to some extent, and (e) is self-standing; or
• (2) a non-standard short story, that is:
– a short story in verse—a verbal object that (a) is written in verse, (b)
has n words, where n is a number in the 2–15,000 word range, (c) was
intended, by its author(s), to tell a story, (d) realizes this intention
at least to some extent, (e) was intended, by its author(s), to be
regarded in a way similar to the way short storiesr were correctly
regarded, and (f) is self-standing;
– a nonfiction short story—a verbal object that (a) has n words, where
n is a number in the 2–15,000 word range, (b) was intended, by its
author(s), to tell a nonfiction story, (c) realizes this intention at least
to some extent, (d) was intended, by its author(s), to be regarded in
a way similar to the way short storiesr were correctly regarded, and
(e) is self-standing; or
– a graphic short story—an object that (a) has at least m pages, where
m is a number in the 1–40 page range, (b) is composed of pictures
and/or words organized in a comic-strip format, (c) was intended,
by its author(s), to tell a story, (d) realizes this intention at least to
some extent, (e) was intended, by its author(s), to be regarded in a
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way similar to the way short storiesr were correctly regarded, and (f)
is self-standing.
Now, a natural question arises: Are the foregoing definitions of “a novella”
and “a short story” satisfactory? Answering this question requires a substantial
analysis of these definitions. Such an analysis, however, goes beyond the scope of
this dissertation.
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Chapter 2: Defining “an Instance of an Artwork”
Introduction
My goal in this chapter is to define “an instance of an artwork” as well as
some derivative expressions—in particular, “a well-formed instance of an artwork”
and “a non-well-formed instance of an artwork.”1 I begin with an exposition and
defense of Davies (2010)’s definition of “an instance of an artwork” (Sections 2.1
and 2.2). Next, I elaborate on this definition by defining “a well-formed instance of
an artwork” and “a non-well-formed instance of an artwork” (Sections 2.3 and 2.4).
Finally, I make a few additional remarks concerning the expression “an instance
of an artwork.” In particular, I define “a token of an artwork,” which is closely
related to “an instance of an artwork,” examine certain ontological implications of
the definition of “an instance of an artwork,” and provide an alternative formulation
of this definition (Section 2.5).
1For the purposes of this dissertation, there is no need to define “an instance of an artwork” and
its derivatives in all contexts; it is sufficient to define them only in the context of the ontology of
artworks. Given this, in what follows, the expression “an instance of an artwork” and its derivatives
are assumed to be located solely within the mentioned context.
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2.1 Defining “an Instance of an Artwork”
How can “an instance of an artwork” be defined? To my knowledge, the
most detailed, and the only explicit, answer to this question has been given by
Davies (2010). In his view, “an instance of an artwork” can be used in two distinct
senses—the purely epistemic and the provenential—and so the question posed above
amounts to two questions: “How can ‘an instance of an artwork’ used in the purely
epistemic sense (hereafter: ‘an instancee of an artwork’) be defined?” and “How can
‘an instance of an artwork’ used in the provenential sense (hereafter: ‘an instancep
of an artwork’) be defined?” The former question, according to Davies (2010), can
be answered as follows: For all x, x is an instancee of an artwork just in case x
“makes manifest to receivers certain properties that bear experientially upon the
appreciation of the work” (Davies, 2010, 415). Or, in other words: For all x, x is an
instancee of an artwork if and only if x manifests certain properties that must be
experienced to fully appreciate this work.2
Regarding this definition, a natural question arises: What is meant by the
expression “to manifest a property”? Given what Davies (2010) says, and taking
into account the standard linguistic practices present in the philosophical literature,
this expression can be defined as follows: For all x, x manifests a property just in
case this property is apprehensible by directly perceiving x—that is, by perceiving x
with the help of one or more of our sensory faculties (such as sight (vision), hearing
(audition), taste (gustation), smell (olfaction), and touch (somatosensation)).
2The question of what these “certain” properties are is addressed later in the chapter.
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Note that the only thing that determines whether an entity manifests a prop-
erty is whether this property can be apprehended by perceiving this entity with the
help of at least one sensory faculty. Thus, a red apple manifests the property of
being red—since this property can be apprehended by perceiving this apple with
the help of the faculty of sight. At the same time, an apple produced in Florida does
not manifest the property of being produced in Florida—for, this property cannot
be apprehended by perceiving this apple with the help of any sensory faculties.
Note also that manifesting a property is not equivalent to having this property.
For, an object can have a property without manifesting it. Thus, an apple produced
in Florida has the property of being produced in Florida but, as mentioned above,
does not manifest this property. Similarly, a musical score has the property of
sounding a particular way but does not manifest this property. (If it did, then at
least some sonic properties could be apprehended by perceiving it with the help of a
sensory faculty. However, no sonic property can be apprehended that way. In order
for this to be possible, it must be possible to hear a musical score. But no musical
score can be heard, since (a) (strictly speaking) only sounds can be heard, and (b)
a musical score is not a sound (rather, it is a concrete sequence of notes and other
symbols).3)
Having clarified the expression “to manifest a property,” let us return to Davies
(2010)’s definition of “an instancee of an artwork”—the definition according to which
3Of course, we can meaningfully say that a musical score can be heard. But when we say this,
we do not mean that this score can literally be heard; what we mean is that the sounds generated
with its help (or perhaps the sounds it encodes) can be heard.
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an instancee of an artwork is whatever manifests certain properties that must be
experienced to fully appreciate this work. It is important to underline that the
set of properties that, according to this definition, an instancee of an artwork must
manifest does not necessarily involve all the properties that must be experienced to
fully appreciate this work. Thus, consider Alexander Ivanov’s painting The Appari-
tion of Christ Before the People. It is reasonable to assume that to fully appreciate
this painting, it is necessary to learn about the process of creating this painting.
Meanwhile, learning about this process is impossible without engaging experien-
tially with at least some of the properties of Ivanov’s preparatory sketches.4 Thus,
experiencing these properties is requisite for a full appreciation of The Apparition
of Christ Before the People. But they cannot be possessed by any instance of The
Apparition of Christ Before the People—the original canvas (and perhaps certain
very good copies of this canvas)—and, hence, cannot be manifested by an instance
of this painting.
Or consider Beethoven’s Symphony No. 5. It can be plausibly argued that a
complete appreciation of this symphony requires an experiential engagement with
those experienceable properties that enable to grasp the history of its composition.
At the same time, these properties cannot be possessed by any of the instances of
Symphony No. 5—particular musical performances—and, hence, cannot be mani-
fested by an instance of this symphony.
Thus, the set of properties manifested by an instancee of an artwork does not
4This is not to say, of course, that learning about the creative process leading up to an artwork—
all the stops and starts, all the false turns, etc.—is always requisite to full appreciation.
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necessarily involve all the properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate
this work. But what, then, determines whether a property that must be expe-
rienced to fully appreciate an artwork must be manifested by an instancee of this
work? According to Davies (2010), what determines that is whether such a property
falls under the category of properties through which the primary content5—that is,
the set of “those contentful properties that may be the ground of other contentful
properties but which are not themselves grounded in contentful properties” (Davies,
2010, 411)6—of the work is articulated: If the property falls under this category,
then it must be manifested by an instancee; otherwise, the property does not have
to be manifested by this instancee.
Given what has been said—and assuming that the expression “primary prop-
erties” denotes properties through which the primary content of an artwork is
articulated—Davies (2010)’s definition of “an instancee of an artwork” can be for-
mulated more precisely as follows:
Instancee: For all x, x is an instancee of an artwork if and only if x manifests certain
primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate this work.
Note that the only thing that matters for being an instancee of an artwork is
manifesting the relevant primary properties that must be experienced to fully ap-
preciate this work: As long as an entity manifests such properties, it is an instancee
5The term “content” is used here in a broad sense—to refer to the overall artistic content (and
not just to the semantic content).
6Alternatively, the primary content of an artwork can be characterized as the set of the basic
properties that determine the content of this work.
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of the corresponding work. Thus, consider, for example, the original canvas of Kaz-
imir Malevich’s Black Square and its indiscernible counterpart7 that was created
by someone completely unfamiliar with Malevich’s works. Since both the canvas
and the counterpart manifest the same properties, they are both instancese of Black
Square. Likewise, both a correct recitation of R. L. Stevenson’s “To Friends at
Home” and its indiscernible counterpart produced by someone who has never en-
countered Stevenson’s poetry manifest the same properties and so are instancese of
this poem.8
Let us now turn to the question “How can ‘an instancep of an artwork’ be de-
fined?” This question, according to Davies (2010), can be answered in the following
way: For all x, x is an instancep of an artwork if and only if x is an instancee that is
related, in an appropriate historical-intentional respect, to this work. Or, in other
words:
Instancep: For all x, x is an instancep of an artwork if and only if x (a) manifests
certain primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate this
work and (b) stands in an appropriate historical-intentional relation to it.
It is worth stressing that unlike being an instancee, being an instancep of an
artwork requires not only manifesting certain primary properties that must be expe-
7Following Fisher (1995), I define “an indiscernible counterpart” as follows: For all x and for all
y, x is an indiscernible counterpart of y if and only if x and y share all of their manifest properties
(where a property is manifest just in case it is manifested by something).
8It is assumed that the original canvas of Black Square and the recitation of the poem “To
Friends at Home” manifest the relevant primary properties that must be experienced to fully
appreciate the corresponding works.
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rienced to fully appreciate this work but also standing in an appropriate historical-
intentional relation to this work. Thus, an indiscernible counterpart of Malevich’s
Black Square that was created by someone completely unfamiliar with Malevich’s
works is not an instancep of Black Square, since this counterpart does not stand in
any appropriate historical-intentional relation to this painting. Similarly, an indis-
cernible counterpart of a recitation of Stevenson’s “To Friends at Home” produced
by someone who has never encountered Stevenson’s poetry is not an instancep of
“To Friends at Home” because this counterpart does not stand in any appropriate
historical-intentional relation to this poem.
Regarding the definition of “an instancep of an artwork,” a natural question
arises: What exactly is the appropriate historical-intentional relation to an artwork
in which an instancep of this work must stand?
9 An answer to this question can vary
depending on what kind of art is under consideration. In the case of classical music,
the historical-intentional relation to an artwork in which an instancep of this work
stands is usually understood as the relation of being identical to a performance of
this work generated with the help of either the original score (i.e., the score directly
created—say, written or typed—by the composer) or an entity that stands in the
“copy” relation to this score (where x stands in the “copy” relation to y just in
case x is a copy of y, or x is a copy of a copy of y, or x is a copy of a copy of a
copy of y, and so on).10 In the case of photographic art, the historical-intentional
9Davies (2010) leaves this question open. So the following is not part of his account of “an
instance of an artwork.”
10If this treatment is correct, then “an instancep of a work of classical music” can be defined as
follows: For all x, x is an instancep of a work of classical music if and only if x (a) manifests certain
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relation to an artwork in which an instancep of this work stands is usually taken to
be the relation of being identical to a print derived from particular photographic film
created by the author.11 In the case of painting, the historical-intentional relation
to an artwork in which an instancep of this work stands is typically treated as the
relation of being identical to the original canvas.12,13 And in the case of literature,
the consensus is that the historical-intentional relation to an artwork in which an
instancep of this work stands is the relation of being identical to the work’s original
manuscript or an entity that stands in the “copy” relation to this manuscript.14
primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate this work and (b) stands in the
relation of being identical to the work’s performance generated with the help of a score that is
either the original score (i.e., the score directly created by the composer) or an entity that stands
in the “copy” relation to this original score.
11If this treatment is correct, then “an instancep of a photographic work” can be defined as
follows: For all x, x is an instancep of a photographic work if and only if x (a) manifests certain
primary experienceable properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate this work and (b)
stands in the relation of being identical to a print derived from particular photographic film created
by the work’s author.
12If this treatment is correct, the definition of “an instancep of a painting” can be formulated
as follows: For all x, x is an instancep of a painting if and only if x (a) manifests certain primary
properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate this painting and (b) stands in the relation
of being identical to the canvas.
13According to a widely endorsed view, a painting is identical to its canvas. If this view is true,
then the relation here is that of being identical to the painting.
14If this treatment is correct, then the definition of “an instancep of a painting” can be formulated
as follows: For all x, x is an instancep of a literary work if and only if x (a) manifests certain primary
properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate this work and (b) stands in the relation of
being identical to the work’s original manuscript or an entity that stands in the “copy” relation to
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It should be noted that the foregoing interpretations of the appropriate historical-
intentional relation to an artwork in which an instancep of this work must stand
are not claimed to be correct. In fact, although these interpretations are widely
accepted, they may well be misguided. The interpretation provided in the case
of classical music implies that an instancep of a musical work must be a perfor-
mance. But why can’t an instance of a musical work be something other than a
performance—say, a playing of a recording of a performance or a reproduction of a
performance (that is, a particular sequence of sounds generated by some electronic
device with the help of a musical score)? Similar questions arise with regard to the
interpretations given in the case of painting and photographic art. According to
the interpretation given in the case of painting, a painting has only one instance,
namely the canvas. But why can’t a painting be instanced not only by its canvas
but also by something else—say, certain copies (for example, molecule-for-molecule
duplicates) of this canvas? The interpretation provided in the case of photographic
art assumes that the only instances of photographic artworks are prints. But why
can’t photographic artworks be properly instanced by things other than prints—
say, copies of prints? Finally, it can be questioned whether the interpretation given
in the case of literary works is right in identifying instances of literary works with
either original manuscripts or their copies.15 (Note that what has been said here
is not intended to show that the mentioned interpretations are, in fact, misguided.
this manuscript.
15In the following chapter, I provide an argument showing that this interpretation is actually
wrong in doing that.
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The goal is to suggest that these interpretations could be misguided.)
2.2 Evaluating the Definition
As pointed out in Chapter 1,16 a definition of an expression is satisfactory just
in case this definition is sufficiently informative and covers all and only those entities
that fall under this expression. In light of this, Davies (2010)’s definition can be
rejected on the grounds that it is insufficiently informative or on the grounds that it
does not cover all and only those entities that fall under “an instance of an artwork.”
There seems no real reason to question the sufficiency of the informativeness of
Davies (2010)’s definition. However, one could question whether this definition
covers all and only those entities that fall under “an instance of an artwork.” In
particular, one could argue as follows. Suppose some entity E makes available for
experience the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate some
artwork A (where y makes x available for experience just in case y makes it possible
to experientially engage with x either by directly perceiving x or by perceiving x as
a result of applying a special skill, or, in other words, a skill that is not acquired
in a natural way (such as the skill of reading or the skill of playing a musical
instrument)). Suppose next that E does not manifest these properties. Then Davies
(2010)’s definition entails that E is not an instance of A. Is this entailment true?
Given the actual use of the expression “an instance of an artwork,” (a) to be an
instancee of an artwork, it is sufficient to make available for experience the primary
16See Chapter 1, Footnote 1.
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properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate this work, and (b) to be
an instancep of an artwork, it is sufficient (i) to make available for experience the
primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate this work and (ii) to
stand in an appropriate historical-intentional relation to this work. In light of this, E
is an instancee of A. Moreover, assuming that E stands in an appropriate historical-
intentional relation to A, E is an instancep of A. Thus, the foregoing entailment is
false—and, as a result, Davies (2010)’s definition fails to cover all of those entities
that fall under “an instance of an artwork.”
This objection is based on the thesis that the actual use of the expression
“an instance of an artwork” supports the account of “an instance of an artwork”
according to which (a) if x makes available for experience the primary properties
that must be experienced to fully appreciate an artwork, then x is an instancee of
this work, and (b) if x (i) makes available for experience the primary properties that
must be experienced to fully appreciate an artwork and (ii) stands in an appropriate
historical-intentional relation to it, then x is an instancep of this work. Is this thesis
true? Suppose there is a musical score S such that by applying to it a particular
special skill—namely, the skill of silent score reading—one can imagine, and, hence,
experientially engage with, a performance of S that manifests the primary proper-
ties that must be experienced to fully appreciate the corresponding musical work
M.17 Then S makes available for experience the primary properties that must be
experienced to fully appreciate M. Furthermore, it can be assumed that S stands in
an appropriate historical-intentional relation to M. Given this, if the foregoing ac-
17Many musical scores are too complex for score reading. So S is not any musical score.
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count of “an instance of an artwork” is true, then S is an instancep/e of M. However,
this result does not correspond to the actual use of the expression “an instance of
an artwork,” since according to this use, scores of musical works are not instances
of these works (the consensus is that instances of musical works are solely musical
performances (as well as perhaps their surrogates—playings of recordings of musical
performances)).
Alternatively, that the foregoing account of “an instance of an artwork” does
not accord with the actual use of the expression “an instance of an artwork” can
be shown as follows. Suppose there is a verbal description V of some very simple
drawing D—say, a drawing of a black square. Suppose also that by applying a
special skill—namely, the skill of reading—to V, one can mentally form, and, hence,
experientially engage with, an accurate image of D—an image that makes it possible
to perceptually grasp the primary properties that must be experienced to fully
appreciate D. Then V makes available for experience the primary properties that
must be experienced to fully appreciate D. Furthermore, it can be assumed that V
stands in an appropriate historical-intentional relation to B. Thus, if the definition
of “an instance of an artwork” being discussed is true, then V is an instancep/e of
B. However, this does not accord with the actual use of the expression “an instance
of an artwork,” since according to this use, no verbal description of a drawing is an
instance of this drawing.
Thus, the foregoing alternative account of “an instance of an artwork” contra-
dicts the actual use of the expression “an instance of an artwork.” As a result, the
thesis that the actual use of this expression supports this account is false. Mean-
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while, if this thesis is false, then, since, as already mentioned, the objection being
discussed is based on this thesis, this objection fails.
Are there any other potentially successful objections to the idea that Davies
(2010)’s definition covers all and only those entities that fall under “an instance of an
artwork”? No—or so it seems. As a result, given that, as already mentioned, there
are no potentially successful objections to the idea that Davies (2010)’s definition
is sufficiently informative, there seems no reason to reject this definition. At the
same time, there is reason to consider it satisfactory. First, as already mentioned, it
seems to satisfy one of the criteria of a successful definition—that of being sufficiently
informative. Furthermore, there is reason to hold that it also satisfies the second
criterion—that of covering all and only those entities that fall under the expression
being defined. As pointed out in Footnote 1, the expression “an instance of an
artwork” is assumed to be located within a particular context—namely, the context
of the ontology of artworks. So Davies (2010)’s definition reflects the actual use
of this expression if it reflects this use by ontologists of art. Does Davies (2010)’s
definition reflect the latter use? The answer to this question, I think, is “Yes.”
Many ontologists of art—including, Currie (1989), Danto (1981), Davies (2003b),
Levinson (1980), Nannicelli (2013), and Wollheim (1980)—use the expression “an
instance of an artwork” according to the provenential version of the definition, with
regard to all artworks. At the same time, a number of ontologists of art use this
expression according to the purely epistemic version of the definition, with regard
to at least some artworks. For example, Dodd (2000) uses it that way when he
talks about instances of musical works, and Goodman and Elgin (1987) use it that
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way with regard to instances of notational artworks (such as literary and musical
works).18
Thus, Davies (2010)’s definition seems to reflect the actual use of the expression
“instance of an artwork.” Meanwhile, if this is so, then there is reason to think that
this definition covers all and only those entities that fall under “an instance of an
artwork.”
2.3 Defining “a Well-Formed Instance of an Artwork”
Davies (2010)’s account of “an instance of an artwork” can be elaborated
further. Note that this account does not specify whether an instancep/e of an artwork
is capable of manifesting all the primary properties that must be experienced to
fully appreciate this work. Can such an instancep/e (in principle) manifest all such
properties? Apparently, the only plausible reason to answer “No” is that there are no
entities capable of manifesting all the primary properties that must be experienced
to fully appreciate artworks. But this reason is unsatisfactory. If there are no entities
capable of manifesting all the primary properties that must be experienced to fully
appreciate artworks, then no artwork can be fully appreciated. But this consequence
is doubtless false. A complete appreciation of an artwork may be hard, but in an
overwhelming majority of cases, it is, at least in principle, possible.19
So there seems no real reason to think that an instancep/e of an artwork cannot
18At the same time, according to Goodman and Elgin (1987), non-notational (analog) artworks,
such as etchings and paintings, have instancesp, not instancese.
19This is not to say, of course, that every artwork can be fully appreciated.
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manifest all the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate this
work. At the same time, there is a good reason to uphold the opposite thesis—that
an instancep/e of an artwork can, in principle, manifest all of these properties. The
reason is that according to the consensus among ontologists of art, for most (though
not all) artworks, there, in fact, existed, exist now, or will exist instancesp/e that
manifest all the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate
these works. Thus, taking into account what has been said, it is reasonable to
conclude that there can be instancesp/e of an artwork that are capable of manifesting
all the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate this work.
Given the foregoing result, we are justified in adding to Davies (2010)’s account
the definition of “an instancep/e that can manifest all the primary properties that
must be experienced to fully appreciate the corresponding artwork”—or, in other
words, the definition of “a well-formed instancep/e of an artwork”:
20
Well-formed instancee: For all x, x is a well-formed instancee of an artwork if and
only if x manifests all the primary properties that must be experienced to fully
appreciate this work.
Well-formed instancep: For all x, x is a well-formed instancep of an artwork if and
only if x (a) manifests all the primary properties that must be experienced
to fully appreciate this work and (b) stands in an appropriate historical-
intentional relation to it.
20This kind of instancep/e could also be characterized as “strict,” or “genuine,” or “perfect,” or
“ideal.”
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2.4 Defining “a Non-Well-Formed Instance of an Artwork”
The only difference between well-formed instancesp/e of an artwork and instancesp/e
of an artwork is that well-formed instancesp/e manifest all the primary properties
that must be experienced to fully appreciate the work, whereas instancesp/e manifest
certain primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate the work.
In light of this, one might ask: Are the class of instancesp/e and the class of well-
formed instancesp/e coextensive? Put otherwise, are all instancesp/e well-formed?
Consider a slightly damaged print of a photograph or a musical performance that
contains one incorrect note. Clearly, neither the performance nor the print provide
access to all the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate the
corresponding works. But, at the same time, both the print and the performance
provide access to a significant set of such properties. As a result, it seems reasonable
to think that both of them can be (a) non-well-formed instancese and—assuming
that each of them can stand in an appropriate historical-intentional relation to the
corresponding work—(b) non-well-formed instancesp. And, in fact, most ontologists
of art do think so. Given this, the above question, I think, should be answered in
the negative.
In light of the fact that the class of instancesp/e is not exhausted by well-formed
instancesp/e, a natural question arises: How can “a non-well-formed instancep/e of an
artwork” be defined? As is clear from what has been said in the previous paragraph,
a non-well-formed instancep/e of an artwork manifests only some of the primary
properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate this work. Can this fact
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alone be used to define “a non-well-formed instancep/e of an artwork”? No—for there
are entities that (a) manifest only some primary properties that must be experienced
to fully appreciate an artwork but (b) are not instancesp/e of this work. Consider,
for example, a black and white image of a color painting. Such an image cannot
manifest any color properties. Meanwhile, such properties are doubtless among the
primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate any color artwork.
So a black and white image cannot manifest all the primary properties that must
be experienced to fully appreciate a color painting. But such an image doubtless
can manifest some of these properties—for example, those that are concerned with
the shapes of what is depicted in this painting. Thus, a black and white image
can manifest some of the properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate a
color painting. At the same time, as is generally agreed, no such image can be an
instancep/e of such a painting.
So what distinguishes non-well-formed instancesp/e of artworks from entities
that are not such instances? Taking into account the art-ontological context, this
question, I think, can be answered as follows: Unlike entities that are not instancesp/e
of artworks, non-well-formed instancesp/e of artworks (a) manifest sufficiently many,
though not all, of the primary properties that must be experienced to fully ap-
preciate these works and (b) can, in principle, manifest all sensory kinds of such
properties (by “a sensory kind of properties” is meant any kind of properties that is
relevantly concerned with a sensory modality—for example, visual properties (i.e.,
properties related to vision), auditory properties (i.e., properties related to hear-
ing), and olfactory properties (i.e., properties related to olfaction)). Given this, “a
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non-well-formed instance of an artwork” can be defined as follows:
Non-well-formed instancee: For all x, x is a non-well-formed instancee of an artwork
just in case x (a) manifests sufficiently many, though not all, of the primary
properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate this work and (b)
could, in principle, manifest all sensory kinds of such properties.
Non-well-formed instancep: For all x, x is a non-well-formed instancep of an artwork
just in case x (a) manifests sufficiently many, though not all, of the primary
properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate this work, (b) could,
in principle, manifest all sensory kinds of such properties, and (c) stands in
an appropriate historical-intentional relation to this work.
Note that one of the features that any non-well-formed instancep/e must pos-
sess is the feature of being, in principle, capable of manifesting all sensory kinds
of the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate the corre-
sponding artwork. Thus, a performance of a musical work that contains an incorrect
note but can, in principle, manifest all sensory kinds of these properties can be a
non-well-formed instancep/e of this work. At the same time, given some plausible
assumptions, a playing of an audio recording of a live performance of a work of
classical music cannot be a non-well-formed instancep/e of at least some classical
musical works. Such a playing, being non-visual, cannot, in principle, manifest any
visual properties.21 Meanwhile, the primary properties that must be experienced to
21Note that what is said here applies only to playings of “audio only” (non-video) recordings.
Perhaps playings of audio-video recordings—recordings that capture both the sonic and the visual
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fully appreciate a work of classical music often include certain visual properties.22
So in some cases, a playing of an audio recording of a live performance of a work
of classical music cannot manifest all sensory kinds of the primary properties that
must be experienced to fully appreciate this work.
Likewise, a soundless screening cannot be a non-well-formed instancep/e of a
sound film. The primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate
such a film include particular sonic properties. But no soundless screening can
manifest any such properties. So no such screening can manifest all sensory kinds
of the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate a sound film.
Here, one could object as follows. The foregoing definition implies that being,
in principle, capable of manifesting all sensory kinds of the primary properties that
must be experienced to fully appreciate an artwork is necessary to be a non-well-
formed instance of this work. However, this implication is false. There can be
non-well-formed instances that can manifest only some of the sensory kinds of the
mentioned properties.
Is this objection successful? It assumes that it is possible for a non-well-
formed instance of an artwork to be incapable of manifesting all sensory kinds of
the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate this work. This
assumption, however, is problematic. According to a widely accepted view, non-
aspects of a performance—can manifest all the primary properties that must be experienced to
fully appreciate the corresponding works. For a discussion of this possibility, see Mag Uidhir
(2007).
22For evidence that can be used to support this claim, see Bergeron and Lopes (2009), S. Davies
(2001), Kivy (2002), Mag Uidhir (2007), and Nanay (2012).
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well-formed instances of artworks are slightly incorrect well-formed instances of
these works. Meanwhile, a slightly incorrect well-formed instance of an artwork
is doubtless capable of manifesting all sensory kinds of the primary properties that
must be experienced to fully appreciate this work. So if the abovementioned view
is true—and there seems no reason to think otherwise—non-well-formed instances
of artworks must be, in principle, capable of manifesting all sensory kinds of the
primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate these works.
Here is another consideration against the assumption being discussed. If this
assumption is true, then there must be non-well-formed instances that are, in prin-
ciple, incapable of manifesting all the sensory kinds of the primary properties that
must be experienced to fully appreciate the corresponding artworks. What entities
could serve as such instances? Here are some possible candidates:
(a) a silent screening of a sound film
(b) a playing of the sound of a film
(c) a silent performance of a sound play
(d) a purely sonic performance of a play
(e) a purely sonic performance of a musical
(f) a silent performance of a musical
But can (a)–(f), in fact, serve as non-well-formed instances that are, in principle,
incapable of manifesting all the sensory kinds of the primary properties that must be
experienced to fully appreciate the corresponding artworks? To be such instances,
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(a)–(f) must satisfy two conditions. First, they must be, in principle, incapable
of manifesting at least one sensory kind of the primary properties that must be
experienced to fully appreciate the corresponding artworks. Second, they must
manifest sufficiently many, but not all, of these properties. There is no doubt that
(a)–(f) satisfy the first condition. But do they satisfy the second one? Prima
facie, (a)–(f) can manifest sufficiently many of the primary properties that must
be experienced to fully appreciate the corresponding artworks only if perceiving
(a)–(f) enables us to adequately (though, of course, not fully) appreciate these
works. However, we cannot adequately appreciate a film solely by watching its
silent screening or by listening to its sound; likewise, we are unable to adequately
appreciate an (audible) play or a musical just by watching their silent performances
or just by listening to the sound of their performances. Thus, there is good reason
to hold that (a)–(f) do not manifest sufficiently many primary properties that must
be experienced to fully appreciate the corresponding artworks. Meanwhile, if this is
so, then (a)–(f) cannot be non-well-formed instances.
Now, what has been said about (a)–(f) can, I think, be said about any other
potential candidates for the role of non-well-formed instances that are, in principle,
incapable of manifesting all the sensory kinds of the primary properties that must
be experienced to fully appreciate the corresponding artworks. So there are no
non-well-formed instances that are, in principle, incapable of that—and, hence, the
assumption being discussed is false.
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2.5 Additional Remarks
In closing, a few additional remarks.
Remark 1. In the philosophical literature, there is an expression that is closely
related to “an instance of an artwork”—namely, “a token of an artwork.” This latter
expression can be defined as follows: For all x, x is a token of an artwork just in
case (a) this work is a type (where a type can understood as an entity that can have
multiple instancesp/e) and (b) x is its instancep/e.
Remark 2. The account presented in Sections 2.1–2.3 has certain implications
with regard to the existence and identity conditions of artworks. Suppose this
account is true. Then:
(1) The existence of an instancep/e of an artwork entails that this work exists.
Substantiation. Suppose there is an instancep/e of some artwork A. Then A
can be adequately appreciated. But if this is so, then there is no real reason
to deny the existence of A.
(2) The fact that an instancep/e of an artwork does not exist does not entail that
this work does not exist.23
Substantiation. Suppose there is no performance, reproduction of a perfor-
mance, or playing of a recording of a performance of some musical work M.
23This does not imply, of course, that any artwork can exist if none of its instancesp/e exist.
According to a widely accepted view, a painting is identical to its only instancep/e—the canvas. If
this view is correct, then a painting cannot exist if no instancesp/e of this painting exist.
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Then there are no instancesp/e of M. Suppose next that there is an encoding
of M —say, a copy of M ’s score or a recording of a performance of M. Does M
exist in this case? Prima facie, the answer is “Yes.” M exists qua an entity
that is, in some sense, contained in that encoding. Thus, a musical work can
exist even if there are no instancesp/e of this work.
(3) If (a) there is an instancep of some artwork A and an instancep of some art-
work B and (b) these instances (i) manifest the same primary properties that
must be experienced to fully appreciate A and B and (ii) stand in the same
historical-intentional relation to A, then A is identical to B.
Substantiation. Suppose there is an instancep of some artwork A and an
instancep of some artwork B. Suppose next that these instances (i) manifest
the same primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate A
and B and (ii) stand in the same appropriate historical-intentional relation
to A. Then, since nothing can stand in an appropriate historical-intentional
relation to more than one artwork, both of them must be instancesp of one
and the same work. But if this is so, then A must be identical to B.
(4) The fact that (a) there is an instancee of some work A and an instancee of some
work B and that (b) these instances manifest the same primary properties that
must be experienced to fully appreciate A and B does not entail that A and
B are identical.
Substantiation. Consider Brahms’s Piano Sonata Opus 2 (1852) and an (imag-
inary) “work identical with it in sound structure, but written by Beethoven”
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(Levinson, 1980, 12).
Brahms’s Piano Sonata Opus 2 (1852), an early work, is strongly
Liszt-influenced, as any perceptive listener can discern. However,
[the] work identical with it in sound structure, but written by Beethoven,
could hardly have had the property of being Liszt-influenced. And
it would have had a visionary quality that Brahms’s piece does not
have. (Levinson, 1980, 12)
Given what has been said, the foregoing works are not identical. Suppose
now that there are some instances, I1 and I2, that manifest all the primary
properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate Brahms’s work. Then,
since, by assumption, Beethoven’s work is identical in its sound structure to
Brams’s work, I1 and I2 also manifest all the primary properties that must be
experienced to fully appreciate Beethoven’s work. Thus, it is possible (a) for
an instancee of an artwork A and an instancee of an artwork B to manifest
the same primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate A
and B and (b) for A and B to be nonidentical.
(5) If (a) there is an instancep/e of some work A and an instancep/e of some work
B and (b) these instances manifest nonidentical sets of primary properties,
then it cannot be inferred that A and B are nonidentical.
Substantiation. Suppose there is an instancep/e of A and an instancep/e of B.
Suppose next that the primary properties manifested by the instancep/e of A
and the primary properties manifested by the instancep/e of B are not the same.
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Then, of course, these instances are not identical. But they can nevertheless
be instancesp/e of the same artwork, since each of them can manifest different
sufficient sets of the primary properties of the same work and stand in an
appropriate historical-intentional relation to this work. Thus, in this case, A
and B are not necessarily nonidentical.
Remark 3. Given what has been said in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, Davies (2010)’s
definition of “an instance of an artwork” can be formulated in a way other than the
way it is formulated in Section 2.1. As shown in Sections 2.2 and 2.3, an instancep/e
of an artwork can be well-formed or non-well-formed. At the same time, there can be
no instancesp/e other than well-formed and non-well-formed ones. In light of this, as
well as the definitions of “a well-formed instancep/e of an artwork” and “a non-well-
formed instancep/e of an artwork,” “an instance of an artwork” can alternatively be
defined as follows:
Instancee (ALT): For all x, x an instancee of some artwork A if and only if x is
either:
• a well-formed instancee of A—an entity that manifests all the primary
properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate A; or
• a non-well-formed instancee of A—an entity that (a) manifests sufficiently
many, but not all, of the primary properties that must be experienced to
fully appreciate A and (b) could, in principle, manifest all sensory kinds
of these properties.
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Instancep (ALT): For all x, x an instancee of some artwork A if and only if x is
either
• a well-formed instancee of A—an entity that (a) manifests all the primary
properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate A and (b) stands
in an appropriate historical-intentional relation to A; or
• a non-well-formed instancee of A—an entity that (a) manifests sufficiently
many, but not all, of the primary properties that must be experienced to
fully appreciate A, (b) could, in principle, manifest all sensory kinds of
these properties, and (c) stands in an appropriate historical-intentional
relation to A.
Clearly, the foregoing formulation provides a more detailed account of “an instance
of an artwork” than the formulation given in Section 2.1. It should be underlined,
however, that the former formulation does not differ extensionally from the latter
one; that is, these formulations cover exactly the same set of entities.
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PART II
Introduction to PART II
Now that “a novel” and “an instance of an artwork” have been defined, the main
question of this dissertation—“What is the ontological status of novels and their
instances?”—can be addressed. Clearly, to answer this question, it is sufficient to
answer the following questions: “What is the ontological status of novels?” and
“What is the ontological status of instances of novels?” The main goal in PART II
is to answer the second of these questions.
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Chapter 3: Against Inscriptions as Instances of Novels
Introduction
What is the ontological status of instances of novels1? Put otherwise, what sort
of entities can play the role of such instances? According to the view accepted by
an overwhelming majority of theorists, including Noel Carroll, Arthur Danto, David
Davies, Stephen Davies, John Dilworth, Nelson Goodman, Peter Lamarque, Jerrold
Levinson, Christy Mag Uidhir, Aaron Meskin, Richard Wollheim, and Lee Walters,
the paradigmatic, or most typical (though not the only), entities that play this role
are inscriptions—concrete (usually physical) texts written or printed on something
(say, paper, papyrus, or parchment) or displayed on the screen of some device (such
as a computer or an e-reader).2,3 My goal in this chapter is to show that this view,
which I will call “Orthodox,” is misguided. I begin with a formulation and defense of
an argument against the strong version of the Orthodox View—the version according
to which inscriptions are well-formed instances of novels4 (hereafter: “the Strong
1Here and in what follows, by “novels,” I mean novels that can, in principle, be read aloud.
2[See the appendix to this chapter (Section 3.5).]
3Although this view is accepted by an overwhelming majority of theorists, it is not accepted by
all of them (thus, it is rejected by Kivy (2006)).
4As shown in Chapter 2, “a well-formed instance of an artwork” can be defined as follows:
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Orthodox View”) (Section 3.1). Next, I provide a critical analysis of an alternative
argument against this view and of potential ways to defend this argument, including
those based on the ideas championed by Kivy (2006) and Urmson (2004) (Section
3.2). I then turn to an examination of a weaker version of the Orthodox View—the
version according to which inscriptions are non-well-formed instances of novels5—
arguing that this version (hereafter: “the Weak Orthodox View”) does not stand
up to criticism (Section 3.3). Finally, I provide an argument against the Orthodox
View simpliciter (Section 3.4).
Well-formed instancee: For all x, x is a well-formed instancee of an artwork if and only if x mani-
fests all the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate this work.
Well-formed instancep: For all x, x is a well-formed instancep of an artwork if and only if x (a)
manifests all the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate this work
and (b) stands in an appropriate historical-intentional relation to it.
5As shown in Chapter 2, “a non-well-formed instance of an artwork” can be defined as follows:
Non-well-formed instancee: For all x, x is a non-well-formed instancee of an artwork if and only
if x (a) manifests sufficiently many, but not all, of the primary properties that must be
experienced to fully appreciate this work and (b) could, in principle, manifest all sensory
kinds of these properties.
Non-well-formed instancep: For all x, x is a non-well-formed instancep of an artwork if and only
if x (a) manifests sufficiently many, but not all, of the primary properties that must be
experienced to fully appreciate this work, (b) could, in principle, manifest all sensory kinds
of these properties, and (c) stands in an appropriate historical-intentional relation to this
work.
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3.1 Against the Strong Orthodox View
According to the definition of “a well-formed instance of an artwork,” a well-
formed instancee of an artwork is whatever manifests all the primary properties that
must be experienced to fully appreciate this work, and a well-formed instancep of
an artwork is whatever (a) manifests all the primary properties that must be ex-
perienced to fully appreciate this work and (b) stands in an appropriate historical-
intentional relation to it. Thus, regardless of whether the expression “a well-formed
instance of an artwork” is used in the epistemic or the provenential sense, to be a
well-formed instance6 of some artwork, it is necessary to manifest all the primary
properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate this work. Recall now that
according to the Strong Orthodox View, inscriptions are well-formed instances of
novels. So if this view is true, then inscriptions must be capable of manifesting all
the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate the correspond-
ing novels. This consequence, however, is problematic. For, in fact, no inscription
can manifest all of the properties of the mentioned kind. The reason for this is that
there is (at least) one class of primary properties that (a) must be experienced to
fully appreciate a novel but (b) cannot be made manifest by any inscription: the
sonic properties of the novel, or, in other words, the properties related to how the
6Terminological note: If it is not specified whether the expression “instance” is used in the
purely epistemic or the provenential sense, then this expression can be used in either of these
senses. Also, it is assumed that, regardless of whether “instance” is used in the purely epistemic
or the provenential sense, it is used in one and the same sense throughout the relevant passage.
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novel sounds.7 Clearly, the thesis that the sonic properties of a novel are primary
properties that (a) must be experienced to fully appreciate this novel but (b) can-
not be manifested by any inscription is far from obvious and, therefore, requires
substantiation. To substantiate this thesis, it is sufficient to show that these prop-
erties (a) cannot be manifested by any inscription, (b) must be experienced to fully
appreciate the novel, and (c) are primary.
3.1.1 Why Inscriptions Cannot Manifest Sonic Properties
Let us first show that the sonic properties of a novel cannot be manifested by
inscriptions. According to the definition of the expression “to manifest a property,”8
an entity manifests a property only if this property is apprehensible by directly per-
ceiving this entity. So if sonic properties can be manifested by an inscription, they
must be apprehensible by directly perceiving it. But can they, in fact, be appre-
hended this way? For a property to be apprehensible by directly perceiving an
inscription, this property must be apprehensible by means of directly applying some
sensory faculty to this inscription. What is this faculty, in the case of sonic proper-
ties? Presumably, it can only be the faculty of hearing, for no other faculty can be
used to adequately grasp sonic properties when it is directly applied to an inscrip-
tion. So sonic properties can be apprehended by directly perceiving an inscription
only if they can be apprehended through hearing it. However, an inscription (as
7Examples of sonic properties are “being sonorous,“ “being mellifluous,” “having a particular
rhythm,“ “having a particular sounding,” etc.
8See Chapter 2, Section 2.1.
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opposed to a reading of it) cannot be heard. The reason for this is that (a) (strictly
speaking) only sounds can be heard, but (b) an inscription is not a sound (ac-
cording to our definition,9 it is a concrete text written or printed on something or
displayed on the screen of some electronic device). Thus, sonic properties cannot be
apprehended by directly perceiving an inscription and so cannot be manifested by
it.
One might object as follows. The foregoing argument assumes that the only
faculty that can be used to adequately grasp sonic properties by means of a direct
application of this faculty to an inscription is the faculty of hearing. But this
assumption is false. For, in fact, there is another faculty that can be used this
way—the faculty of aural imagination.
The foregoing objection, however, fails. It assumes that the faculty of aural
imagination can be directly applied to inscriptions. But this assumption is false.
Recall that inscriptions are, by definition, concrete. So, since any concrete entity
is either physical (spatiotemporal) or mental, every inscription is either physical or
mental.10 Can the faculty of aural imagination be directly applied to a physical
inscription? No. In order for this faculty to be directly applicable to a physical
inscription, it must be possible to mentally “hear” such an inscription. However,
(strictly speaking) no physical object (as opposed to a mental object—such as an
imaginary sound or a sequence of imaginary sounds) can be mentally “heard.” Can
9See the introduction to this chapter.
10It is safe to assume that all existent inscriptions of novels are physical. The argument, however,
does not depend on this assumption.
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the faculty of aural imagination be directly applied to a mental inscription (that is,
an imaginary text)? Again, the answer is “No.” The faculty of aural imagination is
directly applicable to a mental inscription only if the latter can be mentally “heard.”
However, a mental inscription cannot be mentally “heard,” since (a) such an inscrip-
tion cannot be a mental sound (according to our definition, it can only be a mental
text—a sequence of written or printed symbols), but (b) (strictly speaking) only
mental sounds can be mentally “heard.” Thus, the faculty of aural imagination
cannot be directly applied to physical inscriptions; nor can it be directly applied
to those inscriptions that are mental. But then, given that any inscription is ei-
ther physical or mental, this faculty cannot be directly applied to any inscriptions
whatsoever.
So we have established that the sonic properties of a novel cannot be mani-
fested by inscriptions. Before proceeding, it is worth emphasizing two things. First,
although an inscription does not manifest sonic properties, it can be characterized
as having such properties in some non-manifesting way—for example, as encoding
them (similar to how a musical score encodes the sonic properties of a musical work).
Second, although sonic properties are not manifestable by inscriptions, some other
properties are. Consider, for instance, visual properties. For these properties to be
apprehensible by directly perceiving an inscription, they must be apprehensible by
seeing it. And they doubtless can be apprehended in this latter manner. So, since
they are apprehensible by directly perceiving an inscription, they can be manifested
by it.
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3.1.2 Why the Sonic Properties of a Novel Must Be Experienced to
Fully Appreciate This Novel
Let us now show that the sonic properties of a novel must be experienced to
fully appreciate it. Clearly, among the factors that determine the aesthetic value of
a novel, the factor of how this novel sounds is not the most important. (Presumably,
the most important factors pertain to the novel’s content and structure.) But this
should not lead us to think that the sonic dimension is completely irrelevant to the
aesthetic value of a novel. Although this dimension is not the main determinant of a
novel’s aesthetic significance, it is, nevertheless, a determinant. One reason to think
so comes from an observation of our professional literary community. Consider
novelists. Many of them use sound techniques—such as alliteration, assonance,
consonance, rhythm, etc.—in their writing, and presumably intentionally. Here are
some examples of such use:
• Alliteration: “So we beat on, boats against the current, borne back cease-
lessly into the past” (F. Scott Fitzgerald, The Great Gatsby); “You may say
that dear d iligent Dexter gets carried away in his job. . . ” (Jeff Lindsay, Darkly
Dreaming Dexter); “. . . neither of these can feel stranger and stronger emo-
tions than the man does, who for the first time finds himself pulling into the
charmed, churned circle of the hunted sperm whale” (Melville, Moby-Dick).
• Assonance: “Lolita, light of my li fe, fire of my loins“ (Vladimir Nabokov,
Lolita); “And stepping softly with her air of blooded ruin about the glade
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in a frai l agony of grace she trai led her rags through dust and ashes, cir-
cling the dead fire, the charred billets and chalk bones, the little calcined
ribcage” (Cormac McCarthy, Outer Dark); “Perhaps tonight—after a month
of waiting—would be the night“ (J. K. Rowling, Harry Potter and the Order
of the Phoenix ).
• Consonance: “An oblong puddle inset in the coarse asphalt . . . ” (Vladimir
Nabokov, Bend Sinister); “When he woke in the woods in the dark and the
cold of the night. . . “ (Cormac McCarthy, The Road); “A loud, echoing crack
broke the sleepy silence like a gunshot. . . ” (J. K. Rowling, Harry Potter and
the Order of the Phoenix ).
• Rhythm: “Becky was always good to him, always amused, never angry“ (William
Thackeray, Vanity Fair); “With the first gray light he rose and left the boy
sleeping and walked out to the road and squatted and studied the country to
the south. Barren, silent, godless. He thought the month was October but
he wasnt sure. He hadnt kept a calendar for years. They were moving south.
There’d be no surviving another winter here” (Cormac McCarthy, The Road);
“Then she took off the hank and looked me straight in the face, and very
pleasant, and says, ‘Come on, now, what’s your real name?’” (Mark Twain,
The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn); “TJ’s brother is Rex, age forty-four,
my second son, currently married to a stripper. Amber is her name, a poor
creature without a brain but with a large fake chest, who, I think, is his third
wife. Second or third, but who am I to condemn?” (John Grisham, The
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Testament).
Consider next literary critics. Although their primary focus is usually the plot of a
novel, they sometimes attend to how the novel sounds. Here are a few quotes that
illustrate the point:
• “[Stevenson’s] writing. . . remains true to its musical principles. It is the re-
sult of trained ear and recognition of language as a conscious instrument. . . ”
(Swinnerton, 1915, 87).
• “In Twain’s own terms, Cooper actually is a word-musician; he does create a
sound in his prose that we cannot ignore. . . ” (Kowalewski, 1993, 72).
• “. . . the opening pages of A Farewell to Arms do merge a realist aesthetic with
a valorization of form and the musical aspects of language that one might
expect of a Mallarmé prose poem” (Eby, 2013, 177).
• “All readers have been affected by Fitzgerald’s style, for Fitzgerald was mar-
velously sensitive to the sounds and cadences of language” (Lewis, 1985, 89).
• “From youth, Truman Capote was a master of literary style, writing with
a true sense of the sound, rhythm and texture of language, with a feel for
trenchant detail and metaphor” (Hicks, 2009, 94).
• “The rhythm of Cervantes is incredible. Not always, obviously, because what
I call pulsation, or rhythm should have, as in music, moments of climax,
moments of extreme tension that cannot be sustained, otherwise they would
end up being monotonous” (Yúrkievich, 2003, 227).
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• “Balzac was as devoted to style for its own sake as Malherbe, and had the same
narrow oratorical ideal of correctness, the same devotion of order, dignity, and
sonorous rhythm” (Grierson, 1906, 273).
Finally, it is not uncommon for literary theorists to stress the importance of sonic
elements in prose. Thus, according to Aristotle (2010), “the form of a prose compo-
sition” should not be “destitute of rhythm” (Aristotle, 2010, 139). Gustave Flaubert
notes that “a good prose sentence must be like a good line of verse, unchangeable,
as rhythmic, as sonorous” (Llosa, 1987, 219). And according to R. L. Stevenson
(2011):
In all ideal and material points, literature, being a representative art,
must look for analogies to painting and the like; but in what is technical
and executive, being a temporal art, it must seek for them in music.
Each phrase of each sentence, like an air or a recitative in music, should
be so artfully compounded out of long and short, out of accented and
unaccented, as to gratify the sensual ear. And of this the ear is the sole
judge. (Stevenson, 2011, 9–10)
So our professional literary community emphasizes the sonic aspect of the
novel: Novelists endow their texts with certain sonic properties; literary critics
take into account the sound of a novel in their aesthetic evaluation; finally, literary
theorists stress the importance of sound in literary prose. But why would our
professional literary community emphasize this aspect if the latter were irrelevant
to the aesthetic value of novels? The very fact of such emphasis suggests that the
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aesthetic value of a novel depends, in part, on how the novel sounds.
Here, one might object that there is an analogous reason against the view that
the sound of a novel is aesthetically important, namely this: Most ordinary readers
do not, in fact, pay attention to the sonic aspect of the novels they read.11 This
reason, however, has much less credibility than the abovementioned reason in favor
of this view. As is generally agreed, what is done/said by specialists is a lot more
likely to be right than what is done/said by non-specialists.12 Novelists, literary
critics, and theorists are professionally involved in literary practices and, hence,
may well be considered specialists in literature. At the same time, it is clear that
ordinary readers are non-specialists in literature. So novelists, literary critics, and
theorists are, most likely, right in stressing the importance of the sonic properties
of a novel, whereas ordinary readers are, most likely, wrong in disregarding these
properties.
Thus, that the professional literary community emphasizes the sonic aspect of
novels provides a reason to believe that the sound of a novel is a determinant of the
aesthetic value of this novel. This is, however, not the only reason to believe so.
Another such reason is concerned with certain syntactic, semantic, and pragmatic
features of the text of a novel and their relation to the aesthetic value of this text.
Before stating this reason, we first need to clarify in what respects sentences13 can
11It is worth noting that although, when reading silently, readers usually do not attend to the
sound of what they read, they seem to generate this sound in their minds. For recent empirical
evidence confirming this, see, e.g., Petkov and Berlin (2013).
12I assume here that the specialists and non-specialists are trustworthy.
13Hereafter, by “a sentence,” I mean a sentence-token, not a sentence-type.
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differ from each other.
So in what respects can sentences do that? First of all, sentences can differ
in their appearance. Whether they differ in this respect depends on what syntactic
structures they have and what font they employ. If sentences have different syntactic
structures or use different fonts, then they differ in their appearance; otherwise, they
are identical with regard to their appearance.14 Below are examples of sentences
that differ in their appearance because of the difference in their syntactic structure
((1a) and (1b)) and because of the difference in their fonts ((2a) and (2b)), as well
as an example of sentences that do not differ in their appearance ((3a) and (3b):
(1a) The idea is obvious.
(1b) The idea is evident.
(2a) The problem can be solved.
(2b) The problem can be solved.
(3a) The problem can be solved.
(3b) The problem can be solved.
Second, sentences can differ in their semantic meaning. An example of sen-
tences that differ in this respect is sentences (2a) and (1a)/(1b). And examples of
sentences that do not differ in their semantic meaning are sentences (2a) and (2b)
14It is worth noting that sentences that are identical in their appearance may not be identical
in certain other respects (for example, they may not be identical in their meaning).
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and (3a) and (3b).15 Note that the fact that sentences differ in their semantic mean-
ing does not necessarily entail that they differ in their appearance. Thus, consider
the sentences:
(4a) We approached one of the banks.
(4b) We approached one of the banks.
These sentences have the same appearance. But they can have different semantic
meanings. Suppose, for instance, that the first occurrence of the word “bank” is
intended to mean “a river bank,” whereas the second occurrence of this word is
intended to mean something else—say, “a particular kind of financial institution”
or “a receptacle where something may be deposited for recycling.” Then (4a) and
(4b) have different semantic meanings.
Third, sentences can differ in their phonology, or, in other words, in their sonic
properties. Whether sentences differ in this respect depends on what phonemic
structures they have. If sentences have different phonemic structures, then they
differ in their sonic properties; otherwise, they are identical with regard to their sonic
properties. Examples of sentences that differ in their phonemic structures—and,
hence, in their sonic properties—are sentences (1a), (1b), (2a)/(2b), (3a)/(3b), and
(4a)/(4b). Examples of sentences that do not differ in their phonemic structures—
and, hence, in their sonic properties—are sentences (2a) and (2b); (3a) and (3b);
and (4a) and (4b). Note that the fact that some sentences differ in their sonic
15Assuming that the expressions “obvious” and “evident” are exact synonyms, (1a) and (1b)
can also serve as an example of sentences that mean the same.
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properties does not always entail that these sentences differ in their appearance or
meaning. Thus, both (1a) and (1b) as well as the following sentences:
(5a) There is no sewer [in the sense of a person who sews] outside.
(5b) There is no sewer [in the sense of an artificial conduit for carrying out waste
water] outside.
—differ in their sonic properties. However, (1a) and (1b) do not differ in their mean-
ing (assuming that the expressions “evident” and “obvious” are exact synonyms),
and (5a) and (5b) do not differ in their appearance.
Fourth, sentences can differ in how natural (or “normal”) they appear to a
competent speaker. Examples of sentences that do not differ in this respect are
sentences (1a) and (1b); (2a) and (2b); (3a) and (3b); (4a) and (4b); and (5a) and
(5b). Here is an example of sentences that differ in the foregoing respect:
(6a) John picked up his wallet.
(6b) John picked up John’s wallet. [It is assumed that all occurrences of “John”
refer to the same individual.]
(6a) does not sound odd to us. On the contrary, we find it quite natural. When
faced with a necessity to express the fact that John picked up his wallet, most of
us would say “John picked up his wallet.” At the same time, (6b) appears to us
considerably less natural than (6a). We would not normally say “John picked up
John’s wallet” if we had to describe John’s picking up his wallet.16
16Here, of course, the following question arises: Why do we find (6b) less natural than (6a)?
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Fifth, sentences can differ in the structure-based difficulty of comprehension,
or, in other words, in the difficulty of understanding them that arises from the way
they are structured. Examples of sentences that do not differ in this respect are
sentences (1a) and (1b); (2a) and (2b); (3a) and (3b); (4a) and (4b); (5a) and (5b);
and (6a) and (6b). Here is an example of sentences that differ in the foregoing
respect:
(7a) “My first kiss will always be recalled by me as how my romance with Shayna
was begun” (King, 2000, 117).
(7b) “My romance with Shayna began with our first kiss. I’ll never forget it” (King,
2000, 117).
Clearly, (7a) and (7b) differ in how difficult it is to comprehend them: Compre-
hending (7b) is doubtless easier than comprehending (7a). The reason for this is
not concerned with the meaning of (7a) and (7b), for they express roughly the same
idea. Rather, the reason is related to the way they are structured (in particular,
the fact that (7a) involves the use of passive voice, whereas (7b) employs active
voice). Thus, the difference in how difficult it is to comprehend (7b) and (7a) is
structure-based.
Sixth, sentences can differ in their conversational implicatures, where by “a
conversational implicature” is meant an implicature17 that depends, for what it is,
Although this question is worth investigating, it is tangential to our main purposes, and so I will
leave it unanswered.
17An implicature simpliciter is what is implied by a sentence within a particular context. Thus,
suppose someone says:
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not on the meaning of the sentence uttered but solely on the conversational context
in which this sentence is placed.18,19 Thus, consider the sentences:
(9a) I am not feeling well.
(9b) I am not feeling well.
Suppose (9a) is Jack’s answer to the question “Are you going to the party?” and
(9b) is Jill’s answer to the question “Are you running a marathon tomorrow?” Then
the implicature of (8a) is that Jack is not going to the party, whereas the implicature
of (9b) is that Jill is not running a marathon tomorrow. Thus, given the context,
(8) John “is an Englishman; he is, therefore, brave” (Grice, 1975, 44).
Clearly, this sentence implies that John’s being an Englishman entails that he is brave. Hence, the
implicature here is the idea that “it follows from [John’s] being an Englishman that he is brave”
(Grice, 1975, 75).
18An example of a conversational implicature is the implicature “Jill is not going to the collo-
quium” contained in the following dialog:
Jack: Are you going to the colloquium?
Jill: I am not feeling well.
The reason why this implicature is conversational is that it is generated solely by the features of
the conversational context of the dialog (note that it is not part of the meaning of Jill’s answer,
for, strictly speaking, the latter does not contain the idea that Jill is not going to the colloquium)
19It is worth mentioning that a conversational implicature should be distinguished from what is
known as a conventional implicature. The latter kind of implicature is an implicature that is part
of the linguistic meaning of a sentence. An example of such an implicature is the implicature “his
being an Englishman entails that he is brave” contained in (8). Another example is the implicature
“some books are not interesting” contained in the sentence “Not all books are interesting.”
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(9a) and (9b) differ with regard to their conversational implicatures. (It is worth
noting that (9a) and (9b) do not differ with regard to their appearance and semantic
meaning (or so we can assume). Furthermore, since (9a) and (9b) semantically mean
the same, they do not differ with regard to their conventional implicatures either.)
In addition to the mentioned respects, sentences can differ in their aesthetic
value. For instance, a sentence can provide a more colorful description of a character,
or be more pleasing to the ear, or be more visually pleasing (say, as a result of
the fact that it has been calligraphed) than some other sentence. It should be
stressed, however, that the difference in aesthetic value supervenes on the differences
in one of the abovementioned respects.20 If some sentences differ in their aesthetic
value, then they differ in (a) their appearance, (b) their semantic meaning, (c) their
sonic properties, (d) how natural they appear to a competent speaker, (e) their
structure-based difficulty of comprehension, (f) their conversational implicatures, or
(g) some combination of the mentioned respects.21 For instance, if some sentences
20Note that this does not imply that the difference in aesthetic value is reducible to the differences
in one of those respects.
21One could object as follows. Suppose there are sentences S1 and S2 that do not differ in (a)
their appearance, (b) their semantic meaning, (c) their sonic properties, (d) how natural they
appear to a competent speaker, (e) their structure-based difficulty of comprehension, and (f) their
conversational implicatures. Then S1 and S2 can still differ aesthetically—if they differ in their
rhythmic features.
However, this objection fails. It assumes that S1 and S2 can differ in their rhythmic features.
But this assumption is false. By assumption, S1 and S2 do not differ in their appearance and sonic
properties. Meanwhile, if sentences that do not differ in their appearance and sonic properties,
then these sentences have the same rhythmic features.
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are different because one of them is more visually pleasing than the other, then
these sentences differ in their appearance; if some sentences differ in that one of
them can provide a more colorful description of a character than the other, then
these sentences differ in their semantic meaning; and if the difference between some
sentences is that one of them is more pleasing to the ear than the other, then these
sentences differ in their sonic properties.
Having characterized the respects in which sentences can differ from each other,
we can now formulate the second reason in favor of the thesis that the sonic prop-
erties of a novel are relevant to the aesthetic value of this novel. Take any standard
novel—a novel that has a text and perhaps some (non-textual) graphic elements. It
seems plausible to suppose that this novel contains a sentence/set of sentences S1
with aesthetic value V1 and that there is a paraphrase of S1—S2—such that:
(I) S2 means the same or almost the same as S1.
(II) S2 does not differ from S1 with regard to the structure-based difficulty of
comprehension.
(III) From a competent speaker’s perspective, S2 seems as natural (or “normal”) as
S1. (That is, when S2 is encountered by a competent speaker, the latter does
not have thoughts like “While we say S1, we do not normally say S2” or “It
would be odd to say S2, as opposed to S1.”)
(IV) If S1 has any conversational implicatures, then S2 has the same conversational
implicatures.
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(V) S2 is typed in the same aesthetically neutral black font (such as Times New
Roman) as S1.
(VI) S2 has an aesthetic value, V2, that is noticeably different from V1.
As mentioned above, if there is an aesthetic difference between sentences, then this
difference can be explained in terms of differences in (a) their appearance, (b) their
semantic meaning, (c) their sonic properties, (d) how natural they appear to a com-
petent speaker, (e) their structure-based difficulty of comprehension, (f) their con-
versational implicatures, or (g) some combination of the mentioned respects. So the
fact that S1 and S2 have different aesthetic values (V1 and V2, respectively) should
be explainable with the help of one or more of the foregoing kinds of differences.
Which of these kinds is/are involved in the explanation? It is not the difference in
meaning, since, by assumption, both S1 and S2 mean the same or almost the same.
It is not the difference in the structure-based difficulty of comprehension because,
by assumption, comprehending S1 and S2 is equally difficult/easy. It is not the
difference in how natural S1 and S2 appear to a competent speaker, for, by assump-
tion, they both appear to her equally natural. And it is not the difference in the
conversational implicatures, since, by assumption, if S1 and S2 have conversational
implicatures, these implicatures are identical.
Now, what about the difference in appearance? Can this difference explain the
aesthetic difference between S1 and S2? Perhaps it could—if the visual properties of
S1 and S2 were intrinsically relevant to the aesthetic values of S1 and S2, respectively.
However, in fact, neither the visual properties of S1 nor the visual properties of S2
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are intrinsically relevant to those values. The visual properties related to the color,
size, and shape of S1/S2 are not relevant to the aesthetic value of S1/S2 at all
and, a fortiori, are not intrinsically relevant to this value. And the visual properties
related to the meaning and sound of S1/S2 are relevant to the aesthetic value of S1/S2
only instrumentally—as something on which those properties that are intrinsically
relevant to the aesthetic value of S1/S2 depend (or supervene). Of course, if S1/S2
were calligraphed or typed in a fancy, aesthetically interesting font, then S1/S2 would
possess certain visual properties relevant to the aesthetic value of S1/S2. However,
according to (V), S1 and S2 are neither calligraphed nor typed in such a font.
Before proceeding, two remarks are worth making. First, while the thesis
about the intrinsic irrelevance of the visual properties of the text of a novel to the
aesthetic value of this novel applies to typical novels (which are typed in “ordinary”
fonts), it does not apply to all novels. The aesthetic value of the text of some
(non-standard) novel can intrinsically depend on the visual properties of this text
(consider, for instance, a Japanese calligraphic novel). Second, the thesis that the
visual properties of the text of a typical novel are not intrinsically relevant to the
aesthetic value of this novel should not be confused with a stronger thesis—that the
visual properties of a typical novel (as opposed to just the text of this novel) are
not intrinsically relevant to the aesthetic value of this novel. This stronger thesis
is false: A typical novel may well contain graphic elements (drawings, photographs,
schemes, diagrams, etc.), and in this case, some of its visual properties (namely, the
properties related to these graphic elements) are intrinsically relevant to its aesthetic
value.
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Thus, the aesthetic difference between S1 and S2 cannot be explained by ap-
pealing to the difference in their appearance. Nor can it be explained by appealing
to the difference in their meanings, structure-based difficulty of comprehension, con-
versational implicatures, or in how natural they appear to a competent speaker. So
how can the aesthetic difference between S1 and S2 be explained? It can be ex-
plained, I think, by appealing to the difference in their sonic properties. The reason
why S1 and S2 have different aesthetic values is that S1 and S2 have different sonic
properties. Meanwhile, if this is so, then the sonic properties of S1 are relevant to
its aesthetic value (for, otherwise, the aesthetic value of S1 would be independent
of the sonic properties of S1, and, hence, no difference in sonic properties could
explain why S1 is aesthetically different from S2 or some other set of sentences). As
a result, since S1 is an essential part of a novel, these properties are also relevant to
the aesthetic value of this novel.
Let us consider some possible applications of the foregoing reasoning, which
might be called “the Paraphrasability Argument.” Consider Charles Dickens’s A
Tale of Two Cities. This novel begins with the sentence:
St: “It was the best of times, it was the worst of times, it was the age of
wisdom, it was the age of foolishness, it was the epoch of belief, it was
the epoch of incredulity, it was the season of Light, it was the season
of Darkness, it was the spring of hope, it was the winter of despair. . . ”
(Dickens, 1902, 3).
Compare this sentence with the following paraphrase:
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Pt: It was the best of times, the worst of times, the age of wisdom,
the age of foolishness, the epoch of belief, the epoch of incredulity, the
season of Light, the season of Darkness, the spring of hope, the winter
of despair. . . .
From an intuitive viewpoint, Pt differs aesthetically from St. How can we account
for this difference? The visual properties of St and Pt are not intrinsically relevant
to the aesthetic values of St and Pt. So the aesthetic difference between St and Pt
cannot be explained by saying that they have different visual properties. Can we
explain this difference by appealing to the difference in meaning between St and
Pt? If St and Pt differ in meaning, then, obviously, this difference can only result
from the fact that in St, the expression “it was” occurs several times, whereas in Pt,
this expression occurs only once. However, the mentioned fact does not really affect
the meaning expressed in St/Pt (it does not matter, with regard to the meaning,
whether St or Pt is used). Thus, the meanings of St and Pt are the same. But
if this is so, then we cannot explain the aesthetic difference between St and Pt by
appealing to the difference in their meanings.
Can we explain this difference by saying that the structure-based difficulty of
comprehending St and the structure-based difficulty of comprehending Pt are differ-
ent? No. Although St and Pt have different syntax, the structure-based difficulty
of comprehending each of them is similar: With regard to their structures, compre-
hending St is not more difficult that comprehending Pt, and comprehending Pt is
not more difficult than comprehending St.
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Also, we cannot explain the aesthetic difference between St and Pt by saying
that St and Pt have different conversational implicatures. First of all, even if St
has a conversational implicature, nothing stops us from assuming that Pt has the
same conversational implicature. Furthermore, there is no reason to assume that
St or Pt has conversational implicatures. Recall that a conversational implicature
is an implicature that depends, for what it is, not on the meaning of the sentence
but solely on the conversational context in which this sentence is located. So in
order for a conversational implicature of St to exist, there must be an implicature
generated by the context in which St was placed by Dickens. However, there seems
to be no such implicature. (If it exists, what is it?) Furthermore, a conversational
implicature of Pt exists only if there is an implicature generated by the context in
which St was placed. But there is no such implicature—or so we can assume.
Finally, we cannot explain the aesthetic difference between St and Pt by saying
that from a competent speaker’s viewpoint, Pt/St seems less natural than St/Pt.
From a competent speaker’s viewpoint, Pt does not seem less natural than St; nor
does St seem less natural than Pt. In other words, from such a viewpoint, the
“naturalness” of Pt and the “naturalness” of St are the same (or, at least, very
similar).
Thus, the aesthetic difference between St and Pt cannot be explained by ap-
pealing to the difference in their appearance, meanings, or conversational implica-
tures. Nor can it be explained by appealing to the difference in their structure-based
difficulty of comprehension or to the difference in how natural they seem to a compe-
tent speaker. How can the aesthetic difference between St and Pt then be explained?
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The only satisfactory way to explain it is by appealing to the difference in the sonic
properties of St and Pt. Indeed, because of the lack of a particular rhythm, Pt does
not sound as good as St; Pt, one might say, is less gratifying to the ear than St.
But if this is so—if the aesthetic difference between St and Pt is to be explained in
terms of their sonic properties—then the aesthetic value of St and, hence, of A Tale
of Two Cities depends on these properties.
Here is another application of the Paraphrasability Argument. Compare the
following excerpt from John Grisham’s novel Bleachers :
Sf : “The bleachers were silent now, waiting” (Grisham, 2011, 8).
with its possible paraphrase:
Pf : The bleachers were silent now. They were waiting.
There seems to be an aesthetic difference between Sf and Pf . But what exactly is re-
sponsible for this difference? As before, and by the same reasoning, it can be shown
that the aesthetic difference between Sf and Pf cannot be explained by appealing to
the difference in their meanings, or visual properties, or conversational implicatures,
or how natural they appear to a competent speaker, or their structure-based diffi-
culty of comprehension. The only acceptable way to explain the aesthetic difference
between Sf and Pf is by appealing to the difference in their sonic properties. Like
in the previous case, in this case, it can be argued that, due to a particular rhythm,
Sf sounds better than Pf and, hence, is more aesthetically pleasing. Meanwhile,
if the aesthetic difference between Sf and Pf is to be explained in terms of the
106
sonic properties, then these properties are relevant to the aesthetic value of Sf and,
consequently, to the aesthetic value of Bleachers.
Let us consider one more application of the Paraphrasability Argument. J. K.
Rowling’s Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone contains the following text:
Sh: “Mr. Dursley stopped dead. Fear flooded him. He looked back at
the whisperers as if he wanted to say something to them. . . ” (Rowling,
2004, 9).
Compare this text with its possible paraphrase:
Ph: Mr. Dursley stopped dead, and fear flooded him, and he looked back
at the whisperers as if he wanted to say something to the whisperers. . . .
Intuitively, there is an aesthetic difference between Sh and Ph. How can we explain
this difference? Like in the previous case, in this case, it can be demonstrated,
with the help of the reasoning used in the Dickens example, that the aesthetic
difference between Sh and Ph cannot be explained by appealing to the difference in
their meanings, or visual properties, or conversational implicatures, or how natural
they appear to a competent speaker, or how difficult it is to comprehend them
because of their structural complexity. The only satisfactory way to explain the
aesthetic difference between Sh and Ph is by appealing to the difference in their
sonic properties (primarily, the properties related to the rhythms of Sh and Ph).
But if this is so—if Sh is aesthetically different from Ph by virtue of having certain
sonic properties—then these properties are relevant to the aesthetic value of Sh and,
therefore, to the aesthetic value of Harry Potter and the Philosopher’s Stone.
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In a similar way, the Paraphrasability Argument can be applied to any other
standard novel (i.e., a novel that contains a text and perhaps some graphic elements).
This, of course, requires us to assume that any such novel contains a sentence or set
of sentences for which there is a paraphrase that (a) is not relevantly different in its
appearance, (b) means the same or almost the same, (c) has a similar syntax-based
difficulty of comprehension, (d) has the same conversational implicatures (provided
that the original sentence or set of sentences has any conversational implicatures),
(e) seems equally natural, from a competent speaker’s perspective, but (f) possesses
a different aesthetic value. But this assumption does not strike me as implausible.
On the contrary, I think it is correct. I am not aware of any novel that does not
contain a sentence or set of sentences for which there could be no such paraphrase.
Thus, the thesis that the sonic aspect of novels is relevant to their aesthetic
value is supported by the Paraphrasability Argument as well as the fact that our
professional literary community emphasizes this aspect. This, I believe, is sufficient
to show that this thesis is true.
Now, if that is the case, then a complete appreciation of a novel is impossible
without an experiential engagement with at least some of the sonic properties of
this novel.22 For suppose the thesis that the sonic aspect of novels is relevant
to their aesthetic value is true. Then the aesthetic value of a novel is, in part,
determined by the sonic properties of this novel—and so we cannot fully appreciate
22It is worth noting that the foregoing thesis can be used to derive another peculiar consequence—
that the structure of a novel involves a sonic dimension. An account of how this can be done is
provided in Chapter 7.
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this value without appreciating these properties. Meanwhile, to fully appreciate a
novel, we must fully appreciate the aesthetic value of this novel. Thus, we cannot
fully appreciate a novel without appreciating its sonic properties. Now, can we
fully appreciate the sonic properties of a novel without experiencing them? If we
can, then we must be able to do this with the help of a mere description. But can
we fully appreciate the sonic properties of a novel using a mere description? No.
Appreciating the sonic properties of a novel solely by means of a description cannot
enable us to fully appreciate them—similar to how appreciating the sonic properties
of a musical work through a mere description is insufficient for a full appreciation of
these properties. Thus, to fully appreciate the sonic properties of a novel, we must
experience them. As a result, taking into account what has been said, we cannot
fully appreciate a novel without experiencing its sonic properties.
Note that, in and of itself, our inability to fully appreciate a novel without
experiencing the sonic properties of this novel does not entail that those who do not
hear the physical sound of this novel—such as those who read silently—cannot ex-
perience these properties and, hence, cannot fully appreciate the novel. For suppose
that to fully appreciate a novel, it is necessary to appreciate the sonic properties
of this novel. Suppose also that these properties can be manifested not only by
physical sound but also by mental sound (i.e., sound produced by imagination). In
this case, those who do not hear the physical sound of a novel could experience
the sonic properties of this novel by imagining and attending to the novel’s mental
“sounding” and, hence, could fully appreciate this novel.23
23That the thesis that we must experience the sonic properties of a novel to fully appreciate this
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3.1.3 Why the Sonic Properties of a Novel Are Primary
Having shown that inscriptions cannot manifest sonic properties and that the
sonic properties of a novel must be experienced to fully appreciate this novel, let us
show that the sonic properties of a novel are primary. Given what has been said
above, it is uncontroversial that the sonic properties of a novel articulate a part of
the artistic content of this novel—namely, the sonic dimension. And this dimension
is primary, since it is not grounded in any other contentful properties. Meanwhile,
according to the definition of “a primary property,” if properties articulate the
primary artistic content—a particular set of the primary contentful properties (i.e.,
the contentful properties that are not grounded in any other contentful properties)—
of an artwork, then these properties are primary.
3.1.4 Conclusion
So we have established that the sonic properties of a novel (a) are primary
properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate this novel but (b) cannot be
manifested by any inscription. Meanwhile, as mentioned in the introduction to this
section, to be a well-formed instance of a novel, an inscription must be capable of
manifesting all the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate
novel does not, in and of itself, entail that we cannot fully appreciate this novel without hearing
certain physical sounds does not mean that we can fully appreciate a novel without hearing such
sounds. In fact, in the following chapter, I argue that a full appreciation of novels requires listening
to their physical sound.
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this novel. So inscriptions cannot be well-formed instances of novels. But then
the Strong Orthodox View—the view that inscriptions are well-formed instances of
novels—fails.
3.2 Against the Strong Orthodox View: An Alternative Argument
The argument presented in Section 3.1 is not the only possible argument
against the Strong Orthodox View. One could argue against this view as follows:
(10) Given our ordinary reading and performing practices (that is, practices com-
mon among “ordinary” readers and musicians), inscriptions of novels (here-
after: “inscriptions”) and musical scores are relevantly analogous.
(11) Musical scores are not well-formed instances of musical works.
(12) If (10) and (11) are true, then inscriptions are not well-formed instances of
novels.
(13) Therefore, inscriptions are not well-formed instances of novels.
Call this “the Analogical Argument.”
Is the Analogical Argument acceptable? Its most controversial premise is
premise (10). We do not normally treat musical scores as the ultimate perceptible
objects of artistic appreciation; rather, we treat them as instructions (or prescrip-
tions) for generating such objects—musical performances. Given this, in order for
(10) to be true, it must be true that (i) we do not normally treat inscriptions as the
ultimate perceptible objects of artistic appreciation; (ii) we normally use inscriptions
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as instructions (or prescriptions) for generating such objects; and (iii) according to
our ordinary reading practices, the ultimate perceptible objects of artistic appreci-
ation that are generated by means of inscriptions are relevantly analogous to the
ultimate perceptible objects of artistic appreciation that are generated by means of
musical scores. Are (i), (ii), and (iii) true?
There is little doubt that (i), (ii), and (iii) are true in the case of reading
aloud. For, in this case, we do not consider inscriptions to be final perceptible
products of artistic appreciation. Rather, we treat them as instructions (or pre-
scriptions) to generate such products—namely, readings. Furthermore, readings are
relevantly analogous to the ultimate perceptible objects of artistic appreciation that
are generated by means of musical scores—musical performances. First, like musical
performances, readings are generated with the help of instructions (or prescriptions).
Second, it seems plausible to hold that, similar to musical performances, readings
are artistic performances.24 Third, like musical performances, readings possess their
own artistic properties. Fourth, like musical performances, readings provide experi-
ential access to certain other artistic objects (namely, novels).25
However, in the case of silent reading, the truth of (i), (ii), and (iii) is far from
obvious. Do we actually generate any objects of artistic appreciation when we read
24An argument in favor of the claim that readings are artistic performances is provided in
Chapter 5.
25The thesis that musical performances provide experiential access to other artistic objects (mu-
sical works) does not apply to all kinds of musical works. In those cases in which a musical
performance is identical to a musical work (e.g., jazz), the performance does not provide experi-
ential access to any artistic object other than itself.
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silently? If we do, what are these objects? Furthermore, why think that they are
relevantly analogous to musical performances? Unless a proponent of the Analogical
Argument provides satisfactory answers to these questions, premise (10) and, hence,
the Analogical Argument cannot be accepted.
3.2.1 Kivy’s Response
The foregoing objection is based on the thesis that in the case of silent read-
ing, (i), (ii), and (iii) are questionable. This thesis, however, is rejected by Kivy
(2006). In his view, when we read novels silently, we do not treat the inscrip-
tions as the ultimate perceptible objects of artistic appreciation; rather, we treat
them as instructions for generating particular final perceptible objects of artistic
appreciation—silent readings (that is, mental soundings, or “voicings”)—that are
relevantly analogous to the ultimate perceptible objects of artistic appreciation that
are generated by means of musical scores—musical performances. Is Kivy (2006)’s
view acceptable? Before addressing this question, let us first clarify what he means
by “a reading of a novel.”
In characterizing “a reading of a novel,” Kivy (2006) first notes that a reading
of a novel is an event that, in most (though not all) cases, takes up “a certain non-
continuous period of time” (Kivy, 2006, 5).26 He then specifies what kind of event
a reading of a novel is. In his view, such a reading:
26In those cases in which a reading takes up such a period of time, this reading amounts to a
complex event—“the sum total of a number of reading events, separated by various, sometimes
protracted periods” (Kivy, 2006, 5).
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is the kind of event we would describe as an act or an activity: it is an
action performed by a reader. And the most important aspect of this
act is that it... results in an “experience.” The point of an act of reading
Pride and Prejudice is to have an experience of it for the usual reasons
people have for experiencing works of art of that kind. Some people
might say that such a reading act has as its purpose the experiencing of
the work “aesthetically.” But I will not say that. I will say rather that
its purpose (usually) is the experiencing of it qua art work of that kind:
all the art-relevant ways of experiencing it, of which the aesthetic way is
one. (Kivy, 2006, 5)
Thus, according to Kivy (2006), “a reading of a novel” is a particular event—namely,
an act—that typically results in an art-relevant experience of the novel being read.
What sort of act is this act? In Kivy (2006)’s view, it is a sounding of the text of
a novel, where “a sounding” is understood as a sequence of sounds generated by a
reader (such as a human being or a computer). Thus, given what has been said, “a
reading of a novel,” according to Kivy (2006), can be defined as follows: For all x, x
is a reading of a novel just in case x is a particular act—namely, a sounding of the
text of this novel—that usually results in an artistic experience of this novel.
Before proceeding further, it is worth making a few additional remarks con-
cerning Kivy (2006)’s account of “a reading of a novel.” First, on this account, a
reading of a novel can be either audible or silent, where an audible reading is one
that is generated as a result of reading the text aloud, and a silent reading is one
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that is generated as a result of sounding out, or “voicing,” the text mentally (“in
one’s head”).
Second, on Kivy (2006)’s account, a reading of a novel should be distinguished
from an interpretation of this novel. Surely, when one reads a novel, one must
interpret it at least to some extent. But this does not mean that this reading is
identical to, or includes, or is contained in the interpretation of the novel. The two
acts, although related to each other, are different. Reading a novel is an act of
sounding out the text of this novel; interpreting a novel is an act of understanding
what this text means.
Third, on Kivy (2006)’s account, a reading of a novel should be distinguished
from an experience of this novel. Although a reading of a novel normally results
in an experience, it is not an experience; rather, it is an act—namely, the act of
sounding out the novel’s text.
Having clarified the sense in which Kivy (2006) uses the expression “a reading
of a novel,” let us return to an examination of his view. Recall that according to
Kivy (2006), in the case of silent reading, (i), (ii), and (iii) are true: When we
read novels silently, we do not treat the inscriptions as the final perceptible objects
of appreciation; rather, we use these inscriptions to generate such objects—silent
readings—that are relevantly analogous to the final perceptible products generated
by means of musical scores—musical performances. Is Kivy (2006) right about this?
Let us first consider the thesis that when we read novels silently, we gener-
ate silent readings—that is, silent soundings that usually result in some artistic
experiences of what we read. Is this thesis true?
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The answer to this question is “Yes” only if in the case of reading silently, we
generate silent readings. Do we, in fact, generate such readings in this case? Al-
though Kivy (2006) does not provide any reason in favor of answering this question
in the affirmative,27 such a reason can be provided. That we generate silent sound-
ings when we read silently can be supported by the fact that there is psychological
evidence suggesting that when we read silently, we mentally “voice” what we read
and, hence, generate something that may well be called “a silent sounding.”28 In
27At the same time, Kivy (2006) provides a reason to think that when we read novels silently,
we can generate silent soundings. The reason is as follows.
...It seems... consistent with what we know about thought and consciousness that
reading a story might be experienced as “hearing” a story told in your head, in the way
that reading a score, we know, is experienced, by those few who can, as “hearing”
music played in your head. For at least there is nothing... implausible about the
underlying premise, that one hears a voice in one’s head, with what we know about
consciousness: first-person reports seem to confirm the experience. (Kivy, 2010,
111–112)
Thus, the idea that reading a story silently can be experienced as “hearing” this story in our mind
reflects what we know about consciousness. So there is reason in favor of the thesis that reading
a story silently can be experienced as “hearing” this story in our mind. Meanwhile, if this thesis
is true, then, of course, we can mentally sound out this story.
It should be noted, however, that the foregoing consideration does not support the thesis that
when we read silently, we actually generate silent soundings. For it is one thing to be capable
of generating silent soundings, and it is another thing to actually generate such soundings when
reading silently.
28See, e.g., Petkov and Berlin (2013).
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light of this, the question posed above can, I think, be answered in the affirmative.
So when we read silently, we generate silent soundings. Are these soundings
readings? It is uncontroversial that silent soundings we generate in the process of
reading silently usually result in artistic experiences of what we read. Meanwhile,
to be a silent reading, it is sufficient to be a silent sounding that usually results in
artistic experiences of what is being read. So the answer to the foregoing question
is “Yes.”
Thus, the thesis that when reading novels silently, we generate silent readings
can be considered true. Meanwhile, if this is so, then there is good reason to accept
the first part of Kivy (2006)’s view—the part according to which when we read
novels silently, we do not treat the inscriptions as the ultimate perceptible objects of
artistic appreciation; rather, we treat them as instructions for generating particular
final perceptible objects of artistic appreciation—silent readings. Now, what about
the second part—that our silent readings of novels are relevantly analogous to the
final perceptible products of playing music—musical performances. Is this part
acceptable?
The answer to this question is “Yes” only if there are no serious disanalogies
between our silent readings of novels and musical performances. Are there such
disanalogies? Consider musical performances. They belong to the class of artistic
performances. Given this, if our silent readings of novels do not belong to this
class, then, prima facie, there is a serious disanalogy between them and musical
performances. So do our silent readings of novels belong to this class?
According to Kivy (2006), they do. To support his view, he appeals to a
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particular account of reading. In presenting this account, Kivy (2006) first invites
us to consider the case of Ion—an Ancient Greek rhapsode famous for telling the
stories of the Iliad and the Odyssey. According to Kivy (2006), when telling these
stories, “Ion is ‘playing the role’ of Homer: he is impersonating the storyteller—not
of course in the sense of an imposter, passing himself off as someone else for purposes
of deception, but in the sense of an actor or actress impersonating a character in
a play, playing a part” (Kivy, 2006, 44–45). In Kivy (2006)’s mind, when we read
novels silently, we are like Ion: “We impersonate the storyteller silently, as Ion
does out loud” (Kivy, 2006, 59). For example, when we read Pamela silently, we
impersonate “the storyteller telling his story through the representation of letters”
(Kivy, 2006, 60).
Regarding Kivy (2006)’s account of how we read novels, two remarks are worth
making. First, the fact that x impersonates the storyteller does not entail that
x make-believes that he/she is the storyteller. For suppose x impersonates the
storyteller. Then, since x impersonates y just in case x plays the part of y,29,30
x ’s impersonating the storyteller = x ’s playing the part of the storyteller. But x ’s
playing the part of y does not entail that x make-believes himself/herself to be
y. If someone plays the part of, say, Hamlet, then this does not necessarily mean
that he make-believes that he is Hamlet.31 So x does not necessarily make-believes
himself/herself to be the storyteller.
29See Kivy (2006, 44–45).
30Thus, when Ion impersonates Homer, Ion plays the part of Homer. Conversely, Ion’s playing
the part of Homer entails Ion’s impersonating Homer.
31See Kivy (2006, 59).
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Second, given the fact that when we read a story we impersonate a storyteller,
it may seem natural to suppose that when we read characters’ words, we impersonate
the characters, and not the storyteller. However, according to Kivy (2006), this
supposition is mistaken: In fact, when we read characters’ words, we impersonate the
storyteller impersonating the characters. Similarly, Kivy (2006) notes, “when [Ion]
recites the characters’ speeches, he is impersonating the storyteller impersonating
the characters by reciting their speeches, much as in Hamlet, in the play within the
play, the actor who plays ‘the actor’ impersonates an actor impersonating a king:
an impersonator of an impersonator” (Kivy, 2006, 46).
Using the foregoing account of reading, Kivy (2006) explains why our silent
readings of novels are, in fact, artistic performances. In his view, when we read
a novel silently, we read while impersonating the storyteller. Meanwhile, whenever
we read that way, we read con espressione—as a result of which the silent reading
we generate acquires certain artistic properties, in particular the property of being
“expressive.” Of course, how “expressive” this reading is may vary. If it is generated
by a professional reader, like Julie Harris, then, most likely, it is quite “expressive”;
if, on the other hand, it is generated by a relatively unprepared, average reader,
then its “expressiveness” is usually less noticeable. However, at least some “expres-
siveness” is always present, to a certain noticeable extent, in every proper silent
reading. Meanwhile, if that is so, then, assuming that being “expressive” is suffi-
cient for being artistic, a silent reading is an artistic entity. Moreover, there is good
reason to treat a silent reading as a performance. Prima facie, to be a performance,
it is sufficient to be an action that is intended to be presented to an audience. A
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silent reading is doubtless an action—an activity that is generated by an agent (the
reader) and directed at a goal (to generate a silent reading). Furthermore, a silent
reading is intended to be presented to an audience (this audience consists of just
one person—the reader herself). Thus, taking into account what has been said, our
silent readings of novels are artistic performances.
The foregoing argument depends on Kivy (2006)’s account of how we read
novels. Is this account satisfactory? Before addressing this question it is important
to underline that Kivy (2006)’s account is not normative: It is not aimed at clarifying
“how we should read [novels]” (Kivy, 2006, 2). Rather, this account is descriptive:
Its goal is to clarify “how we, at least some of us, do read [novels]” (Kivy, 2006, 2).
Thus, whether Kivy (2006)’s account is satisfactory depends on whether it reflects
how we actually read novels, and not how we should read them.
So is Kivy (2006)’s account of how we read satisfactory? As D. Davies (2008)
points out, according to this account, when reading a novel—say, David Copper-
field—silently,
the reader impersonates Charles Dickens who is himself impersonating
David Copperfield.... [And] in the case of direct quotation in such a fic-
tion, the reader must presumably impersonate the author impersonating
the narrator impersonating one of the characters. (Davies, 2008, 90)
However, that is not how we normally silently read David Copperfield or other
novels. Perhaps, when reading a novel silently, we impersonate the storyteller. But
we do not engage in a multi-level impersonation of the kind entailed by Kivy (2006)’s
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account.
While D. Davies (2008)’s objection is successful, it fails to essentially under-
mine Kivy (2006)’s account. For Kivy (2006) can easily defuse this objection by
adopting an account of impersonation that does not presuppose any multi-level
impersonation—for example, an account according to which impersonation has only
one level—say, the level of a storyteller.
A more pressing objection concerns the core of Kivy (2006)’s account—the
thesis that when we read novels silently, we impersonate the storyteller. In a critical
note on Kivy (2006)’s The Performance of Reading, Feagin (2008) writes:
I do not think that I do... what Kivy says he and other ordinary readers
do when he writes that we “impersonate the storyteller silently, as Ion
does out loud (p. 59).” I may, occasionally, silently impersonate a
storyteller when I read, but I do so rarely. . . . (Feagin, 2008, 93)
Like Feagin (2008), I do not normally impersonate the storyteller when reading
a novel silently. And most other readers, I am sure, do not do so either. Given
this, the thesis that we impersonate the storyteller in our silent reading seems false.
Meanwhile, if it is false, then Kivy (2006)’s account of reading cannot be accepted.
One might suggest that Kivy (2006)’s account can be modified by replacing the
thesis that we impersonate the storyteller when reading silently, with the thesis that
we impersonate the characters when reading silently. However, such modification
will not rectify this account, since the latter thesis also seems false. Perhaps, when
reading dialogs, we occasionally impersonate the characters participating in these
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dialogs. However, most of the time, we do not impersonate any of the characters of
a novel when we read it silently.32 (Here, an interesting question arises: Why don’t
we impersonate the characters in the process of silent reading? Probably, the main
reason for this is that, as Feagin (2008, 93) notes, the act of impersonation takes
attention away from the meaning of the text and thereby makes it harder for us
to understand the story. Another reason is that we find impersonating characters
useless, since, in our view, doing this does not help us appreciate the story or any
other relevant aspect of the novel.)
Thus, Kivy (2006)’s account of how we read is unsatisfactory. But if this is
so, then, since this account is used in his argument in favor of the thesis that silent
readings we generate in the process of reading novels are artistic performances, this
argument fails. Meanwhile, to my knowledge, there is no other argument that could
support this thesis. So there seems to be no real reason to hold that our silent
readings of novels are artistic performances.
At the same time, there is reason in favor of the opposite thesis—that our silent
readings of novels are not artistic performances. Consider what Godlovitch (1998)
says about a paradigmatic kind of artistic performance—musical performances:
[Musical] performances are deliberate, intentionally caused sound se-
quences. They are never involuntary like sneezes, nor accidental or in-
advertent. A person, unaware of a certain piece, who plays something
32Note that this does not imply that we should not perform this act. Perhaps our current practice
of silent reading without impersonation is seriously flawed and, hence, should be abandoned in favor
of a practice of silent reading that involves impersonation.
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sounding just like it by casually running a bow across a cello could only
generously be said to have performed that piece. Such a person could
not claim the credit that is normally due to one who has given a per-
formance. The intention to perform and beliefs about the immediate
context are integral to performance. (Godlovitch, 1998, 16)
I agree. Whenever one creates a musical performance, one has a particular intention—
the intention to perform. And the same, I think, can be said with regard to other
paradigmatic kinds of artistic performance, such as performances of dance and the-
atrical performances. An artistic performance is not created without the intention
to perform.33 But when we read a novel silently, we do not intend to give a perfor-
mance. Moreover, in this case, we normally do not have any specific intentions with
regard to our reading at all.
Another consideration in favor of the thesis that our silent readings of novels
are not artistic performances draws upon a particular view on arthood. According
to this view, which is accepted by an overwhelming majority of theorists, when
one creates art, one must, at least at some moment, have a particular intention
with regard to this object—such as the intention to give the object “the capacity
to satisfy the aesthetic interest” (Beardsley, 1983, 58), or the intention that the
object be regarded “in some overall way that some earlier or preexisting artwork
or artworks are or were correctly regarded or treated” (Levinson, 2006, 27–28), or
the intention to endow the object with certain aesthetic properties in accordance
33For an argument in favor of the claim that this intention is necessary for an artistic perfor-
mance, see Davies (2011, 4–7).
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with a particular creative insight (Zangwill, 1995, 307). However, as mentioned
earlier, when we generate silent readings, we usually do not have any intentions with
regard to them; in most cases, we generate them unintentionally. Consequently, if
the foregoing view on arthood is correct, our silent readings of novels cannot be
considered artistic entities and, hence, artistic performances.
In light of what has been said, we are entitled to conclude that our silent
readings of novels are not artistic performances. Meanwhile, if this conclusion is
correct, then there is a serious disanalogy between our silent readings of novels and
musical performances: The latter are artistic performances, whereas the former are
not.
Are there any other serious disanalogies between them? Consider the prac-
tice of generating (silent) readings by reading inscriptions silently and the practice
of generating (silent) musical performances by reading musical scores silently. The
former practice is doubtless very common. This is not to say, of course, that no one
generates readings by reading inscriptions aloud. Parents often generate readings
that way when reading to their kids. Also, readings are generated by reading inscrip-
tions aloud when audio recordings (“audiobooks”) of the corresponding novels are
produced.34 So readings are sometimes generated by reading inscriptions aloud. But
the practice of generating readings by reading inscriptions silently is considerably
34It is also worth noting that in the past, the practice of generating readings by reading inscrip-
tions aloud was not uncommon. Thus, as Cliff-Hodges (2015) notes, this practice “was for a long
time common among the wealthy middle classes, from the novel’s inception onwards” (Cliff-Hodges,
2015, 96).
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more widespread. However, the situation with the practice of generating musical
performances by reading musical scores silently is different. In most cases, we do
not generate musical performances by reading musical scores silently. Rather, we
do it by actually performing the scores. Given what has been said, there is another
striking disanalogy between our silent readings of novels and musical performances:
In an overwhelming majority of cases, the former are generated as a result of silent
reading, whereas the latter are not.
Can’t the foregoing disanalogy be strengthened by saying that generating mu-
sical performances by reading musical scores silently is not just something unusual
but is something that, in virtually all cases, simply cannot be done? According to
Kivy (2006), the answer is “No.” He admits that “reading scores... and realizing
the sounds of musical works in one’s mind is decidedly not the customary way of
experiencing music nor is it anything but very unusual” (Kivy, 2006, 36). But, in his
view, some highly gifted musicians are capable of generating musical performances
by silent score reading:
The ability to read scores and thereby to successfully experience musical
works is part of the aura that surrounds only the most gifted, the account
of Beethoven “reading” the scores of Handel’s and Schubert’s works on
his deathbed being a case in point. Of course I am not suggesting that
one need be a musical genius to accomplish the feat. Nevertheless, you
need to have a musical mind and musical training far beyond even that
of most accomplished professional musicians. It is, in other words, a
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feat of considerable mental power, considerably exceeding that of the
average and even above-average musician, a fortiori, beyond that of the
most avid and devoted music-lover. (Kivy, 2006, 36)
Is Kivy (2006) right about this?
As is clear from the foregoing quote, to support his view, Kivy (2006) gives
the example of Beethoven, who could generate musical performances by silently
reading Handel’s and Schubert’s scores. However, the available evidence confirm-
ing this example is anecdotal. At the same time, Kivy (2006) does not offer any
other support for the view that highly gifted musicians are capable of generating
musical performances by reading musical scores silently. Given this, it is reasonable
to consider this view dubious. Perhaps one who has the appropriate skills could
generate musical performances by silently reading very simple, “elementary” musi-
cal scores. However, that someone—even Beethoven himself—could silently read an
average musical score (not to say a score as complex as the score of, say, Beethoven’s
Symphony No. 5) and generate a musical performance of this score in his mind is
hard to believe. Taking this into account, there seems nothing that could stop us
from adopting the strong version of the foregoing disanalogy—the version according
to which virtually no musical performance can be generated by reading its score
silently.
So there are at least two serious disanalogies between our silent readings of
novels and musical performances. First, unlike musical performances, our silent
readings of novels are not artistic performances. Second, our silent readings of
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novels are generated as a result of silent reading, whereas musical performances are
not. Thus, there are good grounds to hold that our silent readings of novels are not
relevantly analogous to musical performances—and, hence, to reject the second part
of Kivy (2006)’s view.
Given this, Kivy (2006)’s view cannot be accepted. As a result, the defense
of (i), (ii), and (iii) based on this view, in the case of the silent reading of novels,
cannot be accepted either.
3.2.2 Other Responses
Another potential way to defend (i), (ii), and (iii) in the case of silent reading
draws upon Urmson (2004)’s account of our silent reading of novels. According to
Urmson (2004), when we read novels silently, we do not treat inscriptions as the
final perceptible objects of appreciation; rather, we treat them as instructions for
generating such objects—silent reading experiences of novels—that are relevantly
analogous to those final perceptible objects of appreciation that we generate in
the case of reading musical scores—silent reading experiences of musical works.
Is Urmson (2004) right about this? Before addressing this question, let us first
clarify the expressions “a silent reading experience of a novel” and “a silent reading
experience of a musical work.”
Consider first the expression “a silent reading experience of a novel.” Accord-
ing to Urmson (2004), it refers to an experience that (a) is acquired as a result
of silently reading a particular “instruction”—namely, an inscription—and (b) en-
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ables one to realize what one would hear if one heard a reading of this novel. Now,
the expression “a silent reading experience of a musical work,” in Urmson (2004)’s
view, has a similar meaning. It denotes an experience that (a) is acquired as a
result of silently reading a particular “instruction”—namely, a musical score—and
(b) enables one to realize what one would hear if one heard a performance of this
work.
Given the foregoing account, it might seem natural to assume that both a
silent reading experience of a novel and a silent reading experience of a musical
work are artistic performances: A silent reading experience of a novel is a particular
“voicing”-performance, whereas a silent reading experience of a musical work is a
particular musical performance. However, Urmson (2004) rejects this assumption.
In his view,
It would be implausible to say that musical score readers are giving a
performance to themselves.... Apart from the fact that they need hear
no sound (they may or may not hum to themselves), considered, ab-
surdly, as performances, what the best score readers normally do would
be intolerably bad. They habitually read through the slower bits far
faster than they perfectly well know that the music should go, and, for
many reasons, nobody can read a fast complex piece at a speed that
he recognizes to be that of the music. Score reading is something quite
distinct from... performance. Urmson (2004, 91)
Thus, according to Urmson (2004), what musical score readers generate—a silent
128
reading experience of a musical work—cannot be characterized as a performance.
And the same, in his view, is true of what literary inscription readers generate—a
silent reading experience of a novel. (Urmson (2004) does not explicitly provide any
reasons why this latter experience is not a performance. However, it seems plausible
to suppose that in this case, he could give reasons similar to the ones he gives in
the quote above.)
Having clarified the expressions “a silent reading experience of a novel” and
“a silent reading experience of a musical work,” let us now turn to an examination
of Urmson (2004)’s view. Recall that on this view, when we read novels silently,
we do not treat inscriptions as the final perceptible objects of appreciation; rather,
we treat them as instructions for generating such objects—silent reading experi-
ences of novels—that are relevantly analogous to those final perceptible objects of
appreciation that we generate in the case of reading musical scores—silent reading
experiences of musical works. Is Urmson (2004)’s view acceptable?
Let us first consider the thesis that when we read a novel silently, we generate
a silent reading experience of this novel, or, in other words, an experience that (a)
is acquired as a result of silently reading an inscription and (b) enables us to realize
what we would hear if we heard an audible reading of this novel. Is this thesis true?
According to Urmson (2004), it is:
somewhat confirmed by some of the critical remarks we make about
literary style. Even in the case of works which would not normally
be read aloud it is a commonplace to speak of assonance, dissonance,
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sonority, rhythm; we reject as unstylish conjunctions of consonants which
would be awkward to say aloud, though we easily read them. We criticize
the writing in terms of how it would sound, if it were spoken. Contrast
the case of logical notation which is not literature and for which we have
only a makeshift oral rendering: who would think of criticizing a piece
of writing in formal logic as unstylish because our conventional reading
of it was awkward in sound? (Urmson, 2004, 92)
Put otherwise, according to Urmson (2004), the thesis that when we read novels
silently, we generate silent reading experiences of these novels is supported by the
fact our critical practice emphasizes the sonic aspect of the novel. Is Urmson (2004)
right about this? I doubt that. There is no real reason to hold that the foregoing
thesis is actually supported by the fact that our critical literary practice emphasizes
the sonic aspect of a novel. (It is worth noting, however, that this fact supports, to a
certain extent, a normative version of Urmson (2004)’s thesis—the version according
to which when we read silently, we should generate silent readings of novels. That
our critical literary practice emphasizes the sonic aspect of a novel corroborates the
thesis that the sonic aspect is relevant to the aesthetic appreciation of a novel. And
this thesis, in its turn, provides support for the thesis that when reading novels
silently, we (that is, ordinary readers) should pay attention to the sound of what
we read—which may well require a generation of a silent reading experience of the
kind suggested by Urmson (2004).)
Thus, Urmson (2004)’s substantiation of the thesis that when we read novels
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silently, we generate silent reading experiences of these novels is unpersuasive. De-
spite this, however, this thesis might still be true. Is it true? When I read a novel
silently, I usually do not have an experience that enables me to realize what I would
hear if I heard an audible reading of the novel. And the same, I believe, can be
said about most other readers. Given this, it is natural to hold that the process
of reading a novel silently usually does not involve any silent reading experience of
this novel. Meanwhile, if this process does not, in fact, involve any such experience,
then the foregoing question must be answered in the negative.
So the part of Urmson (2004)’s view according to which our silent reading of a
novel results in a silent reading experience of this novel (that is, an experience that
enables us to realize what we would hear if we heard the novel’s audible reading)
is, at least, highly questionable. This provides us with a strong reason to reject
this view. But it is not the only such reason. Urmson (2004)’s view states that our
silent reading experiences of novels and our silent reading experiences of musical
works are relevantly analogous. However, there is good reason to doubt that this
analogy, in fact, holds. When typical literature readers silently read a novel, they
are not interested in an experience that enables them to realize what they would
hear if they heard an audible reading of the novel (what they are interested in is
an experience of the story told by the novel). However, the situation is different in
the case of musical score reading. When musical score readers read a musical score
(let us assume, for the sake of argument, that doing this is possible), their primary
aim is to get an experience that enables them to realize what they would hear if
they heard an actual performance of this work. (Why would they read the score—in
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Urmson (2004)’s sense of the word “read”—if they did not aim at that?) As a result,
there is an important disnanalogy between our silent reading experiences of novels
and our silent reading experiences of musical works. Meanwhile, if this is so, then
our silent reading experiences of novels and our silent reading experiences of musical
works cannot be considered relevantly analogous.
Thus, there are at least two good reasons against Urmson (2004)’s view. Given
that, this view cannot be accepted. Meanwhile, if this is so, then defending (i), (ii),
and (iii), in the case of silent reading, with the help of this view cannot be accepted
either.
Is there any other potentially acceptable way to defend (i), (ii), and (iii) in
the case of silent reading? One could try to do this by saying that when we read
novels silently, we do not treat inscriptions as the final perceptible objects of appre-
ciation; rather, we treat them as instructions for generating such objects—namely,
imaginary visual and sonic “actualizations” of the events portrayed in the novels—
that are relevantly analogous to those final perceptible objects of appreciation that
we generate in the case of reading musical scores—imaginary sonic “actualizations”
(soundings) of musical works. However, this way of defending (i), (ii), and (iii) in
the case of silent reading also fails. It entails that our silent reading of novels results
in a generation of imaginary visual and sonic “actualizations” of the events por-
trayed in the novels. But this entailment is false. When we read novels silently, we
rarely imaginatively “actualize” the events described in these novels. This is not to
say, of course, that we never do this in the process of silent reading. When reading
a description of some scene, we may sometimes imagine this scene; when reading
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a dialog, we may sometimes mentally “voice” it. However, it would be mistaken
to say that our silent reading of a novel is always accompanied by our imaginative
“actualizing” of the events described in this novel.
3.2.3 Conclusion
So none of the foregoing ways to substantiate (i), (ii), (iii) in the case of silent
reading is successful. Meanwhile, there seem to be no other potentially satisfactory
ways to do that. Given this, there is good reason to hold that premise (10) (“Given
our ordinary reading and performing practices, inscriptions and musical scores are
relevantly analogous”) cannot be substantiated. Meanwhile, as mentioned in the
introduction to this section, if this premise cannot be substantiated, then it cannot
be accepted—and, hence, the Analogical Argument cannot accepted either.
Despite the fact that the Analogical Argument seems unsatisfactory, there is a
related argument against the Strong Orthodox View which, I believe, is satisfactory.
The argument is as follows:
14. Given our best theory of musical and literary practice, inscriptions and musical
scores are relevantly analogous.
15. Musical scores are not well-formed instances of musical works.
16. If (14) and (15) are true, then inscriptions are not well-formed instances of
novels.
17. So inscriptions are not well-formed instances of novels.
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The argument is valid. (15) is uncontroversial. A musical score is not an instance
of a musical work, let alone a well-formed instance of such a work. The truth of
(16) is beyond doubt. If inscriptions and musical scores are relevantly analogous
and musical scores are not well-formed instances of novels, then inscriptions are not
well-formed instances of novels. The crux of the argument is clearly premise (14).
Is this premise true?
Unlike the truth value of (10), the truth value of (14) does not depend on our
ordinary practices of reading novels and performing musical works (that is, prac-
tices that are common among “ordinary” readers and musicians). The truth value
of (14) depends on our best theory of musical and literary practice—in particular,
(14) is true if and only if this theory implies that inscriptions and musical works
are relevantly analogous. So is (14) true? According to our best theory of musi-
cal practice, musical scores should not be treated as the final perceptible products
of appreciation; rather, they should be treated as instructions for generating such
products—musical performances. Given this, in order for (14) to be true, our best
theory of literary practice must imply that (i*) inscriptions should not be treated as
the final perceptible objects of appreciation; (ii*) inscriptions should be treated as
instructions (or prescriptions) for generating such objects; and (iii*) these objects
(whatever they are) should be treated as relevantly analogous to musical perfor-
mances. Does our best theory of literary practice, in fact, imply that? As shown
in Section 3.1, our best theory of literary practice implies that inscriptions cannot
be used to fully appreciate novels—and, hence, that we should not treat inscrip-
tions as the final perceptible objects of appreciation. Furthermore, as will become
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clear from Chapters 4 and 5, our best theory of literary practice implies (a) that
inscriptions should be treated as instructions (or prescriptions) for generating such
objects and (b) that the latter should be treated as relevantly analogous to musical
performances. Thus, the question about the truth of (14) should be answered in the
affirmative.
Given the fact that the argument (14)–(17) is, at least prima facie, satisfactory,
a natural question arises: Which of the arguments—this argument or the argument
offered in Section 3.1—is preferable? The argument (14)–(17) involves the premise
that according to our best theory of musical and literary practice, inscriptions and
musical works are relevantly analogous. Since no analogy is perfect, it is impossible
to conclusively show that this premise is true. As a result, the soundness of the
argument (14)–(17) can always be questioned. The argument offered in Section 3.1,
however, does not have this shortcoming. And, at the same time, this argument is
at least as good as the argument (14)–(17) in all other respects. Thus, given what
has been said, there is good reason to hold that the argument offered in Section 3.1
is preferable to the argument (14)–(17).
3.3 Against the Weak Orthodox View
As has been shown in Section 3.1, the Strong Orthodox View is false: Inscrip-
tions cannot be well-formed instances of novels. But what about the Weak Orthodox
View—the view that inscriptions are non-well-formed instances of novels? Is it also
false?
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As shown in the previous chapter, to be a non-well-formed instance of an
artwork, it is necessary to manifest sufficiently many of the primary properties that
must be experienced to fully appreciate this work. So an inscription cannot be a
non-well-formed instance of a novel unless this inscription can manifest sufficiently
many of the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate this
novel. Can an inscription manifest sufficiently many of these properties? Perhaps
inscriptions can manifest some primary properties that must be experienced to fully
appreciate novels. However, as has been shown in Section 3.1, inscriptions cannot
manifest a significant portion of such properties—namely, the sonic properties of
novels. Given this, it is reasonable to answer the foregoing question in the negative.
Meanwhile, if this answer is correct, then, given what has been said, the Weak
Orthodox View is false.
The foregoing argument is based on the thesis that the sonic properties of a
novel are a significant portion of the primary properties that must be experienced
to fully appreciate novels. What if this thesis is false? Should we then accept the
Weak Orthodox View? No. For there is another way to show that this view is false.
As demonstrated in the previous chapter, an entity cannot be a non-well-formed
instance of an artwork unless this entity is, in principle, capable of manifesting all
sensory kinds of the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate
this work. So if an inscription is, in principle, incapable of manifesting all sensory
kinds of the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate the
corresponding novel, then inscriptions cannot be non-well-formed instances of novels.
Can an inscription, in principle, manifest all such kinds? As has been established
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in Section 3.1, no inscription can manifest certain primary properties that must be
experienced to fully appreciate a novel—namely, the sonic properties of this novel.
Meanwhile, these properties are a sensory kind. Thus, the answer to the foregoing
question is “No.” As a result, taking into account what has been said, the Weak
Orthodox View is false.
3.4 Against the Orthodox View
Thus, both the Strong and the Weak Orthodox Views fail: Inscriptions can be
neither well-formed nor non-well-formed instances of novels. Meanwhile, the Ortho-
dox View simpliciter—that is, the view that novels are instanced by inscriptions—is
true only if inscriptions are either well-formed instances of novels, or non-well-
formed instances of novels, or both well-formed and non-well-formed instances of
novels. Consequently, this view is false.
3.5 Appendix
That the mentioned theorists endorse the idea that novels are instanced by
inscriptions is evidenced by the following quotes:
• Noël Carroll: “When a play, like the dramatic text of Strange Interlude, is
considered as a literary work, then my copy of Strange Interlude is a token [=
an instance] of the art-type Strange Interlude...” (Carroll, 1998, 213).
• Arthur Danto: “I can... burn up a copy of the book in which a poem is
printed, but it is far from clear that in so doing I have burned up the poem,
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since it seems plain that though the page was destroyed, the poem was not;
and though it exists elsewhere, say in another copy, the poem cannot merely
be identical with that copy. For the same reason, it cannot be identified with
the pages just burned. This immediately suggests that the poem stands to the
class of its copies in something like the relationship in which a Platonic form
stands to its instances, where it would have been acknowledged by Plato that
the destruction of the instances leaves the form unaffected...; and by parallel
reasoning the Poem Itself appears to be logically incombustible” (Danto, 1981,
33).
• David Davies: “Generally, we accord the status of an e-instance only to those
events or objects for which we can obtain some guarantee that they have that
status, as is the case with copies of novels...” (Davies, 2010, 415).
• Stephen Davies: “If I copy out Austen’s Persuasion, I produce another in-
stance of her novel...” (Davies, 2003a, 158).
• John Dilworth: “Type theories are one popular way in which to explain how
a particular novel, musical composition, etc. could have multiple copies or
performances, yet still be such that all of its instances or tokens are purely
concrete items” (Dilworth, 2008, 346).
• Nelson Goodman: “All and only inscriptions and utterances of the text are
instances of the [literary] work...” (Goodman, 1968, 209).
• Peter Lamarque: “The view that copies of literary works are tokens [= in-
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stances] and the works themselves types is widely endorsed, although the
question of what these types are is more controversial” (Lamarque, 2009, 72).
• Jerrold Levinson: “My handwritten copy, I would maintain, is an instance of
Black’s poem...” (Levinson, 2011a, 99).
• Christy Mag Uidhir: “According to this standard account, our interaction
with such art-abstracta (e.g., Moby-Dick, The Eroica Symphony) must be
mediated by their associated concrete instances or specifications (e.g., copies
of Moby-Dick on library shelves, performances of The Eroica in symphony
halls)” (Mag Uidhir, 2013, 167).
• Aaron Meskin: “Multiple instance works (for example, the novel The Name of
the Rose) are types. Particular instances of such works (e.g., the copy of The
Name of the Rose in the British Library) are tokens, specific spatiotemporally
located instance of the novel” (Meskin and Robson, 2011, 554).
• Richard Wollheim: “Ulysses and Der Rosenkavalier are types, my copy of
Ulysses and tonight’s performance of Rosenkavalier are tokens [= instances]
of those types” (Wollheim, 1971, 50).
• Lee Walters: “It is extremely plausible to think of repeatable works of art
as types, of which their particular copies and performances are tokens [=
instances of the corresponding types]” (Walters, 2013, 461–462).
The foregoing quotes do not explicitly support the idea that the abovemen-
tioned philosophers share the conviction that inscriptions are well-formed instances
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of novels. In my view, however, this idea is uncontroversial and can be assumed. If
it were false, at least some of the proponents of treating inscriptions as instances of
novels would point out that inscriptions cannot be well-formed instances of novels.
However, to my knowledge, no one points that out.
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Chapter 4: An Ontology of Instances of Novels
Introduction
As shown in the previous chapter, the most widely held view on the nature of
instances of novels—the Orthodox View—fails. But what is then the correct view?
What are the entities that serve as instances of novels?
My goal in this chapter is to answer this question. I begin by addressing the
question of what entities serve as well-formed instances of novels, arguing that these
entities are readings (that is, particular sequences of sounds generated as a result
of reading aloud) and mereological sums of readings and graphic elements (Sections
4.1 and 4.2). Then I turn to the question of what entities serve as non-well-formed
instances of novels. I argue that these entities are the same as the entities that
serve as well-formed instances of novels—namely, readings and mereological sums of
readings and graphic elements (Section 4.3). Next, I respond to possible objections
to the view that novels are instanced by readings and mereological sums of readings
and graphic elements (Section 4.4). Finally, I examine potential consequences of
this view and make some remarks concerning its possible extension as well as the
question of what makes a reading a reading of a particular novel (Sections 4.5 and
4.6).
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4.1 Primary Appreciation-Relevant Experienceable Properties of Nov-
els
What entities serve as well-formed instances of novels? Before addressing this
question, let us first clarify what kinds of properties are contained in the set of the
primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate a novel.
As shown in the previous chapter,1 one kind of properties contained in this set
is the sonic properties of a novel. Are any other kinds of properties contained in it?
Consider experienceable properties that provide experiential access to the semantic
content of a novel (or, in other words, to what the novel tells the reader). Clearly,
the semantic content of a novel is essential to the aesthetic value of this novel.
And no novel can be fully appreciated without appreciating its aesthetic value.
So a full appreciation of a novel is impossible without appreciating the semantic
content of this novel. Meanwhile, to appreciate the semantic content of a novel,
it is necessary to experience certain properties that provide experiential access to
this content. Thus, the experienceable properties that provide experiential access
to the semantic content of a novel must be experienced to fully appreciate this
novel. Furthermore, these properties are primary. They provide experiential access
to the semantic content of a novel. And this content is clearly part of the novel’s
primary artistic content—the set of the contentful properties of the novel that are not
grounded in any other contentful properties. So the experienceable properties that
provide experiential access to the semantic content of a novel provide experiential
1See Chapter 3, Section 3.1.
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access to the primary artistic content of this novel. But then they are properties
through which this content is articulated. Meanwhile, any property through which
the primary artistic content of an artwork is articulated is primary.2
So another kind of properties contained in the set of the primary properties
that must be experienced to fully appreciate a novel is the experienceable properties
that provide experiential access to the semantic content. Now, what about the visual
properties of a novel? Are they contained in this set? Clearly, sonic properties are
non-visual. So the fact that such properties are contained in the set of the primary
properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate a novel does not entail that
any visual properties are contained in this set. What about the experienceable
properties that provide experiential access to the semantic content? Does the fact
that these properties are contained in the set of the primary properties that must be
experienced to fully appreciate a novel entail that any visual properties are contained
in this set? No. Of course, the experienceable properties that provide experiential
access to the semantic content can be visual, since in some cases, they can be
apprehended by merely looking at some entity—say, an inscription. But they do
not have to be visual. Thus, consider the properties of a (correct) recitation of a
novel. These properties provide experiential access to the semantic content of this
novel. But they are not visual (they are sonic).
So the fact that the sonic properties and certain experienceable properties that
provide experiential access to the semantic content are contained in the set of the
primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate a novel does not
2See Chapter 2, Section 2.1.
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entail that any visual properties are contained in this set. But, of course, this fact
does not entail the opposite—that no visual properties are contained in this set. So
the question remains: Are any visual properties contained in the set of the primary
properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate a novel?
An answer to this question depends on whether novels under consideration
have aesthetically relevant graphic elements—such as drawings, diagrams, maps,
photographs, etc. Suppose these novels do have such elements.3 Then the answer
is “Yes”: Certain visual properties are contained in the set of the primary proper-
ties that must be experienced to fully appreciate a novel. For consider novels with
aesthetically relevant graphic elements. Must any visual properties be experienced
to fully appreciate such novels? As mentioned earlier, no novel can be fully ap-
preciated without appreciating what is essential to its aesthetic value. Clearly, in
the case of novels that have aesthetically relevant graphic elements, these elements
are essential to the aesthetic value of these novels. So none of these novels can
be properly appreciated without appreciating its graphic elements. Meanwhile, a
correct appreciation of a graphic element requires an experiential engagement with
3Examples of novels that have aesthetically relevant graphic elements are Dan Brown’s The Da
Vinci Code, which involves pictures of certain unreadable symbols; Mark Z. Danielewski’s House
of Leaves, which includes words printed in blue and purple; Kurt Vonnegut’s Breakfast of Cham-
pions, which contains numerous drawings of things like the yin-yang symbol, female underpants,
and Eliot Rosewater’s handwriting; R. L. Stevenson’s Treasure Island, which includes a map of
Treasure Island drawn by the author; and W. G. Sebald’s Schwindel. Gefühl, which incorporates
photographs, maps, and drawings.
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certain visual properties.4 Thus, to fully appreciate novels that involve aesthetically
relevant graphic elements, certain visual properties must be experienced. Further-
more, these properties are primary. They provide experiential access to a part of the
primary artistic content of a novel—namely, certain graphic elements—and, hence,
are among the properties through which this content is articulated. Meanwhile,
as already mentioned, any property through which the primary artistic content is
articulated is primary.
Thus, in the case of novels that involve aesthetically relevant graphic elements,
certain visual properties are contained in the set of the primary properties that must
be experienced to fully appreciate these novels. At the same time, that is not how
things are in the case of novels that do not involve aesthetically relevant graphic
elements.5 In this case, it is not necessary to experience any visual properties to
fully appreciate a novel—and so such properties are not contained in the set of the
primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate these novels.
Given what has been said, the question of what kinds of properties are con-
tained in the set of the primary properties that must be experienced to fully ap-
preciate a novel can be answered as follows: The kinds of properties contained in
the set of the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate any
novel are certain sonic properties and experienceable properties that provide expe-
4This is not to say, of course, that we cannot, in principle, correctly appreciate a graphic element
without actually seeing it. For, in at least some cases, we can correctly appreciate such a property
by “seeing” it with the help our imagination.
5It seems safe to maintain that such novels constitute the majority of all novels.
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riential access to the semantic content; the kinds of properties contained in the set
of the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate a novel that
involves aesthetically relevant graphic elements are certain sonic properties, expe-
rienceable properties that provide experiential access to the semantic content, and
certain visual properties.
4.2 The Ontological Status of Well-Formed Instances of Novels
Having clarified what kinds of properties are contained in the set of the primary
properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate a novel, we can now turn to
the question of what entities serve as well-formed instances of novels.
In light of what has been said in the previous section, all novels can be divided
into two groups:
• Non-visual novels, or novels whose primary properties that must be expe-
rienced to fully appreciate these novels are certain (a) sonic properties and
(b) experienceable properties that provide experiential access to the semantic
content; and
• Visual novels, or novels whose primary properties that must be experienced
to fully appreciate these novels are certain (a) sonic properties, (b) experience-
able properties that provide experiential access to the semantic content, and
(c) visual properties.
Given this distinction, it is clear that to answer the question “What entities serve
as well-formed instances of novels?,” it is sufficient to answer two questions: “What
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entities serve as well-formed instance of visual novels?” and “What entities serve as
well-formed instances of non-visual novels?” Let us answer these questions.
4.2.1 Readings as Well-formed Instances of Non-Visual Novels
In my view, the best candidates for the role of the entities that serve as well-
formed instances of non-visual novels are readings. Before explaining why this is so,
let us first clarify what exactly is meant here by “a reading” and what sort of thing
a reading is, ontologically speaking.
Here is a possible definition of “a reading”:
Reading: For all x, x is a reading just in case x is a sequence of particular external
(spatiotemporal) sounds generated as a result of reading aloud.
Note that a reading, thus understood, does not have to be directly produced by a
human being. Thus, both a sequence of sounds generated as a result of sounding
out a text by a computer and a sequence of sounds generated as a result of playing
an audiobook can be readings.
Note also that the sense in which the expression “a reading” is used here
is different from two common senses of this expression: the sense according to
which a reading is an act of extracting meanings from syntactic sequences and the
sense according to which “a reading” is synonymous with “an interpretation.” (An
example of the use of “a reading” in the former sense is the use of “a reading” in
the sentence “Your reading of the instructions is too slow.” In the latter sense, “a
reading” is used, for example, in the sentence “Two literary critics have different
147
readings of James Joyce’s Ulysses.”)
Having clarified the meaning of “a reading,” let us now clarify what sort of
thing a reading is, ontologically speaking. According to the foregoing definition,
readings are sequences of sounds generated as a result of reading aloud (hereafter:
“sequences of sounds”). What is the ontological status of these sequences? To
answer this question, it is necessary to answer the following questions:
(1) Are sequences of sounds concrete or abstract?;
(2) If sequences of sounds are concrete, then are they objects, events, or something
else?;
(3) What sort of things are the constituents of these sequences—sounds—ontologically
speaking?
Let us first answer question (1). Sounds are doubtless concrete. So sequences of
sounds are sequences of concreta. Meanwhile, a sequence—at least, as it is under-
stood here—is a mereological sum. So sequences of sounds are mereological sums
of concreta. But a mereological sum of concreta is a concretum. So sequences of
sounds are concreta.6
Let us now turn to question (2) (“If sequences of sounds are concrete, then are
they objects, events, or something else?”). To answer it, we first need to highlight
some major standard (though not universally accepted) differences between objects
6Note that here, by “a sequence” is meant a mereological sum. If “a sequence” were used in a
different sense—say, in the sense of a particular set—then, of course, the conclusion of the given
argument—“Sequences of sounds are concreta”—would not follow.
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and events. As Casati and Dokic (2014) point out, there are five such differences.
First, there is a difference in mode of being: [1] material objects such as
stones and chairs are said to exist ; events are said to occur or happen
or take place.... Second, there are differences in the way objects and
events relate to space and time. [2] Ordinary objects are supposed to
have relatively crisp spatial boundaries and vague temporal boundaries;
events, by contrast, would have relatively vague spatial boundaries and
crisp temporal boundaries. [3] Objects are said to be invidiously located
in space—they occupy their spatial location; events tolerate co-location
much more easily.... [4] Objects can move; events cannot.... Finally, [5]
objects are standardly construed as continuants—they are in time and
persist through time by being wholly present at every time at which they
exist; events are occurrents—they take up time and persist by having
different parts (or “stages”) at different times.... (2014)
Taking this into account, let us now answer question (2). While sequences of sounds
can be said to exist, it seems more natural to say that they occur or take place.
Furthermore, since it is unclear where exactly sequences of sounds are spatially
located but, at the same time, relatively clear where they are temporally located,
sequences of sounds have vague spatial boundaries and crisp temporal boundaries.
Next, sequences of sounds appear to tolerate co-location: It seems plausible to say
that two different sequences of sounds can be located at the same spatial region
at the same time. Also, sequences of sounds do not seem to be capable of moving
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from one place to another. Finally, sequences of sounds take up time and persist by
having different parts (sounds) at different times. Thus, sequences of sounds seem to
possess the characteristics that, on Casati and Dokic (2014)’s account, are peculiar
to events. Given this, such sequences should be treated as events, not objects.
Finally, let us address question (3) (“What sort of things are sounds, on-
tologically speaking?”). There are a number of possible answers to this question.
According to the Property View, a sound is a particular property. Depending on the
kind of this property, there can be different versions of this view. According to one
version, a sound is a dispositional property, or “power,” to produce auditory expe-
riences in a perceiver. According to another version, a sound is a physical property
that is capable of producing auditory experiences in a perceiver. According to yet
another version, a sound is a mental property of a perceiver’s auditory experiences.7
Can the Property View, in any of its versions, be accepted? Here is one reason
to say “No.” If a sound is a property, then it is a universal, and not a particular.
But is a sound, in fact, a universal, and not a particular? As is generally agreed, a
particular has two features that distinguish it from a universal.8 First, it is not in-
stantiated by other entities; rather, it itself instantiates other entities—for example,
various properties. Second, it can survive change to its intrinsic properties. There
is no doubt that a sound has the first of these features. A sound is not instantiated
by other entities; rather, it itself instantiates other entities—for example, proper-
7A notable proponent of the Property View is Locke (1975). Also, this view has recently been
advocated by Pasnau (1999).
8It is assumed here that an entity is either a particular or a universal.
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ties such as “being loud,” “being high-pitched,” “being mellifluous,” etc. Does a
sound have the second feature? Suppose that at a particular moment t1, we hear
some sound—say, the sound of a siren—and this sound is perceived by us as quiet
and low-pitched. Suppose next that what we hear gradually becomes louder and
louder—so that at t2, it becomes very loud and high-pitched. It would be odd to
say that the t2 sound and the t1 sound are completely different. The natural view is
that the t2 sound is the t1 sound that has undergone a particular change—namely,
has changed from being quiet and low-pitched to being loud and high-pitched. But
if this is so, then, given the fact that being quiet and low-pitched and being loud
and high-pitched are intrinsic properties, there is good reason to hold that a sound
is capable of surviving change in its intrinsic properties, which means that a sound
has the second characteristic feature of a paradigmatic particular.
Thus, a sound possesses both characteristic features of a particular. Mean-
while, if this is so, then a sound should be regarded as a particular, not a universal.
Another consideration against the Property View concerns the possibility of
attributing certain properties to sounds. Consider the property of being red. This
property is not itself red; what is red is an object that manifests this property.
Analogously, the property of being loud is not loud; what is loud is an object that
manifests this property. But if this is so, then if sounds are properties, then sounds
cannot be literally characterized as “loud.” This consequence, however, is unaccept-
able. Surely, any potentially plausible account of sounds must be compatible with
the idea that sounds can literally be characterized as “loud.” (Obviously, the scope
of this objection is not restricted to the case of attributing to sounds the property
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of being loud; the objection can be extended to other similar cases.)
In light of the above considerations against the Property View, it is reasonable
to search for a less controversial account of the nature of sounds. A potential
candidate for the role of such an account is the Sensation View—the view that
a sound is a non-physical, mental entity (say, a sensation produced in the listener
when the sound waves reach her ear).9 To support this view, the following argument
can be offered. There is a good reason to hold that a sound can be generated
even in the absence of any external (physical) cause. The reason is that there
are numerous reports of people literally hearing sounds—such as ringing, buzzing,
and even voices—when there are no external (physical) causes for these sounds.
Meanwhile, a physical entity x can be generated only if there is another physical
entity y that generates x—or, in other words, only if there is a physical cause of x.
Thus, a sound is not essentially physical. Meanwhile, if an entity is not essentially
physical, then it is natural to assume that this entity is not physical at all. As a
result, there is good reason to regard a sound as a non-physical entity. But if a
sound is such an entity, then it must be either mental or abstract. Surely, it is not
abstract, for it can be perceived and, hence, is (directly) perceptually accessible,
whereas no abstractum is (directly) perceptually accessible. So a sound is a mental
entity.
The foregoing argument in favor of the Sensation View implies that the fact
that someone hears a sound when there is no external (physical) cause of this sound
is sufficient to demonstrate that this sound can be generated without such a cause.
9A notable proponent of the Sensation View is Maclachlan (1989).
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Is this implication true? Suppose John claims that he is hearing someone’s voice.
Suppose also that in fact, there is no external (physical) source that could produce
this voice. What would our reaction to John’s claim be? Most likely, we would
say: “In fact, no one is talking here. You are having auditory hallucinations.” If
our reaction to John’s claim is correct—and there seems to be no reason to think
otherwise—then the fact that someone hears a sound when there is no external
(physical) cause of this sound is insufficient to demonstrate that this sound actually
exists (similarly, the fact that someone sees a pink elephant dancing the Argentine
tango does not mean that this elephant actually exists). Meanwhile, if this fact is
insufficient to demonstrate that, then it is also insufficient to demonstrate that the
foregoing sound can, in fact, be generated without an external (physical) cause.
Thus, the above argument in favor of the Sensation View cannot be accepted.
At the same time, there are at least two reasons against this view. One of these
reasons is as follows. If the Sensation View is true, then sounds, being mental
entities, are not publicly available—that is, they cannot be experienced by anyone
other than the person who has them in his/her mind. But this consequence is
problematic. Suppose sounds are not publicly available. Then when listening to a
musical performance (understood as a particular sequence of sounds) at a concert,
each of us is listening to his/her private performance, not one and the same publicly
available performance. However, this result seems false. Prima facie, when we listen
to a musical performance at a concert, each of us listens to one and the same publicly
available performance, not his/her own private performance.
Similarly, if sounds are not publicly available, then when listening to a (public)
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lecture (understood as a particular sequence of sounds), each of us is listening to
his/her private lecture, not one and the same publicly available lecture. But this
result does not appear correct. It seems odd to claim that when we listen to a
lecture, each of us listens to his/her private lecture, rather than to one and the
same publicly available lecture.
Here is another reason against the Sensation View. If this view is true, then,
since mental entities have no spatial location, sounds have no such location. How-
ever, there is a good reason to hold that sounds do have spatial location. The
reason is that according to our auditory experience, many (though, of course, not
all) sounds have a nonmental, spatial origin. Thus, when we perceive that some-
body is talking to us, we do not think that the sound of her voice originates in our
mind; rather, we think that this sound originates outside our mind—somewhere in
space (where exactly it originates is another question). Likewise, when we perceive
that someone is ringing a bell, we think that the sound generated as a result of this
ringing originates in space, not inside our mind.
One could respond that if the mental is identical or can be completely re-
duced to physical brain states, then, contrary to what the foregoing argument states,
sounds have spatial location—they are located where the relevant parts of the brain
are located. This response, however, is unpersuasive. First of all, it assumes that
the mental is reducible to the physical, but this assumption is controversial. More
importantly, the key idea of the response being discussed—that sounds are located
where the relevant parts of the brain are located—contradicts our auditory experi-
ence. Consider again the sounds of talking and ringing a bell. We do not perceive
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these sounds as originating where the relevant parts of one’s brain are located. Ac-
cording to our auditory experience, the sound of ringing a bell originates where the
bell is, while the sound of talking originates where the one who is talking is.
Thus, like the Property View, the Sensation View is problematic. A more
promising account of the nature of a sound is provided by the Wave View. On this
view, a sound is a wave “that is generated by a disturbance and that moves through
a surrounding medium [such as water or air]” (O’Callaghan, 2009, 28). The Wave
View has been rather popular and may well be characterized as the standard account
of the nature of a sound. Advocates of the Wave View include most contemporary
physicists and a considerable number of contemporary philosophers. Furthermore,
this view (or, at least, something very similar to it) was endorsed by Aristotle,
Galileo, Descartes, and some other notable thinkers of the past.
The popularity of the Wave View can be explained by the fact that “many
perceptual properties of sounds are neatly explained by the presence of strong cor-
relations with properties of waves, in particular pitch and intensity (i.e. volume)”
(Casati and Dokic, 2014). Thus:
The felt quality of high pitch is correlated with high frequencies; low
pitch is correlated with low frequencies; high volumes are correlated with
high, low volumes with low, amplitudes. The directionality of sounds
(the fact that they appear to be ‘in a direction’) is related to the fact
that the hearer is located on a propagation line from the source. Even
more accomplished is the explanation of particular auditory effects, such
155
as the Doppler effect, whereby the speed of a sounding object in motion
contributes to a change in the sound’s heard pitch (so that the whistle
of an engine passing by is heard to drop in pitch as it travels past us).
(Casati and Dokic, 2014)
However, as O’Callaghan (2009) points out, the Wave View is not unprob-
lematic. Suppose sounds are waves. Then, since waves travel through air (or some
other medium), sounds must travel through air (or some other medium). However:
...This is not how things seem.... Sounds are not perceived... to travel
through the air [or some other medium] as waves do. They are heard
to be roughly where the events that cause them take place.... When we
hear a clock ticking, the sound seems to be “over there” by the clock;
voices are heard to be in the neighborhood of speakers’ heads and torsos;
when a door slams in another part of the house, we know at least roughly
where the accompanying racket takes place. (O’Callaghan, 2009, 28–29)
So, assuming that our auditory experience is not systematically illusory—and there
seem to be no persuasive considerations to think otherwise—there is a powerful
reason against treating sounds as waves.
Given the foregoing problem, even the Wave View cannot be considered com-
pletely satisfactory (although it seems right to characterize this view as less prob-
lematic than the Property and the Sensation Views). Is there a satisfactory view
on the nature of a sound?
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A highly plausible candidate for the role of such a view is the Event View.10 On
this view, a sound is a particular disturbance event—an event “in which a medium
is disturbed or set into wave-like motion by the movement of a body or interacting
bodies” (O’Callaghan, 2009, 36). Thus, the sound that comes into existence as a
result of the striking of a tuning fork in air is the event of disturbing the air by the
oscillation of the fork (where the oscillation is generated as a result of striking the
fork). And the sound of reading is the event of disturbing the air as a result of the
reader’s moving her lips, tongue, and certain other parts of her body.
Why think that the Event View is a highly plausible candidate for the role of a
satisfactory view on the nature of a sound? One reason to think so is that this view
does not have the shortcomings of the views examined above. A disturbance event
can take place where we perceive the corresponding sound to be. For example, in
the case of the tuning fork, the disturbance event takes place where the oscillation
of the fork disturbs the air—and this accords with our perceptual experience of the
location of the sound that comes into existence as a result of striking this fork. So
if a sound is a disturbance event, then a sound can take place where we perceive it
to be. Consequently, the Event View avoids the problem of the Wave View, as well
as one of the problems of the Sensation View.
Next, a disturbance event, being a physical entity, is publicly available. Thus,
if a sound is a disturbance event, then it is publicly available. Therefore, the Event
View avoids the second of the problems of the Sensation View.
Finally, a disturbance event is a particular and can be literally characterized as
10A notable proponent of the Event View is O’Callaghan (2009, 2010).
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having the property of being loud as well as other properties we normally attribute
to sounds. So if a sound is a disturbance event, then it is a particular and can be
literally characterized as having the mentioned properties. As a result, the Event
View avoids the problems of the Property View.
Thus, the Event View does not face the problems of the Property, Sensation,
and Wave Views. At the same time, as far as I am aware, this view does not face
any other problems.11 In light of this, the Event View can, I think, be regarded as
a highly plausible candidate for the role of a satisfactory account of the nature of a
sound. Given this, there is, I think, good reason to adopt this view—at least, as a
working account of the nature of a sound. (It is worth noting, however, that neither
the arguments of this chapter nor the arguments presented elsewhere depend on the
truth of the Event View.)




• a sequence (a mereological sum) of certain sounds, where the latter are partic-
ular disturbance events, namely events in which the air is disturbed by certain
movements performed by a reader.12
11For a powerful defense of the Event View against potential objections, see O’Callaghan (2009,
2010).
12Here, “a reader” can refer not only to humans but also to things like computers.
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Having clarified what is meant by “a reading” and what sort of thing a reading
is, ontologically speaking, let us return to our main thesis—that the entities that
serve as well-formed instances of non-visual novels are readings. Why think that
this thesis is true?
Surely, readings, being essentially sonic entities, can manifest the relevant
sonic properties. What about the experienceable properties that provide experiential
access to the semantic content? Can they be manifested by readings? Clearly, we
can grasp the semantic content of a novel solely by listening to a reading of this novel.
But if this is so, then the experienceable properties that provide experiential access
to this content can be apprehended by means of directly experiencing this reading.
Meanwhile, if a property can be apprehended as a result of directly experiencing
some entity, then this entity manifests this property. So the foregoing question
should be answered in the affirmative.
Thus, readings can manifest both the relevant sonic properties and experi-
enceable properties that provide experiential access to the semantic content. Mean-
while, as already mentioned, the primary properties that must be experienced to
fully appreciate a non-visual novel include only the relevant sonic properties and
experienceable properties that provide experiential access to the semantic content.
As a result, readings are capable of manifesting all the primary properties that must
be experienced to fully appreciate non-visual novels. But if this is so, then, since
manifesting all the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate
an artwork is sufficient for being a well-formed instancee of this work, readings are
capable of being well-formed instancese of non-visual novels.
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Now, what about well-formed instancesp of non-visual novels? Can readings
serve as such instances? To be a well-formed instancep of an artwork, it is suffi-
cient to (a) manifest all the primary properties that must be experienced to fully
appreciate this work and (b) stand in an appropriate historical-intentional relation
to it. As has been shown above, readings can manifest all the primary proper-
ties that must be experienced to fully appreciate non-visual novels. Furthermore,
there is nothing to suggest that readings of such novels cannot stand in appro-
priate historical-intentional relations to these novels. Given this, readings can be
well-formed instancesp of non-visual novels.
One might suggest that, besides readings, there is another class of entities that
can serve as well-formed instances of non-visual novels—namely, mental “voicings,”
or, in other words, sequences of particular sounds produced in one’s mind with the
help of imagination. Is this suggestion acceptable? To answer this question we first
need to answer the following question: Are mental “voicings” capable of manifesting
the sonic properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate non-visual novels?
The first thing to note is that there is little doubt that mental “voicings”
can manifest some sonic properties. Take any mental “voicing.” At least some
of its sonic properties can be apprehended by directly perceiving it. Meanwhile,
if a property is apprehensible by directly perceiving some entity, then this entity
manifests this property.
But can mental “voicings” manifest the sonic properties that must be expe-
rienced to fully appreciate the corresponding novels? An essential characteristic of
at least some of these properties is the possession of a particular degree of sonic
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vividness—the degree similar to the one possessed by sonic properties that are man-
ifested by means of real sound. However, properties manifested through mental
“voicings” lack this characteristic. The degree of sonic vividness of these proper-
ties is much lower than the degree of such vividness of sonic properties manifested
through reading aloud.
Thus, there is good reason to regard mental “voicings” as incapable of mani-
festing all the sonic properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate novels.
Meanwhile, as shown in the previous chapter, to be a well-formed instance of a novel,
it is necessary to manifest these properties. So mental “voicings” cannot serve as
well-formed instances of novels and a fortiori non-visual novels.
One might object by saying that the foregoing argument fails because it falsely
assumes that sonic properties manifested by mental “voicings” are not as sonically
vivid as sonic properties manifested through reading aloud. Is this objection suc-
cessful? It implies that sonic properties manifested by mental “voicings” are at
least as sonically vivid as sonic properties manifested through reading aloud. But
this implication is false. Reading a text aloud generates sounds that are consid-
erably more sonically vivid than the “sounds” that result from mentally “voicing”
this text. Put otherwise, the sonic vividness of a reading of a text is considerably
greater than the sonic vividness of a mental “voicing” of this text. Similarly, the
sonic vividness of actual music (such as an actual musical performance or a playing
of a recording of such a performance) considerably surpasses the sonic vividness of
any music “performed,” with the help of imagination, in one’s mind.13 Meanwhile,
13This is not to say, of course, that a mental “voicing” of a text/music “performed” in one’s
161
the sonic vividness of sonic properties is directly proportional to the sonic vividness
of the sounds on which these properties supervene. As a result, the sonic vividness
of the sonic properties manifested through reading aloud is greater than the sonic
vividness of the sonic properties manifested by mental “voicings.”
There seems no other potentially successful objection to the foregoing argu-
ment against treating mental “voicings” as well-formed instances of non-visual nov-
els. Given this, this argument can, I think, be accepted. But what if it is, in fact,
unacceptable? In this case, there is good reason to hold that a mental “voicing”
can be a well-formed instance of a non-visual novel. Note, however, that the fact
that a mental “voicing” can be a well-formed instance of a non-visual novel does
not pose any real threat to the essence of the view defended in this chapter. If non-
visual novels can be properly instanced by mental “voicings,” this view can easily be
rectified—by (a) rejecting the foregoing argument against treating mental “voicings”
as well-formed instances of non-visual novels and (b) replacing the current account
of “a reading” with an account according to which readings are not only sequences
of particular actual sounds generated as a result of reading aloud but also mental
“voicings,” or sequences of particular mental “sounds” (or “sounds” produced in
one’s mind with the help of imagination) generated as a result of reading silently.
Before proceeding further, it is worth pointing out that treating readings as
well-formed instances of non-visual novels does not give us reason to think that
“the lookings at a picture and the listenings to a performance” (Goodman, 1968,
mind cannot surpass a reading of a text/actual music in some non-sonic (say, emotional) vividness.
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114) are well-formed instances of paintings and musical works, respectively.14 Before
explaining why this is so, it is necessary to clarify what is meant here by “a looking”
and “a listening.” Each of these expressions can be used in either of two senses. In
one sense, “a looking” and “a listening” refer to particular acts: the act of looking
and the act of listening, respectively. In the second sense, they refer to particular
kinds of experience: the experience of looking at something and the experience of
listening to something, respectively.
So why think that treating readings as well-formed instances of non-visual nov-
els does not give us reason to think that “the lookings at a picture and the listenings
to a performance” (Goodman, 1968, 114) are well-formed instances of paintings and
musical works, respectively? Suppose that “a looking” and “a listening” are used in
the first sense. Then the lookings at a painting and the listenings to a performance
are particular acts. However, such acts, obviously, do not manifest the properties
bearing on the appreciation of the corresponding works and, hence, the primary
properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate these works. So, understood
in this sense, neither the lookings nor the hearings can be well-formed instances of
paintings and musical works, respectively. Suppose next that “a looking” and “a
listening” are used in the second sense. In this case, the lookings at a painting and
the listenings to a performance are particular perceptual or quasi-perceptual (imagi-
nary) experiences, namely the experience of looking at a painting and the experience
of listening to a performance, respectively. However, such experiences do not man-
ifest the properties of the objects of which they are experiences. Thus, when you
14See Goodman (1968).
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are looking at a black painting, the experience that you get—the experience of this
painting—is not itself black and, hence, does not manifest the property of blackness
(what manifests this property is the painting). Similarly, when you hear a particular
sound, the experience that you get—the experience of this sound—does not emit
any sound and so does not manifest the property of sounding a particular way (it
is the sound that manifests this property). Meanwhile, if the lookings at a painting
and the listenings to a performance do not manifest the properties of the objects
of which they are experiences, then neither the lookings nor the listenings mani-
fest the properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate the corresponding
works, and so neither the lookings nor the listenings can be well-formed instances
of paintings and musical works, respectively.
4.2.2 Mereological Sums of Readings and Graphic Elements as Well-
Formed Instances of Visual Novels
Thus, the entities that can serve as well-formed instances of non-visual novels
are readings. What are the entities that can serve as well-formed instances of visual
novels?
The first thing to note is that these entities cannot be readings. To be an in-
stance of an artwork, an entity must manifest all the primary properties that must
be experienced to fully appreciate this work. As shown in Section 4.1, the primary
properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate visual novels include certain
visual properties. Thus, the entities that serve as well-formed instances of visual
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novels must be capable of manifesting visual properties. However, readings cannot
manifest such properties. For (a) an entity can manifest a property only if this prop-
erty is apprehensible by directly perceiving this entity, but (b) no visual property is
apprehensible by directly perceiving a reading (an essentially sonic entity).
What are then the entities that serve as well-formed instances of visual novels?
As is clear from what has been said earlier, the primary properties that must be
experienced to fully appreciate a visual novel are certain sonic properties, experi-
enceable properties that provide experiential access to the semantic content, and
visual properties. As noted in the previous subsection, the sonic properties and
experienceable properties that provide experiential access to the semantic content
can be manifested by readings. Now, what about the visual properties? What can
they be manifested by? The answer, I think, is as follows: The visual properties
can be manifested by various graphic elements—for example, pictures of certain
unreadable singular symbols and sequences of symbols, in the case of The Da Vinci
Code; words printed in blue and purple, in the case of House of Leaves ; a drawing
of the map of Treasure Island, in the case of Treasure Island ; pictures of things like
the yin-yang symbol, female underpants, and Eliot Rosewater’s handwriting, in the
case of Breakfast of Champions ; and photographs, maps, and drawings, in the case
of Schwindel. Gefühl.
In light of what has been said, the entity that can manifest all the primary
properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate a visual novel is whatever
involves a reading of this novel and particular graphic elements. Now, of course, a
natural question arises: Ontologically speaking, what is this entity?
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One possible answer to the foregoing question is that it is a set of a read-
ing and particular graphic elements. This answer, however, is unacceptable. The
consensus is that sets are abstracta. Meanwhile, as is generally agreed, abstracta
are directly imperceptible and, hence, cannot manifest any properties. So if the
entity that involves a reading and graphic elements is a set, then it cannot manifest
any properties—and, hence, cannot be the entity that can manifest all the primary
properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate a visual novel.
One could respond to the foregoing objection by adopting a view according to
which sets are concreta—say, the view advocated by Maddy (1990). However, this
response is unappealing. As shown by Balaguer (1998) and Carson (1996), among
others, Maddy (1990)’s view is highly problematic. And, to my knowledge, there is
no other potentially acceptable view according to which sets are concreta.
Another possible answer to the question posed above is that the entity in
question is a mereological sum (or fusion) of a reading and graphic elements. This
answer has at least two advantages. First, it is categorially transparent: It entails
that the entities containing readings and graphic elements fall under the category
of “a mereological sum,” and this category is reasonably well understood in meta-
physics. Second, the answer being discussed does not face the analog of the problem
of the previous answer. It would face this analog only if a mereological sum of a
reading and graphic elements were abstract. However, such a sum is concrete—for,
(a) it is a mereological sum of certain concreta—namely, a reading and graphic
elements—and (b) any mereological sum of concreta is concrete.
Here, one could object as follows. The foregoing answer implies that mereolog-
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ical sums of readings and graphic elements are metaphysically unproblematic. But is
this implication, in fact, true? Mereological sums of readings and graphic elements
are concreta constituted by readings and graphic elements. As has been demon-
strated above, readings are events. And graphic elements are objects. So mereo-
logical sums of readings and graphic elements are concreta constituted by events
and objects. However, no standard concretum—concretum included in what might
be called “the ontology of ordinary language”—is constituted this way. Meanwhile,
if this is so, then mereological sums of readings and graphic elements are rather
strange entities and, hence, are metaphysically problematic.
This objection assumes that the fact that a mereological sum of a reading
and graphic elements, being an entity constituted by an event and an object, is a
strange concretum entails that such a sum is metaphysically problematic. Is this
assumption true? Surely, a mereological sum of a reading and graphic elements is,
in some sense, a strange concretum—a concretum that, unlike “ordinary” concreta,
is constituted by both an event and objects. But why think that this entails that
such a sum is problematic, from a metaphysical viewpoint? The fact that an entity
is strange does not, by itself, show that there is something wrong with this entity.
For there are a number of entities that are considered strange but at the same time
universally acknowledged as part of our ontology (consider, for instance, quarks).
Thus, a mereological sum of a reading and graphic elements cannot be metaphysi-
cally problematic merely because it is strange. Can it be metaphysically problematic
because it is particularly strange—that is, because, unlike “ordinary” concreta, it is
constituted by an event and objects? Prima facie, the answer is “No.” The mere
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fact that a concretum is constituted by an event and objects does not seem to be a
reason to hold that there is something wrong with this entity, from a metaphysical
viewpoint.
In light of what has been said, the question of whether the assumption being
discussed is true should be answered in the negative. If this answer is correct—and
there seems no reason to think otherwise—the objection being discussed involves a
false assumption and, hence, fails.
One could also object to the answer that the entity involving a reading and
graphic elements is a mereological sum as follows. This answer requires us to add
a new kind of entity—the mereological sum of a reading and graphic elements—to
our ontology and thereby make this ontology less parsimonious. However, making
an ontology less parsimonious is highly undesirable.
Like the previous objection, this objection fails. It assumes that making an
ontology less parsimonious is undesirable. But this assumption is false. Making an
ontology less parsimonious is undesirable only if doing so is unreasonable. However,
in our case, there is a good reason to make the ontology less parsimonious. The
reason is that we need to explain what sort of entity serves as a well-formed instance
of a visual novel.
Thus, neither objection to the answer that the entity that involves a reading
and graphic elements is a mereological sum is satisfactory. And there seem to be
no other potentially satisfactory objections. Meanwhile, as mentioned earlier, this
answer has at least two advantages. First, it is categorially transparent. Second,
it avoids the objection to the answer according to which the entity that contains a
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reading and graphic elements is a set. Given this, let us agree that the entity that
contains a reading and graphic elements is a mereological sum.
Here, one might ask: What sort of thing is a mereological sum of a reading
and graphic elements, ontologically speaking? To answer the foregoing question, it
is necessary to answer the following questions:
(1) Are mereological sums of readings and graphic elements concrete or abstract?
(2) Are mereological sums of readings and graphic elements objects, events, or
something else?
(3) What sort of things are the constituents of these sums—readings and graphic
elements, ontologically speaking?
The first of these questions has already been answered: Mereological sums of read-
ings and graphic elements are concrete. Let us, therefore, turn to question (2). It
is reasonable to assume that a mereological sum is (a) an event if and only if it is
constituted solely by events, and (b) an object if and only if it is constituted solely
by objects. However, as shown above, mereological sums of readings and graphic
elements are constituted by both events and objects. As a result, such sums cannot
be classified as objects or events. How should they be classified then? The best
answer to this question, I think, is to classify them as some third kind of entity—an
entity that is neither (purely) an event nor (purely) an object but that is partly an
event and partly an object.
Let us now address question (3) (“What sort of things are readings and graphic
elements, ontologically speaking?”). The nature of readings has already been clar-
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ified in the previous subsection. The nature of graphic elements is relatively clear:
Graphic elements are particular concrete objects, namely those concrete objects that
manifest visual (primarily, color) properties.
Given what has been said, a mereological sum of a reading and graphic ele-
ments can be characterized as:
• a concretum;
• an entity that is neither (purely) an event nor (purely) an object but that is
partly an event and partly an object;
• an entity that is constituted by a reading and graphic elements, where a read-
ing is a sequence (a mereological sum) of certain sounds (= particular distur-
bance events, namely events in which the air is disturbed by certain move-
ments performed by a reader), and graphic elements are certain concreta that
manifest the relevant visual properties.
Having clarified the nature of mereological sums of readings and graphic ele-
ments, let us return to our main question—the question “What are the entities that
can serve as well-formed instances of visual novels?” As has been established, the
entities that can manifest all the primary properties that must be experienced to
fully appreciate visual novels are mereological sums (hereafter: “sums”) of readings
and graphic elements. Recall now that if an entity manifests all the primary prop-
erties that must be experienced to fully appreciate an artwork, then this entity is a
well-formed instancee of this work. So sums of readings and graphic elements can
be well-formed instancese of visual novels.
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Can sums of readings and graphic elements be well-formed instancesp of visual
novels? An entity is a well-formed instancep of an artwork if this entity (a) manifests
all the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate this work
and (b) stands in an appropriate historical-intentional relation to it. As already
mentioned, sums of readings and graphic elements can manifest all the primary
properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate visual novels. Furthermore,
such sums doubtless can stand in any appropriate historical-intentional relation to
the corresponding visual novels. So the question posed above can be answered in
the affirmative.
4.2.3 Conclusion
Thus, readings can be well-formed instances of non-visual novels, while sums
of readings and graphic elements can be well-formed instances of visual novels. In
light of this, the questions posed at the beginning of Section 4.2—“What entities
serve as well-formed instances of visual novels?” and “What entities serve as well-
formed instances of non-visual novels?”—can be answered as follows: The entities
that serve as well-formed instances of visual novels are sums of readings and graphic
elements; the entities that serve as well-formed instances of non-visual novels are
readings. Now, since, as has already been mentioned, answering these questions is
sufficient to answer the question “What entities serve as well-formed instances of
novels?,” the foregoing answer is also the answer to this latter question.
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4.3 The Ontological Status of Non-Well-Formed Instances of Novels
Having established what entities serve as well-formed instances of novels, let
us now establish what entities serve as non-well-formed instances of novels. The first
thing to note is that establishing what entities serve as non-well-formed instances
of novels makes sense only if we accept that there can be non-well-formed instances
of novels. And we do not have to accept that. Thus, following Goodman (1968),
we could maintain that novels as well as works of other notational arts do not have
non-well-formed instances—for example, instances that involve minor errors (such
as a single wrong letter or note)—since any entity that serves as an instance of
a work of a notational art must comply perfectly with the canonical notation of
this work. However, denying the possibility of non-well-formed instances of novels
goes against the widely endorsed view according to which novels can have non-well-
formed instances. In light of this, let us assume that non-well-formed instances of
novels are possible.
What entities can serve as non-well-formed instances of novels? To be a non-
well-formed instance of an artwork, it is sufficient (a) to be an instance of this
work; (b) to manifest sufficiently many, but not all, of the primary properties that
must be experienced to fully appreciate this work; and (c) to be, in principle, ca-
pable of manifesting all sensory kinds of these properties. Consider now readings.
As already established, readings can be well-formed instances of non-visual novels.
Consequently, readings can be instances (simpliciter) of non-visual novels. Fur-
thermore, as shown above, readings can manifest all the primary properties that
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must be experienced to fully appreciate a non-visual novel. So, clearly, readings
can manifest sufficiently many, but not all, of these properties and are capable of
manifesting all sensory kinds of these properties. Thus, the entities that can serve
as non-well-formed instances of non-visual novels are readings.
Now, what about visual novels? The entities that can serve as non-well-formed
instances of such novels are sums of readings and graphic elements. The argument
in favor of this thesis is analogous to the foregoing argument in favor of the thesis
that readings can serve as non-well-formed instances of non-visual novels.
Given what has been said, the answer to the question of what entities serve
as non-well-formed instances of novels is the same as the answer to the analogous
question about the entities that serve as well-formed instances of novels: The entities
that serve as non-well-formed instances of novels are readings and sums of readings
and graphic elements.
4.4 Objections
Let us now consider potential objections to the view that instances of novels
are readings and sums of readings and graphic elements.
Objection 1. Suppose there is a manuscript that manifests the text of some
novel L. Suppose also that this manuscript has never been read aloud. Then the
view that instances of novels are readings and sums of readings and graphic elements
entails that no instance of L has ever existed. But this entailment is mistaken. For a
novel comes into existence only if its first instance comes into existence. So if there
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have never been any instances of L, then L does not exist. But L does exist—qua
an entity that is embodied (or contained) in its manuscript.
Response. This objection is based on the thesis that a novel comes into exis-
tence only if its first instance comes into existence. Is this thesis true? It is natural
to assume that a novel comes into existence only if an entity that encodes the es-
sential artistic properties of this novel (e.g., an inscription, a reading, or an audio
recording (such as a CD or a computer file)) comes into existence. But not all
encodings are instances of a novel. Consider, for example, an inscription. It is an
encoding of a novel but, as shown in the previous chapter, cannot be an instance of
a novel. Thus, assuming the foregoing assumption is correct—and there seems no
good reason to think otherwise—the answer to the question posed above is “No”: A
novel can come into existence even if no instance of this novel comes into existence.
It is also worth mentioning that the thesis that a novel comes into existence
only if its first instance comes into existence is rejected by some ontologies of lit-
erature. Thus, this thesis is rejected by the ontology advanced by Urmson (2004).
According to Urmson (2004), “for a literary work to exist it is a necessary and suffi-
cient condition that a set of instructions should exist such that any oral performance
which complies with that set of instructions is a performance of the work in ques-
tion” (Urmson, 2004, 92). Now, the entity that serves as such a set of instructions
is the inscription. So according to Urmson (2004), if an inscription of a novel exists,
then the corresponding work exists. Meanwhile, as shown in the previous chapter,
inscriptions cannot be instances of novels. Thus, Urmson (2004)’s ontology of liter-
ature entails that a novel can come into existence even if no instance of this novel
174
comes into existence.15
Furthermore, theses parallel to the thesis that a novel comes into existence only
if its first instance comes into existence are rejected by a number of non-literary
ontologies. Thus, Rohrbaugh (2003)’s ontology of analog photographs (hereafter:
“photographs”) rejects the thesis that photographs come into existence only if the
corresponding instances come into existence. According to Rohrbaugh (2003), pho-
tographs
come into existence when they are taken. At the moment the button is
pressed, the shutter opens and closes, exposing the film, and we say that
we have ‘taken a photograph.’ The phrase has what is called ‘success
grammar.’ If I forget to load the film and blithely snap away at your
birthday party, then I should correct my claim to have taken photographs
of it; without exposed negatives, no such photographs exist. What is
so important about the moment at which the film is exposed? This
event determines certain crucial facts about what the photograph is like,
in particular, structural facts. What is in the frame and what is the
composition? How much depth of field is there? Is it in color or black and
white? All the qualities of a particular photograph have their start here.
Before this moment, there are only shifting possibilities of photographs
that might be taken; after it, the actual initial qualities are fixed for this
one. (2003, 190)
15Another example of a literary ontology that rejects the thesis that a novel comes into existence
only if its first instance comes into existence is the ontology advanced by Ingarden (1973).
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So, in Rohrbaugh (2003)’s view, a photograph comes into existence when the film is
exposed to light. Is this film an instance of the photograph? Surely, as Rohrbaugh
(2003) points out, the film encodes the primary properties that must be experienced
to fully appreciate the photograph. However, it does not manifest these properties.
For it cannot manifest the visual properties that bear on the appreciation of the
photograph,16 and there is no doubt that these properties constitute the primary
properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate this photograph. Meanwhile,
to be an instance of an artwork, an entity must manifest the primary properties that
must be experienced to fully appreciate this work. So the film is not an instance
of the photograph. As a result, on Rohrbaugh (2003)’s ontology, it is not necessary
for an instance of a photograph to come into existence in order for the photograph
itself to come into existence.
Similarly, a number of ontologies of musical works—in particular, the ontolo-
gies defended by Dodd (2004, 2007), Kivy (1983, 1987), and Levinson (1980, 2011b,
2012)—are incompatible with the thesis that a musical work comes into existence
only if an instance of this work comes into existence. According to Dodd (2004,
2007)’s and Kivy (1983, 1987)’s ontologies, musical works are eternal entities (in
particular, eternal abstract sound structures) and, hence, do not come into exis-
tence at all. Hence, if either ontology is correct, then no thesis that presupposes
that musical works come into existence—including the thesis that they come into
16If the film could manifest the visual properties that bear on the appreciation of the photograph,
then these properties would be apprehensible by directly perceiving this film. But, in fact, they
cannot be apprehended that way.
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existence only if the corresponding instances come into existence—can be true.
According to the ontology propounded by Levinson (1980, 2011b, 2012), a
musical work comes into existence when, and only when, the composer creates the
score of this work. So this ontology is compatible with the thesis that a musical
work comes into existence only if an instance of this work comes into existence only
if this score is an instance of the work. However, no score can be an instance of
a musical work. Scores cannot manifest any sonic properties.17 Meanwhile, such
properties are doubtless contained in the set of the primary properties that must
be experienced to fully appreciate a musical work. So scores cannot manifest the
primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate a musical work.
But manifesting these properties is necessary to be an instance of this work.
Objection 2. Most of those who read novels do not listen to readings of these
novels. Meanwhile, if instances of novels are readings and sums of readings and
graphic elements, then one can fully appreciate novels only by listening to readings of
these novels. So most readers do not fully appreciate the novels they read. However,
this consequence is problematic.
Response. This objection attacks the view that instances of novels are read-
ings and sums of readings and graphic elements by claiming that this view has a
problematic consequence—that most of those who read novels do not fully appre-
ciate them. Why is this consequence problematic? Presumably, it is problematic
because it is false. But why think that it is false? That is, why think that most
17If a score could manifest sonic properties, then such properties would be apprehensible by
directly perceiving this score. But, in fact, they cannot be apprehended this way.
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of those who read novels fully appreciate them? One could answer this question
as follows: If readers did not fully appreciate the novels they read, they would be
aware of that, but that is not how things are: Most readers do not think that they
fail to fully appreciate the novels they read. This answer, however, can hardly be
called satisfactory, as there seems no real reason to hold that if readers do not fully
appreciate the novels they read, then they must be aware of that.
There seems no other potentially plausible explanation of why the consequence
being discussed could be false. At the same time, there is good reason to consider
this consequence true. As shown in the previous chapter, a full appreciation of a
novel presupposes an experiential engagement with the sonic properties of this novel.
But the only way to experience these properties is to listen to a reading of this novel.
Thus, contrary to what Objection 2 suggests, readers cannot fully appreciate a novel
without listening to a reading of this novel.18
Objection 3. Imagine a novel M that is composed entirely of meaningful but
unpronounceable strings of characters and, as a result, cannot be read aloud. Ac-
cording to the view that instances of novels are readings and sums of readings and
graphic elements, no instance of M is possible. But, surely, M can have instances.
Response. This objection assumes that novels that cannot be read aloud are
covered by the view that instances of novels are readings and sums of readings and
graphic elements. But this assumption is false. As noted in the previous chapter,19
18A similar response can be used to defuse the objection based on the idea that novels have
clearly been intended, and for centuries, to be read, not listened to via readings of them aloud.
19See Chapter 3, Footnote 1.
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the term “a novel” is restricted to novels that can, in principle, be read aloud. And
so the view that instances of novels are readings and sums of readings and graphic
elements applies only to such novels.20
20Here, one might ask: What are then the entities that serve as instances of novels that cannot
be read aloud? Like novels that can be read aloud, novels that cannot be read aloud can be divided
into non-visual novels, or novels that do not contain any aesthetically relevant visual elements, and
visual novels, or novels that do contain such elements. Let us first establish what entities serve as
well-formed instances of non-visual novels that cannot be read aloud.
To be an instancee of an artwork, it is sufficient to manifest all the primary properties that must
be experienced to fully appreciate this work. What entities are capable of manifesting all such
properties, in the case of non-visual novels that cannot be read aloud? To answer this question, we
first need to clarify what primary properties must be experienced to fully appreciate such novels.
Clearly, since novels that cannot be read aloud cannot, in principle, be heard, no sonic property
needs to be experienced to fully appreciate them. Thus, sonic properties are not contained in the
set of the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate non-visual novels that
cannot be read aloud. Presumably, the only properties that must be contained in this set are
certain experienceable properties that provide experiential access to the semantic content. Now,
inscriptions are doubtless capable of manifesting such properties. So inscriptions can manifest
all the primary experienceable properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate non-visual
novels that cannot be read aloud—and, hence, can be well-formed instancese of such novels.
Furthermore, inscriptions can be well-formed instancesp of non-visual novels that cannot be read
aloud. As shown in the previous paragraph, inscriptions can manifest all the primary properties
that must be experienced to fully appreciate such novels. And there is no doubt that inscriptions
can stand in an appropriate historical-intentional relation to them. Meanwhile, to be an instancep
of an artwork, it is sufficient to (a) manifest all the primary properties that must be experienced
to fully appreciate this work and (b) stand in an appropriate historical-intentional relation to it.
What entities serve as well-formed instances of visual novels that cannot be read aloud? Clearly,
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Objection 4. Suppose there is some novel N that is written in an archaic
language. Suppose also that no one who reads N aloud pronounces all of its words
correctly. Then, according to the view that well-formed instances of novels are read-
the set of primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate such novels does not
contain any sonic properties. What this set contains are (a) certain experienceable properties that
provide experiential access to the semantic content and (b) certain visual properties. Now, it is
clear that mereological sums (hereafter: “sums”) of inscriptions and graphic elements are capable
of manifesting the foregoing properties. Hence, such sums can manifest all the primary properties
that must be experienced to fully appreciate visual novels that cannot be read aloud. Meanwhile,
if an entity manifests all the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate an
artwork, then this entity is an instancee of this work. So sums of inscriptions and graphic elements
can be well-formed instancese of visual novels that cannot be read aloud.
Furthermore, sums of inscriptions and graphic elements can be well-formed instancesp of visual
novels that cannot be read aloud. As mentioned above, these sums can manifest all the primary
properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate such novels. Furthermore, these sums
doubtless can stand in an appropriate historical-intentional relation to them. Meanwhile, if an
entity (a) manifests all the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate an
artwork and (b) stands in an appropriate historical-intentional relation to this work, then this
entity is a well-formed instancep of this work.
Thus, given what has been said, it is reasonable to hold that the entities that serve as well-
formed instances of non-visual novels that cannot be read aloud are inscriptions, whereas the
entities that serve as well-formed instances of visual novels that cannot be read aloud are sums
of inscriptions and graphic elements. In light of this, and taking into account the fact that the
distinction between non-visual and visual novels is exhaustive, the question “What entities serve
as well-formed instances of novels that cannot be read aloud?” can be answered as follows: The
entities that serve as such instances are inscriptions and sums of inscriptions and graphic elements.
Now, what entities serve as non-well-formed instances of novels that cannot be read aloud? To
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ings and sums of readings and graphic elements, there are no well-formed instances
of N. Meanwhile, if there are no such instances, then N cannot be appreciated. But,
surely, this consequence is false: It is possible for us to appreciate N.
Response. According to this objection, the fact that there are no well-formed
instances of a novel implies that this novel is completely inaccessible to our appre-
ciation. Is this implication true? Suppose there are no ideal performances of The
Rite of Spring (each performance contains at least one wrong note)21 or any other
be a non-well-formed instance of an artwork, it is sufficient (a) to be an instance of this work; (b)
to manifest sufficiently many, but not all, of the primary properties that must be experienced to
fully appreciate this work; and (c) to be, in principle, capable of manifesting all sensory kinds of
these properties. As has been shown, inscriptions are well-formed instances of non-visual novels
that cannot be read aloud and, hence, are instances of such novels. Furthermore, given what
has been said above, it is clear that inscriptions can manifest sufficiently many, but not all, of
the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate novels. Finally, inscriptions
doubtless can, in principle, manifest all sensory kinds of these properties. Thus, inscriptions can
be non-well-formed instances of non-visual novels that cannot be read aloud.
Now, what are the entities that can be non-well-formed instances of visual novels that cannot
be read aloud? These entities can be sums of inscriptions and graphic elements. The argument in
favor of this thesis is analogous to the foregoing argument in favor of the thesis that inscriptions
can be non-well-formed instances of non-visual novels that cannot be read aloud.
Given what has been said, the answer to the question of what entities serve as non-well-formed
instances of novels that cannot be read aloud is the same as the answer to the analogous question
about the entities that serve as well-formed instances of novels that cannot be read aloud: The
entities that serve as non-well-formed instances of novels that cannot be read aloud are inscriptions
and sums of inscriptions and graphic elements.
21Given the extreme complexity of The Rite of Spring, this supposition may well be true.
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entities manifesting all the primary properties that must be experienced to fully
appreciate The Rite of Spring. Then there are no well-formed instances of The Rite
of Spring. Despite this, however, we may still be able to appreciate it. Of course,
we will not be able to appreciate it in full.22 But we will be able to appreciate it
partially—say, by listening to one of its imperfect performances.
Thus, we can appreciate a musical work even if there are no well-formed in-
stances of this work. And the same can be said not only about musical works but
about all other artworks. The absence of well-formed instances of an artwork does
not necessarily preclude us from appreciating this artwork. As a result, Objection 4
is based on a false assumption—that a novel cannot be appreciated if there are no
well-formed instances of this novel.
Here, one could object as follows. The foregoing response assumes that a
novel cannot be fully appreciated without appreciating a well-formed instance of
this novel. But this assumption is false. In fact, we can fully appreciate a novel
even if it does not have any well-formed instances.
This objection, however, fails. A full appreciation of a novel presupposes
an appreciation of all the primary properties that must be experienced to fully
appreciate this novel. Meanwhile, if there are no well-formed instances of a novel,
then all of these properties cannot be appreciated. Thus, contrary to what the
objection states, the possibility of a full appreciation of a novel presupposes the
22To be able to do this, we must listen to an entity manifesting all the primary properties that
must be experienced to fully appreciate The Rite of Spring. But, by assumption, no such entity
exists.
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existence of at least one well-formed instance of this novel.
It is worth noting that besides the thesis that an artwork can be appreciated
even if there are no well-formed instances of this work, we can adopt a stronger
thesis—that an artwork can be appreciated even if there are no instances of this
work whatsoever. Suppose the original canvas of the Mona Lisa has been completely
destroyed and, as a result, there are no instances of this painting. Suppose next that
there are a number of reproductions of the Mona Lisa.23 Then it is still possible for
us to appreciate the Mona Lisa. We “might reasonably claim to be knowledgeable
about [this] painting and even have an appreciation of its beauty and power through
studying reproductions alone” (Lamarque, 2010, 59). Now, what has been said
about the Mona Lisa applies to other artworks as well. Given this, it is reasonable
to hold that the absence of instances of an artwork does not necessarily preclude us
from appreciating this work.24
Objection 5. When we apprehend epistolary novels (such as Samuel Richard-
son’s Clarissa, Fanny Burney’s Evelina, and Thornton Wilder’s The Ides of March),
it is reasonable to assume that we are supposed to imagine ourselves apprehending
letters that were not intended to be read aloud. But if this is so, then there is
23It is assumed here that the only instance of a painting is its original canvas. This assumption
reflects the consensus on what entities serves as instances of paintings.
24Perhaps the same can also be said about at least some non-artistic objects. Suppose there
are no Benz Patent-Motorwagens and, hence, no instances of the Benz Patent-Motorwagen. In
this case, it seems natural to suppose that we can still appreciate—at least, to a certain extent—
the Benz Patent-Motorwagen—say, by appreciating a die-cast Benz Patent-Motorwagen model or
photographs of a Benz Patent-Motorwagen.
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good reason to believe that the sonic dimension of such novels is irrelevant to their
aesthetic appreciation, and, as a result, there seems to be no motivation to hold
that their instances are identical to or incorporate readings.
Response. The reason why letters are not supposed to be read aloud is that
their content is not intended for anyone other than the reader, and not because
their sonic properties are aesthetically irrelevant. So perhaps, when we apprehend
epistolary novels, we should assume that we are supposed to imagine ourselves
apprehending letters which were not intended to be read aloud to anyone other
than ourselves. However—contrary to what the objection states—we do not have
any reason to believe that when apprehending such novels, we should assume that
we are supposed to imagine ourselves apprehending letters which were not intended
to be read aloud at all.
Objection 6. Suppose we listen to a reading of War and Peace in English. In
this case, we cannot fully appreciate War and Peace, since we have access only to an
instance of a translation of War and Peace (a particular English reading of it), and
not to an instance of War and Peace (a particular Russian reading of it). However,
this result seems wrong. Intuitively, when we listen to a reading of War and Peace
in English, we can fully appreciate War and Peace itself, and not just a translation
of this novel.
Response. This objection assumes that when we listen to a reading of War and
Peace in translation, we can fully appreciate War and Peace. Is this assumption
is true? Here is a possible argument in favor of answering this question in the
affirmative. War and Peace and its translation are identical. Therefore, whenever
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we listen to a reading of War and Peace in translation, we listen to a reading of
War and Peace—and, hence, can fully appreciate War and Peace (assuming that
War and Peace can be fully appreciated by listening to its reading).
Is this argument satisfactory? If the artistic value of an artwork depends on
some intrinsic property of this work, then the identity of this work depends on this
property. Meanwhile, as shown in the previous chapter, the artistic value of a novel
depends on the sonic and semantic properties of this novel, which are doubtless
intrinsic.25 Thus, given that both War and Peace and its translation are novels,
their identities depend on these properties. Now, it is clear that the language of
War and Peace and the language of the translation are different. So at least some
sonic and semantic properties of War and Peace differ from the sonic and semantic
properties of its translation. But then, contrary to what the foregoing argument
states, War and Peace cannot be identical to its translation.
There seem no other potentially satisfactory arguments in favor of the assump-
tion that we can fully appreciate War and Peace by listening to a reading of War
and Peace in translation. At the same time, there is a strong consideration against
this assumption. To fully appreciate an artwork, it is necessary to appreciate what
the aesthetic value of this work is grounded in. The aesthetic value of a novel is
25Following Lewis (1983), “an intrinsic property” can be defined as follows: For all x, x is an
intrinsic property of y just in case x is a property possessed by y “in virtue of the way [y ] itself,
and nothing else, is” (Lewis, 1983, 112). For a detailed analysis of the expression “an intrinsic
property” (as well as the related expression “an extrinsic property”), see Weatherson and Marshall
(2014).
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grounded in certain sonic and semantic properties. So a proper appreciation of a
novel is impossible without an appreciation of these properties. Can we appreciate
the sonic and semantic properties of War and Peace by listening to a reading of a
translation of this novel? Since the sonic and semantic properties of the translation
of War and Peace are different from the sonic and semantic properties of War and
Peace, a reading of this translation cannot have the sonic and semantic properties of
War and Peace. But if this is so, then listening to such a reading cannot enable us
to appreciate the sonic and semantic properties of War and Peace. Consequently,
since War and Peace cannot be fully appreciated without appreciating its sonic and
semantic properties, War and Peace cannot be fully appreciated by listening to its
translation.
Note that the impossibility of a proper appreciation ofWar and Peace by lis-
tening to a reading of War and Peace in translation does not entail that this novel
cannot be appreciated at all by listening to such a reading. Listening to a reading
of War and Peace in translation can enable us to apprehend some core semantic
properties (such as the properties that constitute the characters and plot), proper-
ties related to the structure, and perhaps even certain sonic properties (for example,
some properties concerned with rhythm). Meanwhile, apprehending these properties
makes it possible for us to appreciate War and Peace.
Note also that Objection 6 does not pose a special threat to the view that
instances of novels are readings and sums of readings and graphic elements. This
objection would pose such a threat only if it were applicable to this view, and not
the Orthodox View—that is, the view that instances of novels include inscriptions.
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However, this objection can be applied to the Orthodox View as well. For one can
say: “Suppose we read an inscription of War and Peace in English. In this case,
we cannot fully appreciate War and Peace, since we have access only to an instance
of a translation of War and Peace (a particular English inscription), and not to an
instance of War and Peace (a particular Russian inscription). However, this result
seems wrong. Intuitively, when we read an inscription of War and Peace in English,
we can fully appreciate War and Peace itself, and not just a translation of this
novel.”
4.5 Some Consequences
Let us now examine some potential consequences of the view that instances of
novels are readings and graphic elements.
One of these consequences is that to fully appreciate a novel, one must listen to
a reading of this novel—a particular sequence of sounds, which can be generated by
the reader herself, or someone else, or some electronic device (such as a computer or
an e-reader). For suppose the foregoing view is true. Then a well-formed instance of
a novel either is identical to or incorporates a reading. Meanwhile, to fully appreciate
an artwork, we must experientially engage with its well-formed instance.26 Thus, a
full appreciation of a novel requires an experiential engagement with a reading of
26Suppose we do not experientially engage with a well-formed instance of an artwork. Then,
since only such an instance manifests all the primary properties that must be experienced to fully
appreciate this work, we do not experience all of these properties. But if this is so, then we do not
fully appreciate the work.
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this novel. How can one experientially engage with a reading? The only way to do
this is to listen to it. So if the view that instances of novels are readings and graphic
elements is true, then a full appreciation of a novel requires listening to a reading
of this novel.
Another consequence of the view that instances of novels are readings and
sums of readings and graphic elements is that a novel cannot be fully appreciated
by means of silent reading. Suppose this view is true. Then, as mentioned above, to
fully appreciate a novel, we must listen to its reading. However, silent reading does
not involve the production of any physical sounds and, hence, does not enable us to
listen to a reading. Thus, by reading a novel silently, we cannot fully appreciate it.
Yet another consequence of the view that instances of novels are readings and
sums of readings and graphic elements is that we may want to stop reading novels
silently and start listening to them. Suppose this view is true. Then, as has been
shown above, we cannot read a novel silently if we want to fully appreciate it; if we
want that, we should listen to its reading. But if this is so, then, assuming that we
would like to fully appreciate novels, we may want to stop reading novels silently
and start listening to their readings.
Here, a natural question arises: Is realizing this change in our way of appreci-
ating novels practicable? There are two potential reasons to answer “No.” First, it
is hard to get access to readings of novels; second, listening to a reading of a novel
is less convenient than reading it silently. Is either reason persuasive?
Consider the first reason. Why is it hard to get access to readings of novels? Is
it hard because the means to generate such readings are unavailable? That cannot
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be true. For there are numerous electronic devices—computers, audio players, cell
phones, etc.—that can be used to produce and/or re-produce readings. Another
potential explanation of why it might be hard to get access to readings of novels is
that it is hard to get access to the sources of such readings. But, like the previous ex-
planation, this explanation is unsustainable. For there are numerous audio versions
of various novels (“audiobooks”), which can easily be accessed over the Internet.
True, audio versions are not available for all novels. But the “audiobook” market is
expanding: More and more audio versions of novels are becoming available as time
goes by. So it is reasonable to suppose that in the not too distant future, there will
be audio versions of all novels.
Thus, neither explanation of why it is hard to get access to readings of novels is
satisfactory. Meanwhile, there seems to be no other potentially plausible explanation
of that. So it is unclear why it is hard to get access to readings of novels. Hence,
the first reason in favor of the claim that switching from reading a novel silently to
listening to its reading is problematic appears unpersuasive.
What about the second reason? Is listening to a reading of a novel less con-
venient than reading this novel silently? Perhaps that is so under certain circum-
stances. However, in some cases, it is more convenient to listen to a reading of a
novel rather than read this novel silently. Clearly, when you drive a car, you do
not want to read a novel silently; but, at the same time, you can easily listen to a
reading of this novel. Also, when you are tired, you may prefer listening to a reading
of a novel to reading this novel silently. Furthermore, listening to a reading of a
novel is preferable to reading this novel silently if you want to reduce your eye strain.
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Given what has been said, the second reason in favor of the claim that switching
from reading novels silently to listening to their readings is problematic also seems
unpersuasive.
Thus, neither reason is persuasive. Meanwhile, there seems to be no other
potentially satisfactory reason to hold that it will be problematic for us to change
our way of appreciating novels by switching from reading them silently to listening
to their readings. But if this is so, then nothing stops us from thinking that changing
this way is, in fact, quite practicable.
Another consequence of the view that instances of novels are readings and
sums of readings and graphic elements is that, given certain plausible assumptions,
novels do not depend for their existence on their instances. Suppose this view is
true. Then, since most novels have never been sounded out, most novels do not have
instances. Meanwhile, if this is so, then the supposition that a novel exists only if
at least one instance of this novel exists entails that most novels do not exist. But
most novels do exist—or so it seems. So we arrive at a contradiction. How can it
be eliminated if we are to assume that instances of novels are readings and sums of
readings and graphic elements? One way to do this is to reject the thesis that most
novels exist. Another way is to reject the idea that a novel cannot exist if at least
one instance of this novel does not exist. Which way is preferable? If we choose
the first way, we must violate one of our deeply entrenched artistic intuitions—that
novels that we consider existent actually exist. Meanwhile, as is generally agreed,
violating deeply entrenched artistic intuitions is highly undesirable. So the first way
of eliminating the contradiction is unsatisfactory. Consider now the second way.
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Given what has been said in the previous section (in particular, the response to
Objection 1), there is no real reason against choosing this way. But if this is so,
then the second way of eliminating the contradiction being discussed is preferable to
the first way. Meanwhile, this way presupposes a rejection of the thesis that novels
depend for their existence on the existence of their instances.
Here, one might ask: If the existence of novels does not depend on the existence
of their instances, then what, if anything, does it depend on? There can be different
answers to this question. One possible answer, advocated by pure platonists, is
that novels, being eternal and indestructible abstracta of some kind, do not depend
for their existence on anything (other than perhaps God). Another possible answer,
endorsed by Levinson (2011b, 2012), is that novels, being initiated types, depend for
their coming into existence on their authors’ acts of indicating particular abstract
structures (by means of creating certain inscriptions), but do not depend on anything
for their subsequent existence.27 According to yet another possible answer, upheld by
27Levinson (2011b, 2012) does not explicitly say that he endorses the idea that novels do not
depend on anything for their subsequent existence. However, that he actually endorses this idea
can be shown as follows. In “What a Musical Work Is, Again,” he points out that he is not sure
“what would be the rationale” (Levinson, 2011b, 262) for holding that “the permanent elimination
of all records and memories of [the musical work] would suffice to destroy it” (Levinson, 2011b,
262). He then says:
. . . The residual pull of [the idea that “nothing can destroy [the musical work], once
created” (Levinson, 2011b, 262)] is hard for me to deny. Once a PSS [performed-sound
structure], in a coherent musical context, it might just inhabit the abstract realms
of the universe, it seems, forever. Why should it lapse into nonexistence, one might
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Rohrbaugh (2003), novels, being “historical individuals,” depend for their existence
on their “embodiments”—particular physical objects that ground the facts about
the novels’ essential properties.
Finally, the view that novels are properly instanced solely by readings and
sums of readings and graphic elements entails that the art of the novel has a lot
more in common with performing arts (especially, with music) than usually thought.
We generally believe that the art of the novel is considerably different from any of
the performing arts. Thus, in our view, the most typical, or paradigmatic, instances
of novels (inscriptions) differ, in their fundamental nature, from instances of works
of performing arts (performances). In particular, we believe that paradigmatic in-
stances of novels are objects, whereas instances of performing arts are events. Fur-
thermore, we think that the way paradigmatic instances of novels are generated is
different from the way instances of performing arts are generated: Paradigmatic
instances of novels are generated by means of writing or copying, whereas instances
of works of most (though not all28) performing arts are generated by means of
ask, just because we do? It is perhaps a comforting thought that the nonmaterial
products of culture, once given start, may be logically destined to outlast us—at least
in the rarefied sense here in question. (Levinson, 2011b, 263)
Thus, according to Levinson (2011b), musical works, once created, are indestructible and, hence,
do not depend for their existence on anything. Meanwhile, as is clear from his “Indication, Ab-
straction, and Individuation,” in his view, the fundamental existence conditions of novels (as well
as all other literary works) are the same as the fundamental existence conditions of musical works.
28In jazz, which is doubtless a performing art, instances are normally produced without recourse
to instructions.
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performing in accordance with particular written and/or oral instructions (or quasi-
instructions). Finally, we usually hold that paradigmatic instances of novels differ
from instances of works of performing arts with regard to the art status: Paradig-
matic instances of novels are not artworks themselves, since these instances do not
have any artistically significant properties besides those that belong to the nov-
els; whereas instances of works of performing arts do possess such properties and,
therefore, can be treated as artworks in their own right.29
Now, if the view that novels can only be properly instanced by readings and
sums of readings and graphic elements is adopted, then the mentioned dissimilarities
largely (though not completely) disappear. For suppose that instances of novels
are readings and sums of readings and graphic elements. Then, since readings are
events, instances of novels are identical to or contain events and, hence, are close
(albeit not the same), in their fundamental nature, to instances of performing arts.
Furthermore, since readings are generated with the help of inscriptions, which can be
characterized as instructions (or quasi-instructions), the way instances of novels are
generated is similar to the way instances of works of performing arts are generated.
29Are instances of works of performing arts, in fact, artworks? There are powerful reasons to
answer this question in the affirmative (see, e.g., Alperson (1984) and Kivy (1995)). But what if the
correct answer is “No” (for reasons in favor of this answer, see Thom (1993) and Kania (2011))? In
this case, the theses “Paradigmatic instances of novels are not artworks themselves” and “Instances
of works of performing arts possess artistic properties and, therefore, can be treated as artworks
in their own right” should be replaced with the theses “Paradigmatic instances of novels do not
deserve artistic appreciation” and “Instances of works of performing arts possess artistic properties
and, therefore, can be treated as objects that deserve artistic appreciation,” respectively.
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Finally, because readings have particular artistically relevant properties that belong
to them, rather than to the corresponding novels, readings can be treated as artworks
in their own right—and so, with regard to the art status, instances of novels are
similar to instances of works of performing arts.30
That the art of the novel has so much in common with performing arts does
not, by itself, mean that it is one of them. For it also differs from them in at least
two important respects. First, not all instances of novels are pure events; some
are sums of events and objects. However, instances of works of performing arts are
generally considered to be pure events. Second, instances of novels can be easily
created by most of those who speak English (or any other sound-based language)
and know how to generate graphic elements using a printer or some other copying
device. But most instances of works of performing arts can be created only by a
relatively small number of specialists (actors, stage directors, musicians, dancers,
etc.).
30There seems no good reason to think that readings cannot be artworks. However, if there
is, in fact, such a reason, then the thesis “Because readings have particular artistically relevant
properties that belong to them, rather than to the novels, readings can be treated as artworks in
their own right” should be replaced with the thesis “Because readings have particular artistically
relevant properties that belong to them, rather than to the novels, readings can be treated as
objects that deserve artistic appreciation.”
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4.6 Final Remarks
In closing, it is worth making two additional remarks concerning the view
that instances of novels are readings and sums of readings and graphic elements.
First: This view naturally invites the question “What makes a reading a reading of
a given novel?” This question is doubtless important. Despite this, however, I will
not address it—for two reasons. First, a satisfactory answer to it would require an
investigation that, given space limitations, is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
Second, answering this question here is unnecessary, since the truth of the thesis
that instances of novels are readings and sums of readings and graphic elements
does not depend on whether we know what makes a reading a reading of a given
novel. If the truth of this thesis depended on whether we know what makes a
reading a reading of a given novel, then, by analogy, the truth of the thesis that
instances of musical works are performances would depend on whether we know
what makes a performance a performance of a given musical work. But the latter
kind of dependence does not hold. For if it did, we would have to question the thesis
that instances of musical works are performances—given the fact that there is no
generally accepted theoretic answer to the question of what makes a performance a
performance of a given musical work. But, of course, we do not want to question
this thesis. (Surely, musical works are properly instanced by performances.)
Before proceeding further, however, I would like to mention three important
constraints on any satisfactory answer to the question of what makes a reading a
reading of a given novel. First, any such answer must be compatible with the idea
195
that to be a reading of a given novel, a reading must manifest the text of this novel
without omitting important parts of this text or adding extraneous elements. Next,
any satisfactory answer must entail that a reading is a reading of a particular novel
only if it follows the norms of pronunciation prescribed by the linguistic context of
the novel. Finally, any satisfactory answer must allow for some phonetic variability
between readings of the same novel. For suppose an answer does not allow for this.
Then according to this answer, only sonically identical readings can be readings of
the same novel. But this is too restrictive. Surely, we would like to regard certain
appropriate readings with minor phonetic differences (such as slight differences in
intonation or in pronouncing [s] and [z]) as readings of the same novel.
The second remark concerns a potential extension of the view that instances
of novels are readings and graphic elements. Clearly, this view has a rather limited
scope: It applies only to novels. But it can be extended to include other textual
entities with similar primary appreciation-relevant experienceable properties. The
most obvious candidates for such inclusion are poems and short stories. Other possi-
ble candidates are speeches (for example, Cicero’s Catilinarian Orations and Martin
Luther King’s “I Have a Dream”), newspaper and magazine articles, pamphlets,
letters, and any other textual entities that are subject to aesthetic appreciation.
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Chapter 5: The Novel as a Performing Art
Introduction
Our analysis has shown that instances of novels are readings and sums of
readings and graphic elements. If this result is correct, then, as noted in the previous
chapter,1 the novel is rather similar to performing arts (primarily, music, dance, and
theater). In light of this, a natural question arises: Is the novel one of such arts?
My goal in what follows is to show that there is good reason to answer this
question in the affirmative. I begin with a critique of the existing arguments in favor
of the view that the novel is a performing art—namely, the arguments advanced by
Kivy (2006) and Urmson (2004) (Section 5.1). Next, I put forward a new argument
in favor of this view. I argue, in particular, that the novel is a performing art,
since (a) it is an art such that to fully appreciate its work, one must experientially
engage with either a performance, a playing of a recording of a performance, or a
reproduction of a performance of this work,2 and (b) being such an art is sufficient
1See Chapter 4, Section 4.5.
2By “a reproduction of a performance” here is meant a sequence of sounds or movements that
is generated, with the help of a set of instructions (such as a score), by a computer or some other
mechanical device.
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for being a performing art (Section 5.2). Finally, I make a remark concerning the
question of whether the view that the novel is a performing art accords with the
historical development of literature (Section 5.3).
5.1 Urmson’s and Kivy’s Arguments: A Critical Analysis
The view that the novel is a non-performing art is accepted by an overwhelm-
ing majority of theorists. Yet it is not accepted by all of them. Some—in particular,
Urmson (2004) and Kivy (2006, 2010)—endorse the opposite view—that the novel,
along with music, theater, and dance, is a performing art. To support this view, both
Urmson (2004) and Kivy (2006, 2010) offer particular arguments. Let us examine
these arguments.
5.1.1 Urmson’s Argument
Urmson (2004)’s argument can be formulated as follows:
1. The novel is relevantly analogous to a particular kind of music, namely music
intended primarily for score reading rather than performance.
2. Music intended primarily for score reading rather than performance is a per-
forming art.
3. If (1) and (2) are true, then the novel (broader: all literature intended for
silent reading) is a performing art.
4. So the novel (broader: all literature intended for silent reading) is a performing
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art.3
The crux of this argument is clearly premise (1). Is this premise true?
Before answering this question, two remarks are worth making. First, (1) is
not equivalent to the thesis that the novel is relevantly analogous to music. This
premise is rather narrow: It implies that the novel is relevantly analogous only to
a particular kind of music—music intended primarily for score reading rather than
performance. The foregoing thesis, on the other hand, is much broader: It implies
that the novel is relevantly analogous not just to the mentioned kind of music but
to music in general.
Second, according to Urmson (2004), the thesis that the novel is relevantly
analogous to music in general is false. The reason for this, in his view, is that
there is an apparent disanalogy between the novel, on the one hand, and “ordinary”
music (i.e., music that is intended for performance rather than score reading), on
the other. In the case of the latter, there are performers, or, to use Urmson (2004)’s
term, “executant artists”—those who perform a musical work for an audience. In
the case of the former, however, there seem to be no such artists. For,
...who could such artists be? When one... reads a novel to oneself, there
seems to be only onself and the novelist involved. Is the reader in fact
the executant artist with himself as audience as the pianist who can
play to himself as audience and the dancer who can dance for his own
satisfaction? But I do not seem to myself to be exhibiting any technical
3Premises (2) and (3) are not explicitly stated by Urmson (2004). However, they (or their
equivalents) must be included in the argument in order for it to be valid.
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or interpretative skills when I read to myself, and there are other grave
objections to this suggestion.... (Urmson, 2004, 90)
Let us now return to the question of whether premise (1) (“The novel is rele-
vantly analogous to a particular kind of music, namely music intended primarily for
score reading rather than performance”) is true. To answer this question, we first
need to clarify the expression “score reading.” By “score reading,” Urmson (2004)
means the process of (a) apprehending what a musical score expresses and (b) gen-
erating an experience that enables us to realize what we would hear were this score
actually performed. Thus, when one reads a musical score—say, the score of Bach’s
Musical Offering—she apprehends the content of this score and generates an expe-
rience that enables her to realize what she would hear if she heard a performance of
the Musical Offering.4
It is important to stress that according to Urmson (2004), the experience gen-
erated in the process of score reading—the experience that enables one to realize
what one would hear were the score actually performed—is not a musical perfor-
mance. As Urmson (2004) points out, to be a musical performance, an entity must
satisfy a number of conditions related to pitch, dynamics, tone color, duration, and
some other aspects of the corresponding musical work. However, at least some of
these conditions are invariably violated by the foregoing experience.
4According to Urmson (2004), score reading can be viewed as analogous to a particular way of
reading a recipe by an experienced cook—the way according to which the cook apprehends what
the recipe expresses—a particular set of instructions—and generates an experience that enables
him to “recognize what the confection would taste like” (Urmson, 2004, 91).
200
Having clarified what is meant by “score reading,” let us now consider Urmson
(2004)’s argument in favor of premise (1). As is clear from what has been said above,
in the case of music intended primarily for score reading, we apprehend the content
of a musical score and generate an experience that enables us to realize what we
would hear were this score actually performed. In Urmson (2004)’s view, that is
very similar to what we do in the case of literature and, in particular, in the case of
the novel. In this case, we also apprehend the content of the “score” of a novel—a
particular inscription—and generate an experience that enables us to realize what
we would hear were this novel actually performed by reading it aloud. Thus, when
we read War and Peace silently, we grasp the content of an inscription of this novel
and generate an experience that enables us to realize what we would hear if this
novel were actually read aloud. The foregoing similarity between the novel and
music intended primarily for score reading is sufficient, according to Urmson (2004),
to substantiate the thesis that the novel is relevantly analogous to music intended
primarily for score reading—and, hence, premise (1).
Is Urmson (2004)’s argument acceptable? The key thesis of this argument
is that when we read novels silently, we generate an experience that enables us to
realize what we would hear were this novel actually read aloud. However, there
is reason to doubt that this thesis is true. When I silently read a novel, I do not
generate an experience that enables me ro realize what I would hear if this novel
were actually performed (by reading it aloud). And most other readers, I suppose,
do not generate any such experience when reading novels silently either.
Thus, Urmson (2004)’s argument in favor of premise (1) involves a dubious
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claim and, hence, cannot be accepted. At the same time, there is a powerful argu-
ment against this premise. It seems uncontroversial that in order for the novel to
be relevantly analogous to music intended primarily for score reading, the way we
read novels must be analogous to the way we read scores of musical works intended
for score reading. However, in fact, the way we read novels is considerably different
from the way we read scores of such musical works. As Urmson (2004) rightly notes,
when we silently read the score of a musical work intended for score reading, our goal
is to acquire a non-performing experience that enables us to realize what we would
hear if the work were actually performed. But that is not what our goal is when we
silently read novels. In this case, we do not try to acquire a non-performing experi-
ence that enables us to realize what we would hear if the work were performed. Our
goal, when reading a novel silently, is to apprehend the story of this novel.5 (One
might object that achieving this goal presupposes a generation of an experience
that enables us to realize what we would hear if the novel were actually performed.
But this objection fails, since, in fact, a generation of such an experience neither
precedes, not accompanies, nor follows the process of apprehending the story of a
novel.)
Thus, it is reasonable to consider premise (1) false. Meanwhile, if this premise
is false, then Urmson (2004)’s argument in favor of the view that the novel is a
performing art fails.
But what if premise (1) is true? Should Urmson (2004)’s argument then be
5Note that this claim is purely descriptive. It is does not imply that when we read a novel
silently, our goal should be to merely apprehend the story of this novel.
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considered acceptable? No. For there is good reason against another premise of this
argument—premise (2) (“Music intended primarily for score reading is a performing
art”). Presumably, the reason why an art is called “performing” is that works of
this art are to be appreciated through a performance or an entity that manifests all
the relevant properties manifested by a performance.6 Consider now music intended
primarily for score reading. Surely, it can be appreciated through a performance
or an entity that manifests all the relevant properties manifested by a performance.
But that is not the proper way to appreciate it. Since it is intended primarily for
score reading, the proper way to appreciate it is by appreciating what results from
score reading, which, as has been mentioned above, is a particular non-performing
experience. But if this is so—if music intended primarily for score reading is to
be appreciated through such an experience, and not through a performance or a
performance-like entity—then, given the above characterization of “a performing
art,” this kind of music is not, in fact, a performing art—and, hence, premise (2) is
false.
5.1.2 Kivy’s Argument
Let us now turn to Kivy (2006, 2010)’s argument in favor of treating the novel
as a performing art. This argument can be formulated as follows:
5. We appreciate novels through readings—particular sequences of sounds gen-
erated either in the external (spatiotemporal) world (when reading aloud) or
6This is a preliminary account of “a performing art.” A complete account of this expression is
presented in Section 5.2.
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in our mind (when reading silently)7.
6. These readings are artistic performances.
7. So we appreciate novels through artistic performances.
8. If we appreciate novels through artistic performances, then the novel is a
performing art.
9. So the novel is a performing art.8
One could object to Kivy (2006, 2010)’s argument as follows. There is no doubt
that sometimes—for example, when we listen to audiobooks—we appreciate novels
through their readings. But what about the case when we read novels silently? In
this case, there is no reason to hold that we generate any readings. But if this is
so, then when we read silently, we do not appreciate novels through readings—and,
hence, premise (5) is false.
This objection may seem strong, but, in fact, it is not. It assumes that there
is no reason to think that we generate any silent readings in the case of reading
novels silently. However, as shown in Chapter 3, this assumption is questionable.
7As might be recalled from Chapter 3, according to Kivy (2006), a reading of a novel is a
particular kind of act—namely, a sounding of the text of the novel—that usually results in an
artistic experience of this novel. Although Kivy (2006)’s concept of “a reading” is not the same
as the concept that I use when formulating the ontology of instances of novels in the previous
chapter, there is no principled difference between these concepts.
8Premise (8) is not explicitly stated by Kivy (2006, 2010). However, it (or perhaps some other
premise equivalent to it) must be contained in the argument, since otherwise, this argument is
invalid.
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According to Kivy (2006, 2010), a reading is a sounding of a novel that usually
results in an artistic experience of this novel. So we generate silent readings in the
case of reading novels silently if in this case, (a) we generate silent soundings of
these novels and (b) these soundings normally result in artistic experiences of these
novels. In light of the psychological evidence that supports the idea that our silent
reading involves the mental “voicing” of what we read,9 it is reasonable to maintain
that in the process of reading novels silently, we do, in fact, generate silent soundings
of these novels. Furthermore, there is no doubt that a silent sounding generated in
the process of reading a novel silently normally results in an artistic experience of
this novel. So, contrary to what the assumption being discussed states, there is a
reason to hold that when we read novels silently, we do, in fact, generate readings.
A more serious objection to Kivy (2006, 2010)’s argument concerns premise (6)
(“Readings through which we appreciate novels are artistic performances”). Perhaps
readings through which we appreciate novels in the case of reading aloud are artistic
performances. But what about readings through which we appreciate novels in the
case of reading silently? Are these readings artistic performances?
Kivy (2006, 2010)’s argument in favor of answering this question in the affir-
mative is as follows. When we read novels silently, we read while impersonating the
storyteller 10 and, as a result, con espressione. Meanwhile, whenever one reads con
espressione, the reading one generates possesses certain artistic properties (includ-
9See, e.g., Petkov and Berlin (2013).
10Kivy (2006, 2010)’s definition of “impersonation” is as follows: For all x and for all y, x
impersonates y just in case x plays the part of y.
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ing the property of being “expressive”) and, hence, is artistic. Thus, when we read
novels silently, the readings we generate are artistic. Furthermore, these readings
are performances. For to be a performance, it is sufficient to be an action that is
intended to be presented to an audience. And our silent readings of novels doubt-
less satisfy this condition: They are actions—activities that are generated by agents
(readers) and directed at a goal (to generate a silent reading)–and each of them is
intended to be presented to an audience (though this audience consists of just one
person—the reader herself). Thus, given what has been said, our silent readings of
novels are artistic performances.
However, as shown in Chapter 3, the foregoing argument fails. It assumes
that when we read a novel silently, we impersonate the storyteller—similar to how
Ion the Rhapsode impersonates Homer when telling the stories of the Iliad and the
Odyssey. But this assumption is false. When reading a novel silently, we apprehend
the story told by this novel and sometimes imagine the characters and certain events
of this story, but we do not impersonate the storyteller.
At the same time, as pointed out in Chapter 3, there are at least two strong
reasons against treating silent readings of novels as artistic performances. First,
an artistic performance comes into existence only if its creator has a particular
intention—the intention to perform. But when we read a novel silently and thereby
generate a reading, we do not have this intention. Second, according to a widely
accepted view, to be artistic, an entity must be created with some art-relevant
intention. However, our silent readings are not created with any such intention.
Thus, there is good reason against the thesis that readings we generate in
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the process of reading novels silently are artistic performances.11 Meanwhile, if this
thesis is false, then premise (6) of Kivy (2006, 2010)’s argument is false—and so this
argument fails.
5.2 The Novel as a Performing Art
Thus, neither Urmson (2004)’s nor Kivy (2006, 2010)’s argument stands up
to criticism. This does not mean, however, that there is no satisfactory argument
in favor of the view that the novel is a performing art. In fact, there is such an
argument. And to this argument I now turn.
5.2.1 What Is a Performing Art?
Let us begin by clarifying the expression “a performing art.” According to
Davies (2011), what distinguishes a performing art from other arts is that in the
case of a performing art, “our access to, and appreciation of, works (as receivers) is
at least in part mediated by performances of those works, and thus by the activities
of those in the performing arts such as conductors, directors, musicians, dancers,
and actors” (Davies, 2011, 18–19). Now, our access to, and appreciation of, y is
mediated by x just in case to fully appreciate y, it is necessary to experientially
engage with x. So Davies (2011)’s account of “a performing art” can be formulated
as follows: What makes an art a performing art is the fact that to fully appreciate a
11Note that the thesis that readings we generate in the process of reading novels silently are
not artistic performances does not entail that readings generated in the process of reading novels
silently cannot be such performances.
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work of this art, it is necessary to experientially engage with a performance of this
work. Or, in other words: For all x, x is a performing art just in case (a) x is an art
and (b) a full appreciation of a work of x requires an experiential engagement with
a performance of this work.
Is Davies (2011)’s account of “a performing art” satisfactory? One consequence
of this account is that to fully appreciate a performable work, it is necessary to
experientially engage with a performance of this work. This consequence, however,
is problematic. Consider, for instance, the case of a musical work. Surely, by
listening to a performance of such a work, one can (under appropriate conditions)
fully appreciate this work. But is listening to a performance of a musical work
necessary to fully appreciate this work? The answer to this question is “Yes” only if
(a) to fully appreciate an artwork, one must experientially engage with an entity that
manifests all the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate
this work and (b) in the case of musical works, the only entity that can manifest
all such properties is a performance of a musical work. There is no doubt that (a)
is true. But what about (b)? Is a performance of a musical work, in fact, the only
entity that can manifest all the primary properties that must be experienced to fully
appreciate this work?
Consider a playing of a recording of a musical work. Surely, not any such play-
ing manifests all the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate
this work. Nevertheless, it is plausible to suppose that there are playings of record-
ings that manifest all such properties. Moreover, even if there are no such playings
of recordings, they doubtless can (and, most likely, will) be created. Meanwhile, a
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playing of a recording of a musical work is not a performance of this work; rather,
it is a representation of such a performance.
The foregoing argument assumes that playings of recordings are not perfor-
mances. According to Mag Uidhir (2007), however, this assumption is mistaken:
In fact, under certain circumstances, playings of recordings are performances. To
support his view, he advances the following argument. Suppose that a number of
members of the audience of a live concert have been stricken by a strange condition,
as a result of which “they are incapable of hearing the sounds produced by the or-
chestra, fellow audience members, or even themselves” (Mag Uidhir, 2007, 308) and
“can only hear sounds produced within their own ear canals” (Mag Uidhir, 2007,
308). Suppose next that there is a hearing device such that “upon placement into
the ear canals, [it] first records all incoming sounds and then plays the recording”
(Mag Uidhir, 2007, 309).12 Can the audience members, with the help of this device,
hear the performance? Given the above assumptions, it is clear that they can hear
only a playing of a recording of this performance. So if playings of recordings are
representations of performances, and not themselves performances, then the answer
to the foregoing question is “No.” But this answer seems wrong. It is natural to say
that in the case being discussed, the audience members do hear the performance.
So it seems that playings of recordings can be performances.
Mag Uidhir (2007)’s argument, however, is unpersuasive. According to this ar-
gument, the fact that it is natural to characterize the audience members as “hearing
12It is also assumed here that “the hearing device flawlessly preserves the wearer’s normal...
coordination of aural input with visual input (and any other sort)” (Mag Uidhir, 2007, 309).
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the performance” supports the claim that they, in fact, hear this performance. But
this fact does not really support this claim. Suppose Mary puts on a virtual reality
headset generating the visual experience indistinguishable from an experience one
could get by actually looking at the Eiffel Tower, and says: “Look! It’s the Eiffel
Tower.” Clearly, her phrase sounds quite natural. But, of course, this fact does not
support the claim that what she sees is the actual Eiffel Tower (what she sees is a
particular representation of this tower). Meanwhile, this case is relevantly analogous
to the case described by Mag Uidhir (2007). Given this, in the latter case, the fact
that it is natural to say that the audience members hear the performance does not
support the claim that they actually hear this performance.
Thus, as shown above, besides a performance, there is at least one entity that
can manifest all the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreci-
ate a musical work—a playing of a recording of this work. Are a performance and
a playing of a recording the only entities that are capable of manifesting all such
properties? No. There is, in fact, another such entity—a reproduction of a perfor-
mance, or, in other words, a sequence of sounds that is generated, with the help
of a score, by a computer or some other mechanical device. Such a reproduction
can, under appropriate conditions, manifest all the primary properties that must
be experienced to fully appreciate the corresponding work. At the same time, it is
neither a performance nor a playing of a recording of a performance. (Here, one
might ask: What is the difference between a reproduction of a performance and a
playing of a recording of a performance? The key difference between them concerns
the status of the sound. In the case of a playing of a recording, the sound is, in some
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sense, “contained” in some medium for playback (say, an electronic file or a DVD)
and, hence, exists before the playing is actualized. In the case of a reproduction,
however, the sound does not exist before this reproduction is actualized; it comes
into existence in the process of actualizing the reproduction.)
Thus, contrary to what Davies (2011)’s account of “a performing art” implies,
to fully appreciate a musical work, it is not necessary to listen to a performance of
this work. As a result, this account cannot be accepted.
But what is then an acceptable account of “a performing art”? To answer this
question, we first need to answer the following question: What is it necessary to
experientially engage with in order to fully appreciate a work of a performing art?
Consider the case of a musical work. A full appreciation of a musical work
requires engaging experientially with (in particular, listening to) whatever manifests
all the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate this work.
As mentioned above, the entities that are capable of manifesting all such properties
include performances, playings of recordings of performances, and reproductions
of performances. And there seem to be no other entities capable of that. So to
fully appreciate a musical work, it is necessary to experientially engage with (in
particular, to listen to) a performance, a playing of a recording of a performance,
or a reproduction of a performance of this work.
Now, what has been said about musical works applies to works of other per-
forming arts as well. As a result, the question posed above can be answered as
follows: To fully appreciate a work of a performing art, it is necessary to experien-
tially engage with a performance, a playing of a recording of a performance, or a
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reproduction of a performance of this work.
Taking this into account, a satisfactory account of “a performing art” can now
be formulated:
Performing art (PA): For all x, x is a performing art just in case (a) x is an art and
(b) to fully appreciate a work of x, it is necessary to experientially engage with
a performance, a playing of a recording of a performance, or a reproduction
of a performance of this work.
Regarding the foregoing account (hereafter: “PA”), two remarks are worth
making. First, this account covers the paradigmatic performing arts—namely, mu-
sic, dance, and theater. To fully appreciate a musical work, it is necessary to listen
to a musical performance, a reproduction of a musical performance, or a playing of
a recording of a musical performance. A work of dance cannot be fully appreciated
without seeing a dance performance, a reproduction of a dance performance, or a
playing of a recording of a dance performance. Finally, a full appreciation of a work
of theater is impossible without seeing and listening to a theatrical performance, a
reproduction of a theatrical performance, or a playing of a recording of a theatrical
performance. At the same time, there is no doubt that music, dance, and theater
are arts. Meanwhile, according to PA, if x is an art and to fully appreciate a work
of x, it is necessary to experientially engage with a performance, a playing of a
recording of a performance, or a reproduction of a performance of this work, then x
is a performing art.
Second, PA entails that those arts that are doubtless non-performing—painting,
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drawing, sculpture, etching, and photography—are not performing arts. It is clear
that a full appreciation of works of these arts—namely, a painting, a drawing, a
sculpture, an etching, and a photograph—is possible without an experiential en-
gagement with a performance, a playing of a recording of a performance, or a repro-
duction of a performance. Meanwhile, according to PA, an art is not performing
if to fully appreciate a work of this art, it is not necessary to experientially engage
with a performance, a playing of a recording of a performance, or a reproduction of
a performance of this work.
One could object to PA as follows. Consider a film. The only way to properly
appreciate it is by engaging experientially with—in particular, by watching and lis-
tening to—a screening of this film. Meanwhile, a screening of a film is a performance
of this film. So if PA is true, then cinema is a performing art—which is, of course,
false.
However, this objection fails. It assumes that a screening is a performance.
But this assumption is false. Consider paradigmatic performances—a dance per-
formance, a performance of a musical work, and a theatrical performance. Each of
these performances is a result of the performer’s interpretation of the instructions
provided by the author. And the same, I think, can be said about other kinds of
performances. Thus, a performance is essentially interpretative. But a screening of
a film is not interpretative. So such a screening cannot be a performance.
An opponent of PA could respond as follows. Let us agree that a screening of
a film is not a performance. However, such a screening is a playing of a recording of
a performance. Meanwhile, if that is the case, then PA is false. For suppose that
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a screening of a film is a playing of a recording of a performance. Then PA entails
that cinema is a performing art. However, as already mentioned, this consequence
is doubtless false.
This response is based on the thesis that a screening of a film is a playing
of a recording of a performance. But this thesis is false. If it were true, then a
film would be a performable entity. However, a film is not such an entity; it is not
something that is performed, even once. Surely, in the case of a film, we can speak
of the actors’ performance. But this kind of performance is not a performance of
the film; rather, it is a performance that is used in the creation of the film.
Here, a natural question arises: If the relation of a screening of a film to this
film is neither that of a performance of a work to this work nor that of a playing
of a recording of a performance of a work to this work, then what exactly is this
relation? Clearly, a screening of a film is a playing of some recording. Meanwhile, it
seems right to consider this recording to be the film itself. Given this, the foregoing
question can, I think, be answered as follows: The relation of a screening of a film
to this film is that of a playing of a work to this work.13
13It is also worth noting that a screening of a film is an instance of this film. That a screening
of a film is capable of being such an instance can be shown as follows. There is no doubt that
a screening of a film can manifest all the primary properties that must be experienced to fully
appreciate this film. So such a screening can be a well-formed instancee of the film. Furthermore,
a screening of a film can stand in an appropriate historical-intentional relation to this film. As a
result, such a screening can be a well-formed instancep of the film. Meanwhile, anything that is
either well-formed instancee or a well-formed instancep of an artwork is an instance of this work.
So a screening of a film can be an instance of this film.
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5.2.2 What Are Performances of an Artwork?
Having clarified the expression “a performing art,” let us now show that the
novel falls under this expression.
According to PA, the novel is a performing art if (a) it is an art and (b) to
fully appreciate a novel, it is necessary to experientially engage with a performance,
a playing of a recording of a performance, or a reproduction of a performance of this
novel. There is no doubt that the novel is an art. So the novel is a performing art if to
fully appreciate a novel, it is necessary to experientially engage with a performance,
a playing of a recording of a performance, or a reproduction of a performance of this
novel.
Now, as shown in the previous chapter, a novel cannot be fully appreciated
without engaging experientially with its reading—a sequence of particular sounds
generated as a result of reading aloud. So, given what has been said, if readings of
novels are performances, reproductions of performances, or playings of recordings of
performances, then the novel is a performing art. Are such readings, in fact, perfor-
mances, reproductions of performances, or playings of recordings of performances?
To answer this question, we first need to clarify the expression “performances
of an artwork.” What characteristic features does a performance of an artwork
have? The first thing to note is that a performance of an artwork—as well as any
other performance—is an event. As mentioned in the previous chapter,14 something
is an event if it (a) is said to occur, or happen, or take place, (b) has relatively
14See Chapter 4, Section 4.2.
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vague spatial boundaries and relatively crisp temporal boundaries, (c) tolerates co-
location, (d) cannot move, and (e) takes up time and persists by perduring, that
is, by having distinct temporal parts (or stages) at different times.15 Meanwhile, a
performance of an artwork has all of these characteristics. It is said to take place
somewhere (“A performance of Beethoven’s Symphony No. 5 is taking place at
the John F. Kennedy Center for the Performing Arts”). Its temporal location (its
beginning and end) can be identified quite accurately, while its spatial location can
be identified only approximately. It appears to tolerate co-location—in particular,
co-location with other events. It cannot move. Finally, it takes up time and persists
by perduring.
Thus, a performance of an artwork is an event. Furthermore, it is a particular
kind of event—namely, an action. Here is a possible definition of “an action”: For
all x, x is an action just in case x is an event that is generated by an agent or
agents and has a goal. This definition is rather intuitive. It entails that (a) events
we would normally call “actions”—biking, talking, scratching, and the like—are,
in fact, actions and (b) events we would not normally call “actions”—for example,
hurricanes, floods, rains, and the movement of the sun—are not actions.16 Suppose,
therefore, that the foregoing definition is correct. Then a performance of an artwork
is an action if it is an event that is generated by an agent or agents and has a goal.
Meanwhile, a performance of an artwork satisfies this condition. As has been shown
earlier, it is an event. Furthermore, it is generated by an agent (the performer) and
15See Casati and Varzi (2015).
16For a detailed account of “an action,” see Wilson and Shpall (2012).
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has a particular goal (to make it possible to appreciate the artwork).
Thus, a performance of an artwork is an action. But, of course, not every
action is a performance of an artwork. So to be such a performance, an action must
possess some additional properties. What might these properties be? To answer this
question, let us consider a typical performance of an artwork. What characteristic
features does such a performance have?
First, a typical performance of an artwork is usually generated with the help
of a set of (written or spoken) instructions—such as a musical score, a theatrical
script, and a score that describes a dance. This is not to say, of course, that the
use of instructions is necessary to generate a performance. Surely, a performance
can be generated without using any instructions whatsoever. However, common
performing practices normally involve the use of certain instructions.
Second, a typical performance of an artwork is interpretation-driven, that is,
it is, in part, a result of the performer’s interpreting this work. By “interpreting
an artwork” here is meant the process that consists of two consecutive activities.
The first activity is that of comprehension: A performer understands the work—by
apprehending instructions on how to perform it, its semantic meaning, potential
intentions of the author, and any other relevant factors. The second activity is that
of creative modification: Based on her understanding of the work, a performer makes
modifications to the performance that are not specified in the work’s instructions.17
17The process of a performer’s interpreting a work can be illustrated with the help of the following
example. Suppose John (an actor) interprets the following excerpt from Tennessee Williams’s A
Streetcar Named Desire:
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Third, creating a typical performance of an artwork requires the application of
special skills. Thus, in most cases, to create a musical performance, it is necessary
to be able to play a musical instrument and/or read scores; to create a dance per-
formance, it is necessary to be able to perform certain elaborate bodily movements;
and to create a theatrical performance, it is necessary to be able to play the roles
of various fictional characters. (This is not to say, of course, that a performance
cannot be created by someone who lacks any special skills.18 Rather, the point is
that creating a typical performance requires an exercise of certain special skills.)
Fourth, a typical performance of an artwork is intended to be presented before
an audience. As Godlovitch (1998) puts it,
Performances are not reflective activities savoured by their agents in soli-
tude. Performances... are other-directed, or, in the idiom, “given.” Un-
like rehearsals, exploratory sight-seeing, recreational practice, and other
Blanche: What kind of bed’s this—one of those collapsible things?
In this case, John performs two actions. First, he comprehends Blanche’s phrase—by grasping its
semantic meaning as well as various contextual factors that might be relevant to Blanche’s voice,
gesticulation, and facial expression. Second, in his performance of the phrase, John adds certain
features that are not specified in Williams’s play—such as making a particular facial expression
when pronouncing this phrase (for example, smiling) or pronouncing this phrase in a particular
way (for example, loudly or with a certain accent).
18Arguably, an example of a performance that does not require any special skills is Yvonne
Rainer’s dance Room Service, in which “the dancers perform a series of ordinary movements that
involve... the moving, arranging, and rearranging of objects such as mattresses and ladders”
(Davies, 2011, 13).
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player-centered activities, performances are specifically and directly in-
tended, designed, or meant for audiences. As purposive activities, their
telos is to be experienced by those for whom the performer prepares
them. (Godlovitch, 1998, 28)19
Fifth, a typical performance of an artwork is presented before an audience.
Here, one might ask: Must the audience before which a performance is presented
be actually present? Or, in other words: Can there be a performance without an
actual audience? According to Thom (1993), the answer is “No.” In his view, if x
is presented before a non-actual audience, then x is not a performance. To support
this view, he offers the following argument:
In performing I believe myself to be referring to present persons, to whom
I am in effect saying, “You, attend to me.” If no one is present at the
performance, there is a failure of reference... [Thus,] the audience is not
a mere dispensable accessory to performance. (Thom, 1993, 192)
Alternatively, Thom (1993)’s argument can be presented as follows. x is a perfor-
mance only if its author makes a particular “address” to an audience—namely, an
“address” that has the form of the imperative “You, attend to me.” Meanwhile,
such an “address” can be made only if it successfully refers to an audience. And
this reference is possible only if the audience is actually present. Thus, without an
actual audience, x is not a performance.
19Godlovitch speaks here of musical performances. But what he says, I think, can be said about
all kinds of artistic performance.
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Thom (1993)’s argument assumes that a successful reference of a performer’s
“address” to an audience is a necessary condition of being a performance: If x does
not involve such a reference by a performer, then x cannot be a performance. But
why think this assumption is true? Suppose a performer of a musical work imagines
that he is making an “address” (“You, attend to me”) to an actual audience. Sup-
pose next that he is, in fact, alone. In this case, his “address” fails to refer to the
audience. However—assuming that his performance corresponds to the score of the
work and, hence, is correct—there seems to be no real reason to think that what he
is doing is not a genuine performance.
Thus, Thom (1993)’s argument rests on a highly questionable assumption
and, hence, cannot be accepted. At the same time, as far as I am aware, there is no
other potentially acceptable argument in favor of the thesis that there cannot be a
performance without an actual audience. Given this, as well as what has been said
in the previous paragraph, the question “Can there be a performance without an
actual audience?” should be answered in the affirmative.
Sixth, a typical performance of an artwork is usually not a mere means to
appreciate the corresponding work; in many cases, it is something that is worth
appreciating in its own right. Consider, for instance, a typical musical or theatrical
performance. Such a performance usually is worthy of appreciation qua independent
art object,20 and is not just a means to appreciate the corresponding work.
Finally, by perceiving a typical performance of an artwork, we can appreciate
this work. For example, by listening to a performance of Jean Sibelius’s Finlandia,
20Note that this does not imply that a performance is an artwork.
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we can appreciate Finlandia. By watching and listening to a performance of Hamlet,
we can appreciate Hamlet. And by watching and listening to a performance of Swan
Lake, we can appreciate Swan Lake.21
Suppose now that an action has all of the foregoing features of a typical per-
formance of an artwork. Is this action a performance? There can be no doubt about
that. Thus, the properties that an action must possess to be a performance of an
artwork can (though, perhaps, do not have to) be the properties of being:
• usually generated with the help of some set of (written or spoken) instructions
• interpretation-driven
• created by those who have special skills
• intended to be presented before an audience
• presented before an audience
• often worth appreciating in its own right
• such that by perceiving it, we can appreciate the corresponding artwork
In light of what has been said, the following account of “performances of an
artwork” can be provided:
Performances of an Artwork (POA): For all x, x ’s are performances of an artwork
A if x ’s are actions that (a) are normally generated with the help of some sets
21It is worth noting that the claim that by perceiving a performance of an artwork, we can
appreciate this artwork neither amounts to nor entails the claim that by perceiving a typical
performance of an artwork, we can fully appreciate this work.
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of (written or spoken) instructions, (b) are interpretation-driven, (c) can be
created only by those who have special skills, (d) are intended to be presented
before an audience, (e) are presented before an audience, (f) are, in many cases,
worth appreciating in their own right, and (g) are such that by perceiving
them, we can appreciate A.22
One could object to the foregoing account (hereafter: “POA”) as follows.
Consider live readings of a philosophy text (say, the Critique of Pure Reason or the
Nicomachean Ethics). Such readings are actions that (a) are usually generated with
the help of sets of (written or spoken) instructions (namely, particular inscriptions),
(b) are interpretation-driven, (c) can be created only by those who can read and,
hence, have special skills, (d) are intended to be presented before an audience,
(e) are presented before an audience, (f) are often worth appreciating in their own
right, and (g) enable us to properly appreciate the corresponding works. Meanwhile,
according to POA, any actions that have the foregoing properties are performances.
So if POA is true, then readings of a philosophy text are performances. But if that
is so, then philosophy is a performing art. However, this consequence is doubtless
false. So POA is false.
However, this objection fails. According to it, the fact that live readings of a
philosophy text are performances of this text entails that philosophy is a performing
art. But this entailment does not hold. According to PA, philosophy is a performing
art only if (a) philosophy is an art and (b) to fully appreciate a philosophical text,
22Note that this is not a definition of “performances of an artwork,” as it provides only a sufficient
condition of being such performances.
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it is necessary to engage experientially with a performance, a playing of a recording
of a performance, or a reproduction of a performance of this text. However, even if
live readings of a philosophy text are performances of this text, both (a) and (b) are
false: Philosophy is not an art, and to fully appreciate a philosophical text, there is
no need to engage experientially with a performance, a playing of a recording of a
performance, or a reproduction of a performance of this text.
One could also argue against POA in the following way. Suppose POA is
correct. Then a mother reading Winnie the Pooh to her four year old son is giving
a performance. But this consequence is false.
This objection is also unsuccessful. It implies that it is wrong to treat the
mother’s reading as a performance. But this implication is ungrounded. There
is no real reason against treating the mother’s reading that way. One could say
that such treatment is wrong, since the reading may not possess much aesthetic
value—at least, when compared to readings of professional readers, such as Jim
Dale, Garrison Keillor, and Penny Marshall. But this explanation can hardly be
considered acceptable. It assumes that whether x is a performance depends on
whether x has significant aesthetic value: If x has such value, then x can be a
performance; otherwise, x is not a performance. But this assumption is false. An
entity lacking any significant aesthetic value can still be a performance (a mediocre
performance is still a performance!).
One could also try to explain the inappropriateness of regarding the mother’s
reading as “a performance” by saying that this reading has no aesthetic value. But
this explanation is also unsatisfactory. It assumes that the mother’s reading of
223
Winnie the Pooh has no aesthetic value. But this assumption is false. In fact,
any intelligible reading of a literary work is aesthetically valuable at least to some
degree. If a reading has no aesthetic value at all, then it just cannot be a reading
of a literary work.
5.2.3 Readings as Performances
Taking into account POA, let us now address the question of whether readings
of novels are performances of artworks.
Readings—that is, sequences of particular sounds generated as a result of
reading aloud—can be divided into two categories: (1) readings that are directly
generated by agents or agents and non-agents (for example, computers and stereo
systems) and (2) readings that are directly generated only by non-agents. Call the
first kind of readings “live readings” and the second kind “mechanical readings.”23
Are readings of either of these kinds performances?
Let us first consider whether live readings of a novel are performances. Ac-
cording to POA, to be performances of a novel, it is sufficient for live readings to
satisfy two conditions. First, live readings must be actions. Second, they must be
(a) in most cases, generated with the help of some set of (written or spoken) in-
structions, (b) interpretation-driven, (c) capable of being created only by those who
have special skills, (d) intended to be presented before an audience, (e) presented
before an intended audience, (f) often worth appreciating in their own right, and
23Note that the fact that a mechanical reading is not directly generated by an agent does not
entail that such a reading is not an action.
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(g) such that by perceiving them, we can appreciate the corresponding novels. Do
live readings of a novel satisfy these conditions?
As already mentioned, an entity is an action if it is an event generated by an
agent and is directed at a goal. According to the definition of “live readings,” such
readings are generated by agents. Furthermore, live readings are events. As noted
earlier, something is an event if it (a) is said to occur, or happen, or take place, (b)
has relatively vague spatial boundaries and relatively crisp temporal boundaries,
(c) can be spatially co-located with other events, (d) cannot move, and (e) takes
up time and persists by perduring, that is, by having distinct temporal parts (or
stages) at different times. And there is no doubt that live readings possess all of the
foregoing properties.
Thus, live readings of a novel satisfy the first condition. Do they satisfy the
second condition? There is good reason to answer this question in the affirmative.
First, in an overwhelming majority of cases, a live reading of a novel is generated
with the help of a (physical or mental) inscription of this novel. Meanwhile, an
inscription of a novel is essentially a set of written instructions—the instructions on
how to correctly read this novel. Thus, live readings of a novel are usually generated
with the help of instructions.
Second, live readings of a novel are interpretation-driven. As is clear from
what has been said in the previous section, to be interpretation-driven, x must
satisfy two conditions. First, x ’s creator must have an understanding of the work
associated with x. Second, x ’s creator must make creative additions to x—that
is, additions that are not specified in the corresponding set of instructions and that
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accord with the creator’s conception of the work associated with x. In the case of live
readings of a novel, both conditions are at least minimally satisfied. A reader of a
novel doubtless understands what she reads. Furthermore, it is uncontroversial that
a reader of a novel makes various creative additions to her reading—for example,
by varying the speed and intonation of her reading (usually neither the speed nor
intonation are specified by inscriptions) or by using different voices when reading
the words of different characters (again, inscriptions do not normally provide any
explicit description of what the characters’ voices are).
Third, live readings of a novel require an exercise of a special skill—the skill of
reading aloud. One could object that this skill is not really special, since virtually
everyone has it. But this objection fails. First, although there are considerably
more people who can read aloud than there are people who can, say, play guitar or
dance salsa, not everyone can read aloud; in fact, there are a considerable number
of people who cannot do it. Second, the fact that all or virtually all people can do x
does not entail that x is not special. A skill is special just in case it is not acquired in
a natural way. Thus, the skill of walking on two legs is not special, since acquiring it
is a natural process. On the other hand, the skill of playing guitar is special—for, it
has not been acquired as a result of a natural process. Now, what about the skill of
reading? Is it special? To have a minimal capacity to read, one must have a number
of skills. First of all, one must be capable of recognizing the letters of the alphabet.
Also, one must know the sounds associated with these letters. Furthermore, one
must know and be able to follow the rules on how to pronounce sounds of two or
more concatenated letters. Finally, one must know punctuation and capitalization
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conventions. Clearly, the mentioned skills cannot be acquired in a natural way—
merely by following the instincts. Acquiring these skills is an artificial process—a
process that requires one to go beyond nature. As a result, the question posed above
should be answered in the affirmative: The skill of reading is special.
Fourth, in the process of reading a novel, a reader has the intention to present
what he is reading to himself and/or to those who listen to his reading. Thus, live
readings of a novel are intended to be presented to an audience.
Fifth, when reading a novel, a reader actually presents what he is reading to
someone—either just to himself or, more often, to several people. So live readings
of a novel are presented before an audience.
Sixth, live readings of a novel are usually worth appreciating in their own right,
and not just as entities that make it possible to appreciate another artistic object
(the novel). Of course, not every live reading possesses properties that are high in
artistic value. It may even be right to say that most live readings do not possess
such properties. But despite this, virtually every live reading has a sufficient number
of artistic properties that are worthy of artistic appreciation. Hence, virtually every
such reading is worth appreciating qua an independent artistic object.
Finally, by listening to live readings of a novel, we can appreciate certain
sonic and semantic properties. Meanwhile, as has been established in the previous
chapter, these properties provide direct experiential access to the sonic and semantic
components of the novel and, hence, to the novel itself. Thus, by listening to live
readings of a novel, we can appreciate this novel.
Thus, live readings of novels are performances. Now, what about mechanical
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readings of novels—that is, readings that are directly generated solely by non-agents?
Are such readings performances? It is reasonable to assume that to be a perfor-
mance of an artwork, an entity must be, at least minimally, interpretation-driven.
Are mechanical readings interpretation-driven? Consider playings of recordings. It
is clear that generating them does not require an understanding of the associated
works. Meanwhile, as mentioned above, to be interpretation-driven, an entity must
be generated with an understanding of the work associated with this entity. Thus,
playings of recordings are not interpretation-driven. What about reproductions of
performances? Are they interpretation-driven? No. The argument here is analogous
to the foregoing argument concerning playings of recordings. Thus, neither playings
of recordings nor reproductions of performances are interpretation-driven. Mean-
while, there are no other kinds of mechanical readings. So no mechanical reading is
interpretation-driven. But if this is so, then mechanical readings of novels are not
performances.
5.2.4 Conclusion
As has been established above, the novel is a performing art if readings of
a novel are performances, playings of recordings of performances, or reproductions
of performances of this novel. Thus—given the fact that live readings are perfor-
mances, whereas mechanical readings are not, as well as the fact that readings are
either live or mechanical—if mechanical readings of novels are playings of recordings
of performances or reproductions of performances, then the novel is a performing
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art. As already mentioned, a mechanical reading is either a playing of a recording
of a live reading or a reproduction of a live reading. So, given that live readings
are performances, mechanical readings of novels are playings of recordings of perfor-
mances or reproductions of performances. Consequently, the novel is a performing
art.
Before proceeding, it is worth noting that the fact that the foregoing conclusion
contradicts the consensus view on whether the novel is a performing art cannot be
used to undermine this conclusion and, hence, the argument presented above. There
are two ways x can undermine y—by (logically) entailing that y is problematic
and by counting against y. Clearly, the fact that the conclusion of the argument
presented in this section contradicts the consensus view on whether the novel is a
performing art does not entail that this conclusion is problematic. Does this fact
count against this conclusion? The answer to this question is “Yes” only if there is
no plausible explanation of why most people are mistaken in believing that the novel
is a non-performing art. However, there is such an explanation. What accounts for
the fact that most people mistakenly believe that the novel is a non-performing art
is their commitment to the following unsound argument:
10. For all x, x is a performing art if (a) x is an art and (b) to fully appreciate
works of x, it is necessary to experientially engage with performances or some
surrogates thereof of these works.
11. It is false that to fully appreciate novels, it is necessary to experientially engage
with any performances or surrogates thereof.
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12. So the novel is not a performing art.24
5.3 The Novel as a Performing Art and the History of Literature
One might object that the view that the novel is a performing art does not
accord with the history of literature, as this history is the history of a non-performing
art. This objection, however, does not pose a real threat to this view. First of all, in
the case of the arts, theory trumps practice. Thus, even if the history of literature
contradicts the view that the novel is a performing art, this view can still be true—if
it is supported by our best theoretical considerations regarding the novel. Is it, in
fact, supported by these considerations? Given what has been said in this and the
previous two chapters, the answer to this question is doubtless “Yes.”
Furthermore, there is good reason to think that the history of literature is, in
fact, largely the history of a performing art. To see this, let us first have a look at
the history of the reading practice.
In the ancient world, the practice of reading a literary text silently was un-
common;25 the normal way to read such a text was to read it aloud, whether before
an audience or alone.26 This is not to say, of course, that at that time, everyone
read aloud. Thus, St. Ambrose—one of the doctors of the Church, who lived in the
fourth century—could read silently, as is evidenced by the following excerpt from
St. Augustine’s Confessions :
24Given the above analysis, it is clear that the reason why this argument is unsound is that
premise (11) is false.
25See Balogh (1927), Manguel (2014), Nietzsche (2002), Saenger (1997), and Thomas (1992).
26See Manguel (2014).
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When [Ambrose] read, his eyes scanned the page and his heart sought out
the meaning, but his voice was silent and his tongue was still. Anyone
could approach him freely and guests were not commonly announced, so
that often, when we came to visit him, we found him reading like this in
silence, for he never read aloud. (Finkelstein and McCleery, 2013, 38)
However, Ambrose was the exception, rather than the rule.27,28,29
Thus, in the ancient world, it was uncommon to read silently. Then the
27See Manguel (2014) and Saenger (1997).
28Interestingly, one piece of evidence supporting this thesis is contained in the foregoing quote.
As is clear from this quote, Augustine finds Ambrose’s manner of reading rather odd. (For,
otherwise, why would Augustine stress the fact that Ambrose was silent when reading and never
read aloud?) Meanwhile, the fact that Augustine finds Ambrose’s manner of reading odd is a clear
indication of the fact that silent reading was considered an oddity, rather than the norm, at that
time.
29The fact that the practice of silent reading was so uncommon in the ancient world is doubtless
puzzling. Why didn’t the ancients (at least, the Greeks) read silently? In the literature on the
history of reading, there are two main answers to this question. According to one answer, endorsed
by Knox (1968), among others, the ancients did not do that because at that time, it was generally
agreed that a proper appreciation of a literary text required appreciating the sonic properties of
this work through listening to the work’s sound. The second answer, defended, most notably,
by Saenger (1997), is that the ancients did not read silently because by reading silently, it was
impossible for them to understand what they read. (Regarding the latter answer, a natural question
arises: Why couldn’t they understand what they read by reading silently? A possible answer to
this question is as follows. The ancients read texts “written in what is known to linguists and
paleographers as scriptura continua, which is to say, uninterrupted writing” (Kivy, 2006, 16), or,
other words, texts, there was no separation between words. Meanwhile, as Saenger (1997) points
out, comprehending such texts is extremely hard without hearing them and, hence, through silent
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situation began to change:
During the Middle Ages, one group of readers after another mastered
the technique of silent reading. The first were the copyists working in
the monastic scriptoria. Then, around the middle of the twelfth century,
scholars in the universities acquired the ability. Two centuries later the
lay aristocracy learned to read silently. By the fifteenth century silent
reading was the norm, at least for readers who also knew how to write
and who belonged to segments of society that had long been literate. For
others, who belonged to groups that slowly learned to read and for whom
books remained strange, rare objects, the old way of reading no doubt
remained a necessity. As late as the nineteenth century, neophytes and
maladroit readers could be identified by their inability to read silently.
In Labiche’s play La Cagnotte (1864), the farmer Colladan replies to a
person who loses patience when he reads a very private letter out loud:
“If I read out loud, it’s not for you, it’s for me... Whenever I don’t read
out loud... I don’t understand what I am reading.” (Chartier, 2002,
125–126)
As is clear from the foregoing description, the proliferation of silent reading
was far from swift. In fact, it was not until the early twentieth century that silent
reading became the usual way to read for nearly everyone. Even in the nineteenth
century, there was a considerable number of people who read aloud, rather than
reading.)
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silently, to themselves on a regular basis.
So silent reading was virtually nonexistent for a long time and began to slowly
gain popularity only in the Middle Ages; reading aloud, on the other hand, was the
dominant reading practice before the Middle Ages and then existed, as a popular
alternative to silent reading, for a continuous period—before eventually going out
of fashion in the twentieth century.
Thus, the history of literature is largely (though, of course, not solely) the
history of literature that is read aloud. But literature that is read aloud is literature
that is appreciated through live readings. And, as has been shown in Section 5.2,
the latter are performances. So the history of literature is, to a large extent, the
history of a performing art.
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PART III
Introduction to PART III
As mentioned in the introduction to PART II, to answer the main question of
this dissertation, it is sufficient to answer the following questions: “What is the
ontological status of novels?” and “What is the ontological status of instances of
novels?” The answer to the latter question has been provided in PART II. The
purpose of PART III is to answer the question “What is the ontological status of
novels?”
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Chapter 6: What a Novel Is Not
Introduction
Possible views on the fundamental nature of a novel include:
1. the view that a novel is a set of embodiments of this novel1 (e.g., a set of
inscriptions/readings/inscriptions and readings/certain mental states appro-
priately related to this novel)
2. the view that a novel is a property (e.g., the property of having a particular
syntactic/ semantic/syntactic-semantic/sonic structure)
3. the view that a novel is a pure type2 (e.g., a pure abstract syntactic/semantic/syntactic-
semantic/sonic structure)
4. the view that a novel is an initiated type3 (e.g., a pure abstract syntactic/semantic/syntactic-
semantic/sonic structure indicated4 by the author in a particular cultural con-
1By “an embodiment of a novel” is meant a concrete singular entity that possesses all, or at
least sufficiently many, of the relevant artistic properties of this novel. Entities that can serve
as embodiments of novels include inscriptions, readings, electronic files, and/or mental states
appropriately related to this novel.
2The expression “a pure type” is clarified in Section 6.1.3.
3The expression “an initiated type” is clarified in Section 6.1.4.
4The expression “to indicate” is clarified in Section 6.1.4.
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text)
5. the view that a novel is a “historical individual”5 (e.g., a syntactic/semantic/syntactic-
semantic/sonic abstractum that depends for its essence and existence on cer-
tain concreta)
6. the view that a novel is an “abstract artifact”6 (e.g., a syntactic/semantic/syntactic-
semantic/sonic abstractum that depends for its essence and existence on cer-
tain concreta)
7. the view that a novel is an embodiment of this novel (e.g., the original manuscript)
8. the view that a novel is a mereological sum of embodiments of this novel (e.g.,
a mereological sum of inscriptions/readings/inscriptions and readings/certain
mental states appropriately related to this novel)
9. eliminativism, or the view that a novel does not exist (and so does not have
any nature)
Views (1)–(6) are abstractionist, or ones according to which a novel is an abstractum
(where an abstractum can roughly be characterized as an entity that has at least
some of the following properties: (a) being nonspatial, (b) being atemporal, (c) be-
ing causally impassive (= being incapable of being causally affected by anything),
(d) being causally inactive (= being incapable of causally affecting anything), and
5The expression “a historical individual” is clarified in Section 6.1.5.
6The expression “an abstract artifact” is clarified in Section 6.1.5.
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(e) being modally inflexible (= having all intrinsic properties7 essentially8)). Views
(7) and (8) are concretist, or ones according to which a novel is a concretum (where
a concretum can roughly be characterized as whatever has some or all of the fol-
lowing properties: (a) being in space and/or time, (b) being causally efficacious
(= being capable of causally affecting something and of being causally affected
by something), and (c) being modally flexible (= having some intrinsic properties
nonessentially)).9 The last view, eliminativism, is neither concretist nor abstrac-
tionist (for, (a) it implies that novels do not have any nature at all, whereas (b)
according to both concretist and abstractionist views, novels have some—abstract
or concrete—nature).
My goal in this chapter is to show that none of the views (1)–(9) stands up
to criticism. I begin with a critique of the abstractionist views (Section 6.1). Next,
I argue against the concretist views (Section 6.2). Then I show that eliminativism
is untenable (Section 6.3). Finally, I make a remark concerning the view that, I
believe, is successful (this view is discussed in the next chapter) (Section 6.4).
7Following Lewis (1983), “an intrinsic property” can be defined as follows: For all x and for all
y, x is an intrinsic property of y just in case x is a property possessed by y “in virtue of the way
[y ] itself, and nothing else, is” (Lewis, 1983, 112). For a detailed analysis of the expression “an
intrinsic property” (as well as the related expression “an extrinsic property”), see Weatherson and
Marshall (2014).
8“An essential property” can be defined as follows: For all x and for all y, x is an essential
property of y just in case if x is a property of y and if y is deprived of x, then y goes out of
existence.
9For a detailed analysis of the expressions “abstract” and “concrete,” see Burgess (1997), Cowl-
ing (2017), Hale (1988), Rosen (2012), and Yablo (2002).
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6.1 Abstractionist Views
Let us begin with an examination of the abstractionist views.
6.1.1 A Novel as a Set of Embodiments
Consider first the view that a novel is a set of embodiments of this novel.10 One
objection to this view is as follows. Sets have their members essentially. In other
words, (a) “no set could gain or lose any members (or exchange some members
for others) and still be the set it was” (Van Cleve, 1985, 585) and (b) “no set
could have had members other than the ones it does” (Van Cleve, 1985, 585).11
So if a novel is a set of embodiments of this novel, then the identity of a novel
is determined by the embodiments contained in this set. But is the identity of
a novel, in fact, determined by that? If that is the case, then whenever one of
the embodiments of a novel is modified or destroyed, the novel is also modified or
destroyed, respectively. However, this result is unacceptable. If I modify/destroy one
10One might object that since the existence of a set of embodiments of a novel implies that this
novel must exist independently of this set, the view that a novel is a set of embodiments of this
novel is incoherent. However, this objection is ungrounded. It assumes that the existence of a set
of embodiments of a novel implies that this novel must exist independently of this set. But this
assumption is false. Clearly, a set of concreta that manifest or encode particular textual properties
(and perhaps are appropriately related to the author) can exist even if the corresponding novel
exists only qua an entity identical to this set. Meanwhile, a set of embodiments of a novel is just
a set of such concreta.
11For an explanation of why this is so, see Van Cleve (1985).
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of the existing embodiments of (say) Moby-Dick, I will not thereby modify/destroy
Moby-Dick. Thus, the answer to the foregoing question is “No.” But then the view
that a novel is a set of embodiments of this novel cannot be true.
Here is another objection to this view. Suppose a novel is a set of embodiments
of this novel. Then a novel is either a set that contains more than one embodiment
of this novel or a set that contains just one embodiment of this novel. Suppose a
novel is a set that contains more than one embodiment (perhaps all embodiments)
of this novel. Then to fully apprehend a novel, it is necessary to apprehend all of
the embodiments contained in the set with which this novel is identified. But this
consequence is false. A complete apprehension of a novel requires apprehending only
one of its embodiments (assuming, of course, that this embodiment is of satisfactory
quality).
Suppose, on the other hand, that a novel is a set that contains just one em-
bodiment of this novel. Then to apprehend a novel, it is necessary to apprehend the
embodiment that is contained in the set with which this novel is identified. But this
consequence is doubtless false. A novel can be apprehended not only by apprehend-
ing the embodiment that is contained in the set with which this novel is identified
but also by apprehending any other embodiment of this novel (assuming, of course,
that this latter embodiment is of satisfactory quality).
Thus, a novel is neither a set that contains just one embodiment of this novel
nor a set that contains more than one embodiment of this novel. But if this is so,
then the view that a novel is a set of embodiments of this novel must be false.
Here, a proponent of this view could respond as follows. The foregoing ob-
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jection is based on the assumption that if a novel is a set that contains more than
one embodiment of this novel, then a complete apprehension of a novel requires
apprehending all of the embodiments contained in the set with which the novel is
identified. But is this assumption true? Consider the following principle: For all x
and for all y, if y is appropriately related to x, then it is possible to fully apprehend x
by apprehending y. This principle looks uncontroversial. Suppose, therefore, that it
is true. Then if an embodiment contained in the set with which a novel is identified
is appropriately related to this novel, it is possible to fully apprehend a novel by ap-
prehending just one of the embodiments contained in the set with which this novel
is identified. Meanwhile, any embodiment of a novel (and, hence, any embodiment
contained in the set with which a novel is identified) is appropriately related to this
novel. As a result, the answer to the question posed above is “No.” But if this is so,
then the objection being discussed involves a false assumption and, hence, fails.12
The foregoing response states that an embodiment of a novel is appropriately
related to this novel. But what exactly does it mean for an embodiment of a novel
to be appropriately related to this novel?
Prima facie, this question can be answered as follows: An embodiment of a
novel is appropriately related to this novel just in case it provides all information
relevant to the artistic appreciation of this novel. Suppose this answer is correct.
Then the response being discussed implies that an embodiment of a novel provides
all information relevant to the artistic appreciation of this novel. However, this
12This response draws upon Dodd (2000, 2004)’s response to a similar objection. For an analysis
of that objection and Dodd (2000, 2004)’s response, see Caplan and Matheson (2006).
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implication is incompatible with the view that a novel is a set of embodiments
of this novel. For suppose this view is true. Then, since all information relevant
to the artistic appreciation of a novel includes information about the ontological
composition of this novel, all information relevant to the artistic appreciation of a
novel includes the information that the novel is a set composed of embodiments
of this novel. However, an embodiment of a novel does not normally contain the
information that the novel is such a set. So such an embodiment does not normally
provide all information relevant to the artistic appreciation of the corresponding
novel. As a result, if the view that a novel is a set of embodiments of this novel
is true, then the implication under consideration—that an embodiment of a novel
provides all information relevant to the artistic appreciation of this novel—is false.
Thus, if the foregoing answer to the question “What exactly does it mean for
an embodiment of a novel to be appropriately related to this novel?” is true, then
the response being discussed is not available to a proponent of the view that a novel
is a set of embodiments of this novel. Meanwhile, there is no satisfactory alternative
to this answer. Given what has been said, as well as the fact that the response
being discussed cannot be successful without a satisfactory answer to the foregoing
question, this response fails.
Can any of the foregoing objections to the view that a novel is a set of embodi-
ments of this novel be plausibly countered by a proponent of this view? There seems
no reason to think so. Given this, the view that a novel is a set of embodiments of
this novel should be rejected.
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6.1.2 A Novel as a Property
Let us now turn to the view that a novel is a property. This view faces the
following objection. If x is a property, then x cannot have any of the following
properties:
(a) having a particular number of words
(b) telling a particular story
(c) having particular sonic properties
(d) being in English
So if the view being discussed is true, then a novel does not have any of the properties
(a)–(d). But this consequence is doubtless false. Take, for instance, Pride and
Prejudice. It has all of (a)–(d): It has a particular number of words, tells a particular
story, has certain sonic properties, and is in English.
Can a proponent of identifying a novel with a property plausibly respond to
this objection? No—or so it seems. Given this, the view that a novel is a property
cannot be accepted.
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6.1.3 A Novel as a Pure Type
Consider now the view that a novel is a pure type, or, in other words, an
abstract type13,14 that is eternal (= has always existed and will always exist) and
acausal (= cannot stand in causal relations).15 This view faces the following ob-
jection. If a novel is a pure type, then, since such a type is, by definition, eternal,
a novel is eternal. However, this consequence is false, for (a) if a novel is eternal,
then it cannot be created, it can only be discovered; however, (b) novels are not
discovered, they are created. Thus, the view that a novel is a pure type is false.
Call this “the Creation Objectionpt.”
16
13The use of the word “abstract” here may seem redundant, but, in fact, it is not. Perhaps it
would be redundant if all types were, by definition, abstract. However, according to my termi-
nology, besides abstract types, there are also concrete types. (For a clarification of the expression
“a concrete type” as well as a defense of the view that some entities are best viewed as concrete
types, see Chapter 7.)
14For an account of what a type is, see Rohrbaugh (2003, 179–181) and Wetzel (2009, 2014).
15Proponents of this view include Strawson (2003) and Currie (1989). Also, a parallel view on
the fundamental nature of musical works is endorsed by Dodd (2000, 2002, 2007) and Kivy (1983,
1987).
16Another common objection to the view that a novel is a pure type stems from the idea that
novels are modally flexible (where “modally flexible” can be defined as follows: For all x, x is
modally flexible just in case x does not have all of its intrinsic properties essentially).* Consider
some novel—say, Don Quixote. Had Cervantes’s decisions been different, Don Quixote could
have been shorter or contained slightly different expressions. Meanwhile, the properties of being
shorter and containing slightly different expressions are intrinsic.** So at least some novels could
have intrinsic properties other than the ones they actually have. But if this is so, then at least
some novels are modally flexible.*** Meanwhile, pure types have all of their intrinsic properties
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Response to the Creation Objectionpt (1). A proponent of the view that a
novel is a pure type could respond to the Creation Objectionpt as follows. This
objection implies that if a novel is eternal, then it cannot be created. But this
essentially and, hence, are not modally flexible. So the view that a novel is a pure type is false.
Yet, unlike the Creation Objectionpt, this objection—which might be called “the Objection
from Modal Flexibility”—can, I think, be defused. Here is a plausible response available to a
proponent of the view that a novel is a pure type. The Objection from Modal Flexibility assumes
that novels are modally flexible. If this assumption is true, then some of the intrinsic properties
of a novel can be changed without thereby causing it to go out of existence. Meanwhile, prima
facie, the intrinsic properties of a novel amount to certain semantic, sonic, syntactic, and, in some
cases, visual properties. Thus, the truth of the foregoing assumption entails that at least some
of these properties can be changed without thereby causing the novel to go out of existence. Is
this entailment true? No. The semantic, sonic, syntactic, and, in some cases, visual properties are
essential to a novel. Meanwhile, if this is so, then any change in these properties—regardless of
how minimal this change is—causes the novel to go out of existence. Thus, novels are not modally
flexible—and so the Objection from Modal Flexibility fails.
Here, one could object as follows. Consider those syntactic properties that do not have any
effect on the meaning, sound, artistically relevant graphic elements, or artistic context of a novel
(for instance, the properties of having certain commas, periods, and quotation marks). These
properties can be possessed by this novel. Furthermore, they are intrinsic. But changing them
does not cause the novel to go out of existence. So, contrary to what the foregoing response states,
a novel can be intrinsically changed without being destroyed.
In response to this, a proponent of the view that a novel is a pure type could say the following.
The foregoing objection assumes that those syntactic properties that have no effect on the meaning,
sound, artistically relevant graphic elements, and artistic context of a novel can be possessed by
this novel. But is this assumption true? The artistic value of a novel does not depend on any
property that has no effect on the meaning, sound, artistically relevant graphic elements, or artistic
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implication is false. Suppose a novel is eternal. Then it can be a result of the
process of discovering a particular linguistic structure. Meanwhile, this process is
creative, since (a) it requires a considerable amount of non-standard, highly original
thinking, and (b) any such process is creative. So a novel can be a result of a creative
process. But if x is a result of such a process, then x is created. So, contrary to
what the Creation Objectionpt implies, a novel can be created even if it is eternal.
17
This response is based on a particular account of creation—namely, the account
context of this novel. So those syntactic properties that have no effect on the meaning, sound,
artistically relevant graphic elements, and artistic context of a novel are not directly relevant to
the artistic value of this novel. Meanwhile, if x is an intrinsic property, then x is possessed by
an artwork only if x is directly relevant to the artistic value of this work. Thus, those syntactic
properties that have no effect on the meaning, sound, artistically relevant graphic elements, or
artistic context of a novel cannot be possessed by this novel. As a result, the objection being
discussed involves a false assumption and, hence, fails.
* The view that novels are modally flexible has been defended by Hazlett (2012) and Rohrbaugh
(2003).
** The reason for this is as follows. The properties of being shorter and containing slightly
different expressions are possessed by novels by virtue of the way these novels themselves are, not
by virtue of something else. Meanwhile, as already mentioned (see Footnote 7), a property is
intrinsic if it is possessed by a thing by “virtue of the way that thing itself, and nothing else, is”
(Lewis, 1983, 112).
*** This is not to say, of course, that the modal flexibility of a novel is unrestricted. (Take,
once again, Don Quixote. It could not have the property of describing 2017 England or portraying
Alonso Quixano as one who does not know anything about chivalry.) The point is that novels have
at least some modal flexibility with regard to their intrinsic properties.
17Cf. Fisher (1991, 130).
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according to which being a result of a creative process is sufficient for being created.
Is this account true? Consider the mass–energy equivalence formula E = mc2. It
was not created (rather, it was discovered). But it is a result of a creative process—
the process that required a considerable amount of non-standard, highly original
thinking. So the foregoing account is false. But then the response being discussed
is unsatisfactory.
Response to the Creation Objectionpt (2). Here is another possible response
available to a proponent of the view that a novel is a pure type. According to the
account of creation advanced by Deutsch (1991), “to create is to freely stipulate”
(Deutsch, 1991, 220), or, in other words, to provide a description that is invariably
correct, whatever its content. Clearly, if this account is true, then even an eternally
existing novel can be created—by means of freely stipulating the textual content of
this novel. Is this account, in fact, true? There seems no reason to think otherwise.
Thus, a novel can be created even if it is eternal. But if this is so, then one of the
assumptions of the Creation Objectionpt—that if a novel is eternal, then this novel
cannot be created—is false, and, hence, this objection fails.
This response is also unsatisfactory. It is based on Deutsch (1991)’s account
of creation. But this account is misguided. First of all, it entails that a novel
can be created (by stipulating particular textual content) even if this novel already
exists. But this entailment is problematic. Creation implies coming into existence.
Meanwhile, nothing that already exists can come into existence. So a novel that
already exists cannot be created.
Furthermore, if Deutsch (1991)’s account is true, then all instances of creation
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result from stipulation. However, this consequence is false. Consider, for instance,
painted canvases or copies of musical scores. They are doubtless instances of cre-
ation. But they are not results of stipulation.18
Response to the Creation Objectionpt (3). Following Currie (1989),
19 a pro-
ponent of the view that a novel is a pure type could also respond to the Creation
Objectionpt as follows. Imagine there are two planets—Earth and Twin Earth.
Imagine next that the cultural history of Twin Earth is exactly the same as the
cultural history of Earth, except that the culturally relevant events that take place
on Twin Earth occur later than the corresponding culturally relevant events that
take place on Earth. Consider now Melville living on Earth (hereafter: “Melville”)
and Melville living on Twin Earth (hereafter: “Twin Melville”). Did Twin Melville
create Moby-Dick? According to the foregoing assumptions, his compositional ac-
tivity followed Melville’s. But “a work cannot be created and then created again
at a later time” (Currie, 1989, 61). Thus, Twin Melville did not create Moby-Dick.
Now, what about Melville? Did he create it? By assumption, the cultural histories
of Earth and Twin Earth are identical. So Melville’s compositional activity is the
same as Twin Melville’s compositional activity. But if this is the case, then, given
that Twin Melville did not create Moby-Dick, Melville did not create it either. Thus,
writing a novel does not presuppose creating this novel. But if this is so, then there
is good reason to hold that novels are not created.20 Meanwhile, if novels are not
18See Predelli (2001, 287).
19See Currie (1989, 61–64).
20The original version of this argument—the one advanced by Currie (1989)—is concerned with
music. In a nutshell, this version is as follows. Imagine there are two planets—Earth and Twin
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created, then one of the premises of the Creation Objectionpt is false—and, hence,
this objection fails.
According to this response, the thesis that (a) Twin Melville did not create
Moby-Dick and (b) Melville’s compositional activity is the same as Twin Melville’s
compositional activity entails that Moby-Dick was not created by Melville. Is this
entailment valid? Suppose Twin Melville did not create Moby-Dick. Suppose next
that Melville’s compositional activity is the same as Twin Melville’s compositional
activity. Why can’t it then be true that, since Melville’s compositional activity
occurred before Twin Melville’s compositional activity, Melville created Moby-Dick,
whereas Twin Melville merely discovered it? Meanwhile, if this can be true, then
the foregoing entailment is invalid—and, hence, the response being discussed is
Earth. Imagine next that the cultural history of Twin Earth is exactly the same as the cultural
history of Earth, except that the culturally relevant events that take place on Twin Earth oc-
cur later than the corresponding culturally relevant events that take place on Earth. Consider
now Beethoven living on Earth (hereafter: “Beethoven”) and Beethoven living on Twin Earth
(hereafter: “Twin Beethoven”). Did Twin Beethoven create the Hammerklavier? According to
the foregoing assumptions, his compositional activity followed Beethoven’s. But “a work cannot
be created and then created again at a later time” (Currie, 1989, 61). Thus, the answer to the
foregoing question is “No”: Twin Beethoven did not create the Hammerklavier. Now, what about
Beethoven? Did he create the Hammerklavier? By assumption, the cultural histories of Earth and
Twin Earth are identical. So Beethoven’s compositional activity is the same as Twin Beethoven’s
compositional activity. Meanwhile, if this is so, then, given that Twin Beethoven did not create
the Hammerklavier, Beethoven did not create it either. Thus, composing a musical work does not
presuppose creating this work. But if this is so, then there is good reason to hold that musical
works are not created. (See Currie (1989, 61–64).)
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unsatisfactory.
Here, a proponent of this response could object as follows. The foregoing
argument assumes that Twin Melville discovered Moby-Dick. But this assumption
is false. If it were true, then Twin Melville’s writing Moby-Dick would presuppose
discovering this novel. However, in fact, discovering a novel is not involved in writing
this novel.21
This objection commits a proponent of the foregoing response to the Creation
Objectionpt to the view that at least some artworks are neither created not dis-
covered. Is this view acceptable? The most intuitive view is that all artworks are
created. If, for some reason, this view is false, then the only satisfactory option left
is that some artworks (for example, paintings and non-cast sculptures) are created,
whereas other artworks (such as musical works and works of literature) are discov-
ered. Given this, there is a strong prima facie reason against the view that at least
some artworks are neither created not discovered. At the same time, there seems no
good reason in favor of this view.22 Taking this into account, the objection being
discussed seems untenable.
Here is another problem facing the foregoing response to the Creation Objectionpt.
According to this response, Melville’s Moby-Dick and Twin Melville’s Moby-Dick are
numerically identical (hereafter: “identical”). But why think that they are, in fact,
21Cf. Currie (1989, 63).
22A potential reason in favor of the view that artworks are neither created nor discovered has
been offered by Currie (1989). Yet this reason is unsustainable. It is based on the view that
artworks are action types, but, as shown by Levinson (1992), this view is seriously problematic.
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identical?
One possible answer is as follows: Melville’s Moby-Dick and Twin Melville’s
Moby-Dick are particular pure types, and these types are identical. However, this an-
swer is question-begging, since it presupposes the truth of the view being defended—
that novels are pure types.
Another possible answer is this: All identity-relevant factors (including con-
textual ones) concerning Melville’s Moby-Dick and Twin Melville’s Moby-Dick are
the same; meanwhile, if all identity-relevant factors with regard to some artworks
are the same, then these artworks are identical. However, this answer is based on a
false thesis—that all identity-relevant factors concerning Melville’s Moby-Dick and
Twin Melville’s Moby-Dick are the same. For suppose this thesis is true. Then,
since Melville and Twin Melville belong to different (though qualitatively identical)
worlds and, hence, different cultures—those of Earth and Twin Earth, respectively—
the factor of belonging to a particular culture must be identity-irrelevant. However,
as demonstrated by Levinson (1992, 2007, 2012), there is good reason to hold that
this factor is actually identity-relevant.
Thus, neither answer is satisfactory. Meanwhile, there is no other potentially
satisfactory answer. So there is no reason to treat Melville’s Moby-Dick and Twin
Melville’s Moby-Dick as one and the same novel. Moreover, there are a number of
reasons to consider them nonidentical. Here is one such reason. Given the fact that
Melville wrote Moby-Dick on Earth, it seems odd to say that his Moby-Dick has
no location at all or that it is located not only on Earth but at any other place,
including Twin Earth. From an intuitive viewpoint, Melville’s Moby-Dick has a
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rather specific location—it is located on Earth. Likewise, since Twin Melville wrote
Moby-Dick on Twin Earth, it does not seem right to say that his Moby-Dick is
located everywhere or that it does not have any location at all. Intuitively, like
the location of Melville’s Moby-Dick, the location of Twin Melville’s Moby-Dick is
rather specific: Twin Melville’s Moby-Dick is located on Twin Earth. Thus, our
intuitions support the thesis that (a) Melville’s Moby-Dick is located on Earth,
whereas (b) Twin Melville’s Moby-Dick is located on Twin Earth.23 Meanwhile, if
this thesis is true, then Melville’s and Twin Melville’s Moby-Dick ’s differ in their
essential properties, and, as a result, cannot be identical.
Here is another reason against identifying Melville’s Moby-Dick and Twin
Melville’s Moby-Dick. Melville doubtless intended the names of various places—“the
Pacific Ocean,” “Cape Horn,” “New Bedford,” etc.—involved in his Moby-Dick to
refer to the corresponding places on Earth, not on Twin Earth. But, surely, Twin
Melville did not have this intention. He did not intend “the Pacific Ocean” to re-
fer to an earthly place (namely, the Pacific Ocean located on Earth). Nor did he
intend “Cape Horn,” “New Bedford,” or any other geographical name contained in
his Moby-Dick to refer to any such place. His intention was to refer to certain places
on Twin Earth.24 Thus, given what has been said, the geographical references in
Melville’s Moby-Dick are essentially different from the geographical references in
23Cf. Burgess (1997, 21–22).
24Clearly, what has been said here about Melville’s and Twin Melville’s intentions with regard
to the names of places contained in Moby-Dick can be said about their intentions with regard to
the names of certain other things (e.g., people, animals, and practices) contained in this novel.
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Twin Melville’s Moby-Dick : The former are concerned with Earth, whereas the lat-
ter are concerned with Twin Earth. But if this is so, then, given that the references
contained in a novel determine its semantic content and, hence, are essential to it,
Melville’s Moby-Dick cannot be identified with Twin Melville’s Moby-Dick.
Yet another reason against identifying Melville’s Moby-Dick and Twin Melville’s
Moby-Dick is concerned with potential artistically relevant differences in the prop-
erties of Melville’s Moby-Dick and Twin Melville’s Moby-Dick.25 Clearly, even if
Moby-Dick is assumed to have been regarded in the same way by the peoples of
Earth and Twin Earth, it might still be regarded differently by these peoples in
the future. In particular, it is possible that at some future time t, Moby-Dick is
regarded as (a) a highly original literary work by those who live on Earth and
(b) an unoriginal literary work by those who live on Twin Earth. Suppose now
that at t, Moby-Dick is regarded that way. Then at t, if Melville’s Moby-Dick =
Twin Melville’s Moby-Dick, Moby-Dick is not highly original simpliciter (rather, it
is highly original according to the culture of Earth and is not highly original accord-
ing to the culture of Twin Earth). Thus, if Melville’s Moby-Dick = Twin Melville’s
Moby-Dick, then it is possible for Moby-Dick not to be highly original simpliciter
(and perhaps to be unoriginal). However, this consequence seems wrong. Prima fa-
cie, being highly original simpliciter is an essential property of Moby-Dick, and so it
is impossible for Moby-Dick not to be highly original simpliciter.26 Given this, there
is good reason to hold that Melville’s Moby-Dick and Twin Melville’s Moby-Dick
25Cf. Levinson (1992, 221–222).
26Similar arguments are given by Levinson (1980, 10–13).
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are different novels.
Thus, all things considered, Melville’s Moby-Dick and Twin Melville’s Moby-
Dick are different novels. Meanwhile, as already mentioned, the foregoing response
to the Creation Objectionpt implies that they are identical. So this response is
unsatisfactory.
Response to the Creation Objectionpt (4). A proponent of the view that a
novel is a pure type could also respond to the Creation Objectionpt in the following
way. This objection assumes that novels are created, and not discovered. But why
think that this assumption is true? Until a proponent of the Creation Objectionpt
provides a satisfactory answer to this question, this objection does not pose any real
threat to the view that a novel is a pure type.
The foregoing response is successful only if the thesis that novels are created,
and not discovered, cannot be substantiated. But this thesis can, in fact, be sub-
stantiated. As Levinson (1980) points out,
There is probably no idea more central to thought about art than that
it is an activity in which participants create things—these things being
artworks. The whole tradition of art assumes art is creative in the strict
sense, that it is a godlike activity in which the artist brings into being
what did not exist beforehand much as a demiurge forms a world out
of inchoate matter. The notion that artists truly add to the world,
in company with cake-bakers, house-builders, law-makers, and theory-
constructers, is surely a deep-rooted idea that merits preservation if at all
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possible. The suggestion that some artists... instead merely discover or
select for attention entities they have no hand in creating is so contrary
to this basic intuition regarding artists and their works that we have a
strong prima facie reason to reject it if we can. (Levinson, 1980, 8)27
Thus, one of our core intuitions about art is that artworks are not something that is
already there and to which artists merely draw our attention; rather, artworks are
added to the world by artists. Meanwhile, if this is so, then there is good reason to
think that novels are created, and not discovered.
Following Dodd (2000), one could object as follows. The foregoing argument
assumes that one of our core intuitions about art—that artists add certain entities,
artworks, to the world, and not merely draw our attention to something that already
exists—supports the thesis that novels (as well as other artworks) are created, rather
than discovered. But this assumption is dubious. It is true only if when we claim
that artists add artworks to the world, we mean that they create these works. But
do we, in fact, mean this in the given case? No: When we claim that artists add
artworks to the world, we do not mean that they create these works; rather, we
mean that they bring artworks to the notice of the artworld, or, in other words,
introduce these works to our cultural life and open them up for appreciation.28
This objection is based on the idea that when we claim that artists add art-
works to the world, we mean solely that they bring these works to the notice of
27Besides Levinson (1980), the view expressed in this quote is accepted by many other theorists,
including Currie (1989, 63–64), Fisher (1991), and Predelli (2001, 282).
28See Dodd (2000, 430).
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the artworld. However, this idea is highly questionable. Surely, when claiming that
artists add artworks to the world, we imply that they bring these works to the no-
tice of the artworld. But, prima facie, we do not imply just that. We also imply
that artists actually bring the works into existence and, hence, create them. In
light of this, it is reasonable to hold that unless a proponent of the objection being
discussed offers a plausible explanation of why our claim that artists add artworks
to the world should not be interpreted as implying that artists create artworks, this
objection cannot be considered successful.
Another argument in favor of the thesis that novels are created is as follows.
Consider some great novel, say, Emma. If we conceive of it as existing eternally,
before Austen’s creative act, then a small part of the glory that surrounds this act
seems to be removed.29 But if this is so, then if Emma were discovered, and not
created, it would not have the artistic value that it actually has. So Emma was
created, and not discovered. Now, clearly, what has been said about Emma applies
to many (though perhaps not all) other novels. So at least some novels were created,
and not discovered.
Finally, the thesis that novels are created, and not discovered, is supported by
the following consideration. “Works in the fine arts and in a number of other arts as
well are, as either physical objects or events..., literally created” (Levinson, 2011b,
220). But if this is so, then it just seems wrong to accept the idea that novels are
not created but rather discovered. As Levinson (2011b) puts it:
Shall paintings, drawings, etchings, sculptures, palaces, dances, films,
29See Levinson (1980, 9).
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and so on all be truly creatable, in the full sense of the word, and only...
novels denied this possibility? There would be little profit, and false
economy, in that. (Levinson, 2011b, 221).
Thus, a satisfactory substantiation of the thesis that novels are created, and
not discovered, can be provided. Meanwhile, if this is so, then the foregoing response
to the Creation Objectionpt fails.
Conclusion. Given what has been said, none of the responses to the Creation
Objectionpt examined above stands up to criticism. At the same time, there seem
no other potentially successful responses to this objection. As a result, there is good
reason to consider the view that a novel is a pure type unacceptable.
6.1.4 A Novel as an Initiated Type
Let us now turn to the view that a novel is an initiated type,30 or, in other
words, an abstract type that is created as a result of a particular intentional action—
namely, that of indicating, determining, or fixing a pure type (such as a pure sound
structure or a pure syntactic structure)31 by means of creating an appropriate con-
30This view has been put forward and defended by Levinson (1980, 2011b, 2012).
31According to Levinson (2012), the act of indicating a pure type normally amounts to the
following acts: “a deliberate choice, an act of appropriation, an attitude of approval, and the
establishment of a rule or norm” (Levinson, 2012, 54). Thus, when Chopin indicates the pure type
of his Mazurka in A minor, Op. 17, no. 4, “he chooses or selects [certain] notes—here including
pitches, rhythms, timbres, and dynamics...” (Levinson, 2012, 53). Furthermore, he
has a certain attitude—in part approval, in part appropriation—toward those partic-
ular notes. He doesn’t in effect merely say: ‘here are some sounds’ but rather, ‘here
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cretum (say, a score or an inscription).32,33 Is this view acceptable? Here is a possible
reason to answer “No.” Suppose a novel is an initiated type. Then, since initiated
types are abstract, a novel is an abstractum. Meanwhile, the consensus is that ab-
stracta are incapable of standing in causal relations.34,35 Thus, a novel cannot stand
in such relations. Meanwhile, on the standard account of creation, x can be created
only if x can stand in causal relations. So, assuming that this account is true, a
novel cannot be created. But, surely, novels are created. So the view that a novel
are some sounds, they are now specifically mine, I embrace them, and in this exact
sequence.’ (Levinson, 2012, 53)
Finally, “he establishes a rule, a norm, a miniature practice, whereby pianists play a piece by
Chopin and not just any piece of music when they play that sequence of notes chosen by Chopin,
and do so precisely because that sequence was chosen by Chopin” (Levinson, 2012, 54).
32An example of an initiated type is the Ford Thunderbird—“a metal/ glass/plastic structure-as-
indicated (or determined) by the Ford Motor Company on such and such a date” (Levinson, 1980,
22). Other examples of such a type include (a) Beethoven’s Quintet Opus 16—a sound structure-
as-indicated by Beethoven in 1797; (b) the Lincoln penny—a visual structure-as-indicated-by the
U.S. Government in 1909; and (c) the hedgehog—“a biological structure-as-determined-or-fixed by
natural terrestrial evolution at a particular point in history” (Levinson, 1980, 22).
33Although an initiated type is created, a significant component of this type—a particular pure
type—is not. In this respect, an initiated type differs from many “ordinary” created objects—
desks, cars, watches, etc.
34See Cameron (2008, 296), Dodd (2000, 431), Dummett (1973, 491), Rosen (2012), and
Mag Uidhir (2013, 10).
35As Mag Uidhir (2013) points out, “should any general characterization of abstracta have a
plausible claim to being standardly held, it clearly must be that abstracta are non-causal (especially
given the standard, broad characterization of concreta as causally efficacious material inhabitants
of space-time)” (Mag Uidhir, 2013, 10).
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is an initiated type is false. Call this the Creation Objectionit.
Response to the Creation Objectionit (1). A proponent of the view that a novel
is an initiated type could respond to the Creation Objectionit with the help of the
arguments against the creatability of a novel that are discussed in Section 6.1.3.
However, as has been shown, none of these arguments stands up to criticism, and,
in addition, there are a number of strong considerations in favor of the view that
novels are created. So the foregoing response to the Creation Objectionit fails.
Response to the Creation Objectionit (2). Another response available to a pro-
ponent of the view that a novel is an initiated type is as follows. The Creation
Objectionit assumes that if x is created, then x can stand in causal relations. How-
ever, this assumption is false: Creating x does not require x ’s capacity to stand in
such relations.36
Is this response satisfactory? Suppose x is not caused to exist. Then x either
(a) does not exist, or (b) came into existence without any cause, or (c) is eternal.
Suppose first that x does not exist. In this case, obviously, x is not created.37
Suppose, on the other hand, that x came into existence without any cause. In this
case, x is not created either. For suppose x comes into existence without any cause.
36Note that although a proponent of this response could use one of the “acausal” accounts
of creation discussed in Section 6.1.3 to support the thesis that creating x does not require x ’s
capacity to stand in causal relations, she is not committed to either account.
37The thesis that if x does not exist, then x is not created is not universally accepted. Thus,
following Meinong (1960), Parsons (1975) argues that being created is compatible with being
nonexistent. However, Parsons (1975)’s argument is highly controversial. It is based on Meinong
(1960)’s theory of objects, and the latter faces a number of serious problems (see Reicher (2016)).
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Then nothing can be held responsible for x ’s coming into existence and, hence, x
cannot have an author. However, creation—at least, the kind of creation we are
interested in—presupposes authorship: If x is created, then x has an author.
Finally, suppose that x is eternal. Then, pace Deutsch (1991), x is not created.
For suppose x is eternal. Then there was no time at which x did not exist. However,
creating x requires that there be such a time, since nothing that already exists can
be created.
Thus, if x is not caused to exist, then x is not created. By contraposition, if
x is created, then x is caused to exist. Meanwhile, if x is caused to exist, then x
is capable of standing in causal relations. So, contrary to what the response being
discussed suggests, the thesis that x is created only if x can stand in causal relations
cannot be rejected. As a result, this response is unsatisfactory.
Response to the Creation Objectionit (3). Here is a more promising response
available to a proponent of the view that a novel is an initiated type. The Creation
Objectionit is successful only if abstracta cannot stand in causal relations. How-
ever, at least some abstracta can, in fact, stand in such relations. So the Creation
Objectionit fails.
This response is based on the thesis that at least some abstracta can stand
in causal relations. Clearly, this thesis requires substantiation. Why think that at
least some abstracta can stand in causal relations?
(Argument (i).) Here is one possible reason to think so. Consider the singleton
whose member is the Eiffel Tower. If this singleton cannot stand in causal relations,
then it was not caused to exist and, hence, either (a) has always existed or (b) came
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into existence without any cause. However, neither option is acceptable. Suppose
the singleton containing the Eiffel Tower has always existed. Then, since the Eiffel
Tower has not always existed, there was a time when the singleton existed, but the
tower did not exist and had never existed. But this consequence is implausible. If an
impure set exists at t, then its members exist at t or existed before t.38 Consequently,
there could be no time when the singleton containing the Eiffel Tower existed and
the tower did not exist and had never existed. Thus, this singleton has not always
existed.39
Suppose, alternatively, that the singleton containing the Eiffel Tower came
into existence without any cause. Then this singleton is a purely accidental object.
38Note that this thesis is compatible with the idea that when no members of an impure set exist
at t, this set can nevertheless exist at t if all of its members existed at some time before t.
39According to Howell (2002), not only impure sets can have temporary existence; some prop-
erties can have such existence as well. Thus, consider the property of having a particular sound
structure and being produced in a way that is properly connected to Beethoven’s 1804–1808 acts
of indication. In Howell (2002)’s view:
It surely... cannot be eternal. How can it already have existed in, say, 1600—or at the
moment of the Big Bang—when the specific concrete entities to which it essentially
relates had themselves not yet come into existence? To suppose that it can would
be like supposing that your signature—not just inkmarks geometrically congruent to
it, but actual marks that attest to you, to your own personal identity—could exist
a million years before you do or that the set consisting of last night’s thunderstorm
and today’s gusting of the wind could pre-exist both these events. (Howell, 2002,
112–113)
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However, this consequence seems implausible. It is odd to claim that the singleton
being discussed is a purely accidental object—an object that could have come into
existence at any moment, even at the moment of the Big Bang, without a suffi-
cient reason. The natural view is that this singleton came into existence when its
constitutive element—the Eiffel Tower—came into existence.
Thus, neither the supposition that the Eiffel Tower has always existed nor
the supposition that this tower came into existence without any cause is true. But
then, given what has been said above, the singleton containing the Eiffel Tower was
caused to exist. Meanwhile, if this is so, then, since singletons are sets and, as is
generally agreed, the latter are abstract, at least some abstracta can stand in causal
relations.
The foregoing argument, which might be called “Argument (i),” assumes that
if an impure set exists at t, then its members exist either at t or at some time
before t. Is this assumption true? Presumably, the main reason to say so comes
from the natural inclination to treat impure sets as constituted by, or made of, their
members. However, this inclination does not have any real basis. Although it is
uncontroversial that a set depends on its members for its essence, there is nothing
that would force us to accept the idea that a set is constituted by, or made of, its
members.
Thus, the mentioned reason is unsatisfactory. And there seems no other poten-
tially satisfactory reason to think that if an impure set exists at t, then its members
exist either at t or at some time prior to t. In light of this, the assumption being
discussed can be rejected in favor of the assumption that an impure set can exist at
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t if its members exist not only at t or some time before t but at any other time as
well.40
The above reasoning may not seem very compelling. It states that an impure
set can exist at t even when its members do not exist at t and have never existed
before t. But why think that such a set can, in fact, exist at t in that case?
Here is a possible reason to think so. Suppose determinism—that is, the
view that every event is caused to exist by certain previous events and the laws of
nature—is true. Then for each future event, there is a causal chain that leads to this
event. But if this is so, then at any time, there is, ontologically speaking, all relevant
information about every future event. Meanwhile, if this consequence is true, then
it seems natural to hold that sets—as well as perhaps other abstracta—that depend
for their essence on certain contingent concreta can exist before these concreta come
into existence.41
Following Howell (2002), one could object that this reason is unsatisfactory,
since it is based on determinism and the latter is false.42 But this objection fails.
It assumes that determinism is false. However, this assumption is unsubstantiated:
There is no compelling argument that demonstrates the falsity of determinism.43
But what if this objection is successful—and, hence, the foregoing reason in
favor of the thesis that an impure set can exist at t even if its members do not exist
40On this view, the singleton whose member is the Eiffel Tower exists not only after the creation
of the Eiffel Tower but also before its creation—since the Eiffel Tower exists at some time.
41See Howell (2002).
42See Howell (2002, 113).
43See Hoefer (2016).
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at t and have never existed before t is unsatisfactory? Should this thesis then be
considered ungrounded? No. For there is an alternative reason that is satisfactory.
Before formulating this reason, let us first distinguish between two senses of
the expression “to exist”: the presentist and the ontological.44,45 According to the
presentist sense, x exists at t just in case x is present at t. In this sense, Socrates
does not exist in 2017 but exists in 413 B.C. According to the ontological sense,
x exists (hereafter: “existso”
46) at t just in case x is in the domain of our most
unrestricted quantifier. In this sense, Socrates exists both in 2017 and 413 B.C.
So why think that an impure set can exist47 at t even if its members do not
exist at t and have never existed before t? Suppose eternalism, or the view that not
only entities present now but also past and future entities (for instance, Aristotle, the
Great Library of Alexandria, World War II, lunar orbital stations, and interstellar
flights) existo, is true. Then at every moment, all future concrete entities existo.
But if this is so, then at every moment, any impure set containing one or more
of the future concrete entities existso. Meanwhile, if at every moment, any such
set existso, then there is good reason to think that impure sets exist even if their
members have not come into existence yet. For suppose that at every moment, any
44This distinction is made by Markosian et al. (2016). Cf. also Tillman (2011, 22–23).
45Perhaps, given Quine (1948)’s view on the univocality of “exist,” it would be more accurate to
speak of different uses, rather than senses, of “exist.” However, for the sake of convenience, I speak
of different senses of “exist.” If the reader finds my talk of different senses of “exist” inappropriate,
she is free to paraphrase it in terms of uses of “exist.”
46The subscript “o” means that the expression is used in the ontological sense.
47Here and in what follows, when “exist” is used without a subscript, it is used in the presentist
sense.
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impure set containing one or more of the future concrete entities existso. Then,
given the non-physical character of sets, it seems natural to maintain that at every
moment, impure sets containing one or more of the future concrete entities are
present and, hence, exist. At the same time, the opposite idea—that such sets
come into existence when, and only when, their members come into existence—
seems unmotivated. Presumably, the main motivation to endorse this idea is that
before the members of impure sets come into existence, these members are absent
from our ontology (and hence, cannot serve as the constitutive “material” of the
corresponding sets). But this motivation is absent if eternalism is true. For, as
has already been mentioned, in this case, all future entities—including the future
members of impure sets—existo and, hence, are contained in our ontology.
Here, one could object that the foregoing reasoning is based on a false assumption—
that eternalism is true. Is this objection successful? Surely, eternalism (like virtually
all philosophical views) has not been conclusively proven, and there are powerful ri-
val theories—in particular, presentism (the view that only present objects exist) and
past-and-presentism (the view that only past and present objects exist). However,
there are strong arguments in favor of eternalism.48 Furthermore, both presentism
and past-and-presentism face serious problems.49 Given this, the objection being
discussed can hardly be called successful.
(Argument (ii).) Thus, in light of what has been said, it should be clear that
Argument (i) fails. Yet this is not the only possible argument in favor of the thesis
48See, e.g., Sider (2001).
49See, e.g., Markosian et al. (2016) and Sider (2001).
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that at least some abstracta can stand in causal relations. Another such argument
is as follows.50 Consider the following claims:
(1) John’s reading an Easton Ellis novel caused him to buy copies of all of Easton
Ellis’s other works.
(2) John’s reading that copy/a copy of American Psycho caused him to buy copies
of all of Easton Ellis’s other works. (Walters, 2013, 470)
Is either John’s reading an Easton Ellis novel or his reading that copy/a copy of
American Psycho the cause of his buying copies of all of Easton Ellis’s other works?
x can be the cause of y just in case x is proportional to y, where “proportional” is
defined according to the following principle advanced by Yablo (1996):
Principle of Proportionality: C [a potential cause] is proportional to E [a potential
effect] iff C is both required and enough for E, where
• C is required for E iff none of C ’s determinables51 screens it off from E,52
and
• C is enough for E iff C screens off all of its determinates53 from E. (Yablo,
1996, 266–267; as cited in Walters, 2013, 470)
50This argument has been advanced by Walters (2013).
51For all x and y, x is a determinable of y iff x is necessitated by y because x is immanent or
included in y.
52“C1 screens C2 off from E iff, had C1 occurred without C2, E would still have occurred”
(Yablo, 1996, 266-267; as cited in Walters, 2013, 470).
53For all x and for all y, y is a determinate of x iff y necessitates x because x is immanent or
included in y (see Walters (2013, 470)).
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Is either John’s reading an Easton Ellis novel or his reading that copy/a copy of
American Psycho proportional to his buying copies of all of Easton Ellis’s other
works? Consider first John’s reading an Easton Ellis novel. Is this reading both
required and enough for his buying copies of all of Easton Ellis’s other works? No.
Since John only liked American Psycho, his reading an Easton Ellis novel cannot be
enough for buying copies of all of Easton Ellis’s other works. What about John’s
reading that copy/a copy of American Psycho? Is this reading both required and
enough for his buying copies of all of Easton Ellis’s other works? Again, the answer
is “No”:
Reading a particular copy, or indeed some copy or other, is not required
to secure the effect, since [John] could have read the first three chapters
of one copy and the remainder of another and the effect would still
have occurred. Moreover, it seems that if John reads some copy of
American Psycho, there is some copy of American Psycho that John
reads. But John would have gone book shopping if he’d read American
Psycho without having read one of the actual copies, and so [(2)] brings
in too much in another way too. (Walters, 2013, 471).
Thus, neither John’s reading an Easton Ellis novel nor his reading that copy/a
copy of American Psycho is proportional to his buying copies of all of Easton Ellis’s
other works. But if this is so, then, given that x can be the cause of y only if x
is proportional to y, neither John’s reading an Easton Ellis novel nor his reading
that copy/a copy of American Psycho can be the cause of his buying copies of all
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of Easton Ellis’s other works.
What is then the cause of John’s buying these copies? Consider John’s reading
American Psycho. It is both required and enough for his buying copies of all of
Easton Ellis’s other works. So it is proportional to this buying. Given this, as well
as the fact that x can be the cause of y if x is proportional to y, John’s reading
American Psycho can be the cause of his buying copies of all of Easton Ellis’s other
works. At the same time, there are no other events that are proportional to his
buying copies of all of Easton Ellis’s other works and, hence, that can be the cause
of this buying. Thus, “it was [John’s] reading American Psycho that caused him to
buy the other novels” (Walters, 2013, 470). But American Psycho is an abstractum.
So at least some abstracta can stand in causal relations.
The foregoing argument—call it “Argument (ii)”—assumes that the only plau-
sible candidate for the cause of John’s buying copies of all of Easton Ellis’s other
works is John’s reading American Psycho. Is this assumption true? Consider the
following claim:
(3) John’s reading an inscription of American Psycho caused him to buy copies of
all of Easton Ellis’s other works.
Is John’s reading an inscription of American Psycho enough for his buying copies of
all of Easton Ellis’s other works? The effects from reading an inscription of American
Psycho are equivalent to the effects from reading American Psycho. Meanwhile, by
assumption, reading American Psycho is enough for buying copies of all of Easton
Ellis’s other works. Thus, John’s reading an inscription of American Psycho is
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enough for his buying these copies.
Is John’s reading required for that? Following the logic of the explanation given
in the case of (2), two reasons in favor of answering this question in the negative
could be given. First, John would have bought copies of all of Easton Ellis’s other
works even if he had not read an inscription of American Psycho—say, if he had read
the first three chapters of one inscription and the remainder of another. Second,
John would have bought copies of all of Easton Ellis’s other works even if he had
not read any of the actual inscriptions of American Psycho—provided that he had
read American Psycho. Is either reason successful?
The first reason is successful only if John did not read an inscription of Ameri-
can Psycho when he read the first three chapters of one inscription and the remainder
of another. But is it true that he did not read such an inscription in this case? The
sum of the concrete text of the first three chapters of one inscription of American
Psycho and the concrete text of the remainder of another inscription of American
Psycho is the concrete text that instances the text of American Psycho. Meanwhile,
an inscription of a literary work is, by definition, any concrete text that instances
the text of this work. So the sum of the concrete text of the first three chapters
of one inscription of American Psycho and the concrete text of the remainder of
another inscription of American Psycho is an inscription of American Psycho. As a
result, the answer to the foregoing question is “No”: When John read the first three
chapters of one inscription of American Psycho and the remainder of another, he
did read an inscription of American Psycho. So the first reason fails.
Let us now turn to the second reason. It supports the claim that John’s
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reading an inscription of American Psycho is not required for his buying copies of
all of Easton Ellis’s other works only if (3) entails that John read one of the actual
inscriptions of American Psycho. But (3) does not entail that. According to (3),
John read an inscription simpliciter, and not necessarily an actual inscription, of
American Psycho. Thus, the second reason also fails.
One could replace the second reason with the following alternative: John would
have bought copies of all of Easton Ellis’s other works even if he had not read
an inscription of American Psycho—provided that he had read American Psycho.
However, this alternative is doubtless unacceptable. It implies that a novel can
be read without reading an inscription of this novel (regardless of whether this
inscription is one of the actual inscriptions). But this implication is false. The only
way to read a novel is to read one of its inscriptions.54
Thus, John’s reading an inscription of American Psycho is proportional to his
buying copies of all of Easton Ellis’s other works—and, hence, can be the cause of
this buying. So the assumption involved in Argument (ii)—that the only plausible
candidate for the cause of John’s buying copies of all of Easton Ellis’s other works
is his reading American Psycho—is false. As a result, this argument fails.
(Argument (iii).) Here is yet another possible argument in favor of the thesis
that at least some abstracta can stand in causal relations.55 Consider the claim:
54This is not to say, of course, the only way to apprehend the content of a novel is to read an
inscription of this novel. The content of a novel can also be apprehended by listening to a reading
of this novel.
55Like the previous argument, this argument has been put forward by Walters (2013).
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(4) Conan Doyle wrote The Hound of the Baskervilles.
(4) cannot be paraphrased as:
(4*) “Conan Doyle wrote MANUSCRIPT” (Walters, 2013, 471), where “MANUSCRIPT”
refers to “a single manuscript from which all subsequent copies of The Hound
of the Baskervilles were generated” (Walters, 2013, 471).
If (4) could be paraphrased as (4*), then Conan Doyle could not have written The
Hound of the Baskervilles if he had not written MANUSCRIPT. But, of course, he
could have written The Hound of the Baskervilles in the given case—say, by pro-
ducing a different manuscript containing the text of The Hound of the Baskervilles.
Furthermore, the following potential paraphrase of (4) is also unsatisfactory:
(4**) Conan Doyle wrote a manuscript indiscernible from MANUSCRIPT.
If (4**) were an acceptable paraphrase of (4), then Conan Doyle could not have writ-
ten The Hound of the Baskervilles if he had not written a manuscript indiscernible
from MANUSCRIPT. However, since such “indiscernibility is neither necessary nor
sufficient for the identity of novels” (Walters, 2013, 471), Conan Doyle could have
written The Hound of the Baskervilles in this case—say, by producing a manuscript
relevantly similar to, but not indiscernible from, MANUSCRIPT.
Thus, neither (4*) nor (4**) is an acceptable paraphrase of (4), and there are
no other potentially acceptable paraphrases of (4) that do not require us to assume
that The Hound of the Baskervilles can stand in causal relations. So (4) cannot be
paraphrased as a claim that does not require us to assume that. Meanwhile, The
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Hound of the Baskervilles is an abstractum. So some causal claims that presuppose
the causality of abstracta cannot be paraphrased as claims that do not presuppose
such causality. But if this is so, then there is good reason to believe that least some
abstracta are capable of standing in causal relations.
The foregoing argument—call it “Argument (iii)”—assumes that (4) cannot
be paraphrased as a claim that does not presuppose the causality of abstracta. Is
this assumption true? Consider the following:
(4***) Conan Doyle was the first to write an inscription of The Hound of the
Baskervilles.56
Is (4***) an acceptable paraphrase of (4)? Here is one possible reason to say “No”:
The equivalence of (4) and (4***) has a false implication—that Conan Doyle could
not have written The Hound of the Baskervilles if he had not written an inscription of
The Hound of the Baskervilles from which all subsequent inscriptions of The Hound
of the Baskervilles were generated. But this reason is unsatisfactory. Contrary to
what it states, the equivalence of (4) and (4***) implies that Conan Doyle could not
have written The Hound of the Baskervilles if he had not written an inscription of
The Hound of the Baskervilles simpliciter, not an inscription of The Hound of the
Baskervilles from which all subsequent inscriptions of The Hound of the Baskervilles
were generated.
Another possible reason in favor of the thesis that (4***) is not an accept-
able paraphrase of (4) is as follows: The equivalence of (4) and (4***) has a
56Note that (4***) does not imply that Conan Doyle wrote a particular inscription of The Hound
of the Baskervilles (such as the manuscript he actually wrote).
272
false implication—that Conan Doyle could not have written The Hound of the
Baskervilles if he had not written an inscription indiscernible from the inscription
from which all subsequent copies of The Hound of the Baskervilles were generated.
This reason is also unsatisfactory. According to it, the equivalence of (4) and (4***)
implies that Conan Doyle could not have written The Hound of the Baskervilles if
he had not written an inscription indiscernible from some other inscription. But, in
fact, the equivalence of (4) and (4***) does not imply that.
Here is yet another reason in favor of the thesis that (4***) cannot be accepted
as a paraphrase of (4): The equivalence of (4) and (4***) has a false implication—
that Conan Doyle could not have written The Hound of the Baskervilles if he had not
written an inscription of The Hound of the Baskervilles. Like the previous reasons,
this reason fails. To write a literary work, it is necessary to write an inscription of
it.57 So, contrary to what the reason being discussed assumes, Conan Doyle could
not have written The Hound of the Baskervilles if he had not written an inscription
of The Hound of the Baskervilles.
As a result, none of the foregoing reasons against the thesis that (4***) is an
acceptable paraphrase of (4) stands up to criticism. Meanwhile, there are no other
potentially satisfactory reasons against this thesis. So, all things considered, (4***)
can be considered an acceptable paraphrase of (4).
Thus, given that (4***) does not presuppose the causality of abstracta,58 the
57This is not to say, of course, that to create a literary work, it is necessary to write an inscription
of it. A literary work can be created without writing any inscriptions (for instance, it can be created
in one’s imagination).
58One might object as follows. (4***), if true, commits us to the existence of an inscription
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assumption involved in Argument (iii)—that (4) cannot be paraphrased as a claim
that does not presuppose the causality of abstracta—is false. Meanwhile, if this is
so, then this argument fails.
(Argument (iv).) Another possible argument in favor of the thesis that at least
some abstracta can stand in causal relations is as follows.59 It can be assumed that
events are Kim-style ordered triples of objects, properties, and times. Meanwhile, if
this assumption is true, then the following criterion of an object’s participation in
an event in a causally relevant way seems appropriate: “An object participates in
an event in a causally relevant way if and only if it is a member of the ordered triple
that is the event” (Caplan and Matheson, 2004, 120). Suppose, therefore, that this
criterion is true. Then, since abstracta can be members of ordered triples that are
events, abstracta can participate in events in a causally relevant way and, hence,
can stand in causal relations.
According to this argument, which might be called “Argument (iv),” a par-
of The Hound of the Baskervilles. Meanwhile, there can be no inscription of The Hound of the
Baskervilles unless there is the abstract type The Hound of the Baskervilles and, hence, a particular
abstractum. Thus, (4***), if true, commits us to the existence of a particular abstractum. But if
this is so, then (4***) does presuppose the causality of abstracta.
However, this objection fails. It assumes that there can be no inscription of The Hound of the
Baskervilles unless there is the abstract type The Hound of the Baskervilles and, hence, a particular
abstractum. But this assumption is false. An inscription of The Hound of the Baskervilles is just
a particular concretum—namely, a particular concrete sequence of symbols written on paper (or
some other material) or displayed on the screen of an electronic device. And there seems no real
reason to hold that the existence of such a concretum entails the existence of any abstracta.
59This argument has been advanced by Caplan and Matheson (2004).
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ticular Kim-style view on the nature of events—that events are ordered triples of
objects, properties, and times—is acceptable. But is this view, in fact, acceptable?
Before addressing this question, it is worth noting that characterizing the
view that events are ordered triples of objects, properties, and times as “Kim-style”
is somewhat inaccurate. There is reason to characterize this view as “Kim-style”
only if according to Kim (1973, 1976), events are either ordered triples of objects,
properties, and times or perhaps some similar ordered triples. But, strictly speaking,
Kim (1973, 1976) does not treat events as ordered triples. In his view, an event is “a
concrete object (or n-tuple of objects) exemplifying a property (or n-adic relation)
at a time” (Kim, 1973).60,61
So can the view that events are ordered triples of objects, properties, and
60This is not to say, of course, that ordered triples do not have a role in Kim (1973, 1976)’s
account of events. On this account, ordered triples of objects, properties, and times individuate
events.
61Here is another reason to reject the thesis that Kim (1973, 1976) treats events as ordered
triples. An ordered triple is an abstractum. So if Kim (1973, 1976) treated events as ordered
triples, he would treat them as abstracta. However, in his view, events are concreta, as is clear
from the following quote:
My events are “particulars” and “dated.” That they are dated is obvious. I am not
clear what “particulars” are; but events in my sense have locations in space, namely
the locations of their constitutive substances.... And my events are not “eternal”
objects; they do not exist in all possible worlds; they exist only if the existence
condition is met, which is a contingent matter of fact. If this doesn’t show that
something is “concrete” or “particular,” what does? (Kim, 1976, 315; italics added)
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times be accepted? According to an overwhelming majority of theorists, including
Davidson (1969), Kim (1976), Lewis (1986), and Dretske (1977), events are spa-
tiotemporal (or—to use Schaffer (2016)’s term—immanent). But ordered triples of
objects, properties, and times are sets, and—at least, on the standard account62—
sets are not spatiotemporal. Thus, there is a prima facie reason against the view
that events are ordered triples of objects, properties, and times. At the same time,
there seems no good reason in favor of this view. As a result, all things considered,
the question posed above should be answered in the negative. Meanwhile, if this is
so, then Argument (iv) fails.
The foregoing objection can be avoided if the account of events qua ordered
triples of objects, properties, and times is replaced with Kim (1973, 1976)’s account
of events—the account according to which events are concrete objects exemplifying
properties at particular times. But can Argument (iv) be accepted if it presupposes
the truth of the latter account?
Consider the event described by the sentence “John apologized” and the event
described by the sentence “John said ‘I apologize.’” Clearly, under at least some
circumstances, these events are the same.63 However, as Davidson (1969) points out,
Kim (1976)’s account entails that they must be different. For suppose this account
is true. Then “two sentences are about the same event [only] if they assert truly of
62On the account put forward by Maddy (1990), sets exist in spacetime. However, this account
is highly controversial. For powerful objections to it, see Balaguer (1998), Milne (1994), Riskin
(1994), Carson (1996), and Maddy (1997).
63Note that it is not claimed here that the event described by the sentence “John apologized”
and the event described by the sentence “John said ‘I apologize’” are always the same.
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the same particulars (i.e. substances) that the same properties (or relations) hold
of them” (Davidson, 1969, 300). The sentences “John apologized” and “John said
‘I apologize’” do not assert that the same properties hold of John. According to
the first sentence, John has the property of having apologized, whereas the second
sentence states that he has a different property—that of having said “I apologize.”
Thus, the events described by these sentences cannot be the same.
Thus, Kim (1973, 1976)’s account of events has an unpalatable consequence—
that the event described by the sentence “John apologized” and the event described
by the sentence “John said ‘I apologize’” are necessarily different. In a similar way,
it can be shown that this account has other unpalatable consequences—for instance,
that a murder cannot be a killing, that the signing of a check cannot be the paying
of a bill, and that the death of Walter Scott cannot be the death of the author of
Waverley.64,65 Given this, there is good reason against Kim (1973, 1976)’s account
of events. Meanwhile, if this is so, then, clearly, Argument (iv) cannot be accepted
if this argument presupposes the truth of this account.
Despite what has been said, however, let us assume, for the sake of argument,
that Kim (1976)’s account of events is true. Can the modified version of Argument
(iv) (the version that presupposes the truth of Kim (1973, 1976)’s account of events)
be accepted in this case? The original version of this argument assumes that an ob-
ject participates in an event in a causally relevant way if and only if it is a member
of the ordered triple that is the event. In the context of this version, this assumption
64See Davidson (1969, 300).
65For an exposition of other problems with Kim (1976)’s account, see Davidson (1969).
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is reasonable. But why assume that an object participates in an event in a causally
relevant way if and only if it is a member of the ordered triple that is the event, in
the context of the modified version of Argument (iv)? Prima facie, the construal
of events according to this version warrants the following criterion of an object’s
participation in an event in a causally relevant way: An object participates in an
event in a causally relevant way if and only if it is either (a) the object constituting
this event or (b) the exemplification of the property66 constituting this event. How-
ever, if the modified version of Argument (iv) employs the mentioned criterion, then
this version is inconsistent. For suppose this version actually employs this criterion.
Then this version entails that abstracta can stand in causal relations if and only if
an object constituting an event or the exemplification of a property constituting an
event can be abstract. However, neither the object nor the exemplification of the
property can, in fact, be abstract. The reason for this is that (a) they constitute
an event and (b) according to Kim (1976)’s account, anything that constitutes an
event is concrete and, hence, non-abstract. So according to the modified version of
Argument (iv), abstracta cannot stand in causal relations. But, at the same time,
this version claims that abstracta can stand in such relations. As a result, it is
inconsistent.
Thus, the modified version of Argument (iv) is either (a) based on a completely
unwarranted assumption—that an object participates in an event in a causally rel-
evant way if and only if it is a member of the ordered triple that is the event—or
66Here and in what follows, by “a property,” I mean a property-universal, not a property-
instance.
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(b) inconsistent. Given this, this version cannot be accepted.
Here, one could respond as follows. The foregoing objection is successful only
if in the case of the modified version of Argument (iv), the criterion of an object’s
participation in an event in a causally relevant way is equivalent to (a) the thesis that
an object participates in an event in a causally relevant way if and only if this object
is an object constituting this event or the exemplification of the property constituting
this event, or (b) some other thesis that precludes abstracta from being capable of
standing in causal relations. But, in the mentioned case, this criterion does not have
to be equivalent to either (a) or (b). It can be equivalent to a thesis that does entail
(together with the other assumptions of Argument (iv)) that abstracta can stand
in causal relations—namely, (c) the thesis that an object participates in an event
in a causally relevant way if and only if this object is the object constituting this
event, the exemplification of the property constituting this event, or the exemplified
property itself.
This response assumes that in the case of the modified version of Argument
(iv), the criterion of an object’s participation in an event in a causally relevant
way can be equivalent to (c). Is this assumption acceptable? The relata of causal
relations are events, and on Kim (1976)’s account, the latter are concrete. Given
this, it is natural to hold that participating in events in a causally relevant way
requires being concrete. Meanwhile, if participating in events in a causally relevant
way requires that, then no property (or any other abstractum) can participate in
events in a causally relevant way—and, hence, (c) is false. Thus, there is a strong
prima facie reason against (c). At the same time, there is no real reason in favor
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of (c). Given this, the mentioned assumption is false. But then the response being
discussed fails.
(Argument (v).) Here is yet another argument in favor of the thesis that at
least some abstracta can stand in causal relations.67 It can be assumed that events
are Lewis-style sets of spacetime points. Meanwhile, if this assumption is true, then
the following criterion of an object’s participation in an event in a causally relevant
way seems right: “An object participates in an event in a causally relevant way if
and only if the set of points in the spacetime region that it occupies is a subset of
the set of spacetime points that is the event” (Caplan and Matheson, 2004, 121).
Suppose, therefore, that this criterion is true. Then, given that an abstractum can
occupy a set of points in the spacetime region that is a subset of the set of spacetime
points that is the event, abstracta can participate in events in a causally relevant
way and so can stand in causal relations. Call this “Argument (v).”
Is Argument (v) successful? The answer is “Yes” only if abstracta can occupy
a set of spacetime points and, hence, have a spatiotemporal location. But can
abstracta, in fact, have such a location? There is a good reason to hold that they
cannot. The reason is that if abstract objects can be located in spacetime, then
the very concept of abstractness as well as the abstract/concrete distinction become
extremely vague, if not meaningless.
One can respond that the meaningfulness of the concept of abstractness as
well as the abstract/concrete distinction can be preserved by assuming that those
abstracta that are located in spacetime (hereafter: “spatiotemporal abstracta”) are
67Like Argument (iv), this argument has been put forward by Caplan and Matheson (2004).
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located in spacetime in a way that is essentially different from the way in which
concreta are located in spacetime. Regarding this response, a natural question arises:
How exactly are spatiotemporal abstracta located in spacetime?
Following Goodman (2007), one could answer this question by saying that
spatiotemporal abstracta have precise temporal locations but vague spatial ones
(where x has a vague spatial location at some spatial region y just in case (a) it is
indeterminate that x is located at any particular spatial region within y, but (b)
it is determinately true that x is located within y, and (c) it is determinately false
that x is located outside y). However, this answer is incompatible with the response
being discussed. Suppose that spatial abstracta have vague spatial locations. Then,
given that the abstract/concrete distinction is exhaustive, the way spatiotemporal
abstracta are located in space can be essentially different from the way concreta
are located in space only if there are no concreta that have vague spatial locations.
However, there are, in fact, such concreta. Consider elementary particles (such as
quarks). They are doubtless concrete. At the same time, according to standard
views of quantum mechanics, the spatial locations of these particles are vague.68 Or
consider Mount Everest. As Tye (1990) points out,
It seems obvious that there is no line which sharply divides the matter
composing Everest from the matter outside it. Everest’s boundaries are
fuzzy. Some molecules are inside Everest and some outside. But some
have an indefinite status: there is no objective, determinate fact of the
matter about whether they are inside or outside. (Tye, 1990, 535)
68See Kane (2005, 8–9).
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If Tye (1990) is right—and there seems no real reason to think otherwise—then
Everest has a vague spatial location. Meanwhile, there is no doubt that Everest is
a concretum.
Thus, the answer being discussed entails that the way spatiotemporal abstracta
are located in space is not essentially different from the way concreta are located in
space. However, if this entailment is true, then the foregoing response does not work,
as this response is based on the assumption that the way spatiotemporal abstracta
are located in space is essentially different from the way concreta are located in
space.
So the foregoing answer to the question “How exactly are spatiotemporal ab-
stracta located in space?” is unsatisfactory. At the same time, there seems no other
potentially satisfactory answer to this question. Meanwhile, if there is no such an-
swer, then the foregoing response is too metaphysically obscure and, hence, cannot
be accepted.
(Argument (vi).) Besides the arguments discussed above, there is yet another
argument in favor of the thesis that at least some abstracta can stand in causal
relations.69 This argument is as follows. It can be assumed that events are Lewis-
style sets of spacetime points. Meanwhile, this assumption is compatible with the
following criterion of an object’s participation in an event in a causally relevant way:
“An object participates in an event in a causally relevant way if and only if either
[(a)] the set of points in the spacetime region that it occupies is a subset of the set
69Like the previous two arguments, this argument has been put forward by Caplan and Matheson
(2004).
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of spacetime points that is the event, or [(b)] it is appropriately related to another
object—for example, a token, an instance, or a performance—such that the set of
spacetime points in the region that that object occupies is a subset of the set of
spacetime points that is the event” (Caplan and Matheson, 2004, 121). Suppose,
therefore, that this criterion is true. Then, since an abstractum can be appropriately
related to an object such that the set of spacetime points in the region that this
object occupies is a subset of the set of spacetime points that is the event, abstracta
can participate in events in a causally relevant way and, hence, can stand in causal
relations.
This argument—call it “Argument (vi)”—is based on a particular criterion
of an object’s participation in an event in a causally relevant way—namely, the
criterion according to which an object participates in an event in a causally relevant
way if and only if either (a) the set of points in the spacetime region that it occupies
is a subset of the set of spacetime points that is the event, or (b) it is appropriately
related to another object such that the set of spacetime points in the region that
that object occupies is a subset of the set of spacetime points that is the event. Is
this criterion acceptable? It entails that an object can participate in an event in a
causally relevant way if this object is appropriately related to another object such
that the set of spacetime points in the region that that object occupies is a subset of
the set of spacetime points that is the event. Here, a natural question arises: Under
what conditions is an object appropriately related to that other object (hereafter:
“O”)? Here is a possible answer: An object is appropriately related to O if (and
only if) O or one of O ’s properties is an instance of this object. But why think that
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being related to O in this way is sufficient for participating in an event in a causally
relevant way? There seems no satisfactory explanation of that. Meanwhile, if there
is no such explanation, then the foregoing answer cannot be accepted. Are there
any other potentially acceptable answers to the question “Under what conditions is
an object appropriately related to O?” No—or so it seems. But if this is so, then
the criterion employed in Argument (vi)—and, hence, the argument itself—cannot
be accepted.
Here, one might ask: What criterion of an object’s participation in an event
in a causally relevant way should we then adopt, if events are Lewis-style sets of
spacetime points? It is natural to say that an object participates in an event in a
causally relevant way if this object is, in some sense, a “part” of this event. So if
events are Lewis-style sets of spacetime points, then an object participates in an
event in a causally relevant way if this object is, in some sense, a “part” of the set
of spacetime points that is the event. Meanwhile, an object is a “part” of a set of
spacetime points just in case this object occupies a subset of this set. Given this, if
events are Lewis-style sets of spacetime points, there is good reason to endorse the
criterion of Argument (v): An object participates in an event in a causally relevant
way if and only if this object occupies a set of spacetime points that is a subset of
the set of spacetime points that is the event.
(Conclusion.) Thus, none of the Arguments (i)–(vi) stands up to criticism.
Meanwhile, so far as I am aware, there are no other potentially acceptable arguments
in favor of the thesis that at least some abstracta can stand in causal relations. As
a result, there seems no real reason to uphold this thesis. But if there is no such
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reason, then the foregoing response to the Creation Objectionit is unsatisfactory.
Response to the Creation Objectionit (4). A proponent of the view that a
novel is an initiated type could also respond to the Creation Objectionit as follows.
There is no good reason in favor of the thesis that abstracta cannot stand in causal
relations. As a result, this thesis is ungrounded. But if this is so, then the Creation
Objectionit is itself ungrounded and, hence, does not pose any threat to the view
that a novel is an initiated type.
The foregoing response assumes that there is no good reason in favor of the
thesis that abstracta cannot stand in causal relations. Is this assumption true?
According to Dodd (2000), the mentioned thesis can be substantiated using
the following argument.
Statements seemingly reporting causal relations between abstracta can
always be paraphrased in such a way as to reveal that the relata of
the causal relation are really concrete.... We may well say, for example,
that the bitter taste of a certain substance is caused by the shape of its
molecules, but in saying this we do not commit ourselves to the idea that
an abstract object—a certain shape—causes the bitter taste; what causes
the bitter taste is the presence of a molecule of that shape. Likewise, it
is not an abstract entity—bitterness—which is causally produced but a
substance’s bitter taste. (Dodd, 2000, 431–432)
Thus, for any statement that seems to imply the existence of causal relations between
abstracta, there is a satisfactory paraphrase that does not involve this implication.
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Meanwhile, if this is so, then it is unreasonable to treat abstracta as capable of
standing in causal relations.
However, Dodd (2000)’s argument is unsatisfactory. For, as Caplan and Math-
eson (2004) point out, it is invalid. Its validity holds only if the paraphrasability
claim—“that sentences that seemingly report causal relations between abstract ob-
jects can always be paraphrased as sentences that actually report causal relations
between concrete objects” (Caplan and Matheson, 2004)—entails that abstracta
cannot stand in causal relations. But this claim does not entail that. For suppose
it is true. Then abstracta might be capable of standing in causal relations even if
all sentences that seemingly report causal relations between abstract objects could
be paraphrased as sentences that actually report causal relations between concrete
objects.
Yet there is an argument similar to Dodd (2000)’s that does not face the
foregoing problem. This alternative argument can be formulated in the following
way. One reason to believe that abstracta can stand in causal relations is that
our ordinary talk seems to require abstracta to have the capacity to stand in such
relations. But, in fact, our ordinary talk does not require that—because it can be
paraphrased so that abstracta do not stand in causal relations. Thus, the foregoing
reason to treat abstracta as capable of standing in causal relations is false.70 Are
70Note that it is not assumed here that the possibility of paraphrasing our ordinary talk as talk
that does not require abstracta to be capable of standing in causal relations is incompatible with
the idea that there could be abstracta capable of that. The point is that because of this possibility,
the mentioned reason to hold that abstracta can stand in causal relations is false.
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there are any other plausible reasons to treat abstracta as capable of that? No—or
so it seems. As a result, it is not necessary to treat abstracta as capable of standing
in causal relations. But then, in light of the principle of ontological simplicity,71
abstracta should be treated as incapable of standing in such relations.
The foregoing argument faces two potential objections. One of these objections
is that this argument involves a false claim—that all sentences that require abstracta
to be capable of standing in causal relations can be paraphrased away (that is,
paraphrased as sentences that do not require abstracta to be capable of that). The
second objection is that one of the claims of this argument—that it is possible to
paraphrase away our ordinary talk that requires abstracta to be capable of standing
in causal relations—cannot be substantiated. Is either objection successful?
According to the first objection, there are sentences that (a) require abstracta
to be capable of standing in causal relations but (b) cannot be paraphrased away.
But why think that there are such sentences? As already shown, Walters (2013)’s
answer to this question is unsatisfactory. Following Caplan and Matheson (2004)
and Dodd (2007), one could give the following answer. Consider sentences reporting
causal interactions between events. Since events are abstract, these sentences require
abstracta to be capable of standing in causal relations. At the same time, it is unclear
how these sentences can be paraphrased away.
The foregoing answer assumes that events are abstract. But is this assumption
true? As noted in the introduction, the distinguishing features of an abstractum are
71Roughly, the principle of ontological simplicity is that View A should be preferred to View B





• being causally impassive (= being incapable of being causally affected by any-
thing)
• being causally inactive (= being incapable of causally affecting anything)
• being modally inflexible (= having all intrinsic properties essentially)
—while the distinguishing features of a concretum are as follows:
• being in space and/or time
• being causally efficacious (= being capable of causally affecting something and
of being causally affected by something)
• being modally flexible (= having some intrinsic properties nonessentially).
Consider now events. As pointed out in Chapter 4,72 they are to be construed
as entities that (a) are said to occur, or happen, or take place, (b) have relatively
vague spatial boundaries and relatively crisp temporal boundaries, (c) tolerate co-
location, (d) cannot move, and (e) take up time and persist by perduring, that is,
by having distinct temporal parts (or stages) at different times.73 Given this, it is
72See Chapter 4, Section 4.2.
73See Casati and Varzi (2015).
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clear that events have the first of the abovementioned features of a concretum—
that of being in space and time. Furthermore, on the standard view—endorsed
by Davidson (1963, 1967), Kim (1973), and Lewis (1986), among others—events
have the second of these features—that of being causally efficacious.74 Do events
have the third feature—that of being modally flexible? To be modally flexibly, it is
sufficient to have at least some intrinsic properties nonessentially. Meanwhile, some
events possess such properties nonessentially, since some events could have occurred
in a way slightly different, with regard to their intrinsic properties, from the way
they actually occurred (for example, World War II could have started a few minutes
earlier). So the answer to the foregoing question is “Yes.”
Thus, events have all the distinguishing features of concreta. At the same time,
given what has been said, it is clear that events do not have any of the distinguishing
features of abstracta. Given this, events should be treated as concreta, not abstracta.
Meanwhile, if this is so, then the assumption of the foregoing answer to the question
“Why think that there are sentences that (a) require abstracta to be capable of
standing in causal relations but (b) cannot be paraphrased away?” is false—and, as
a result, this answer is unsatisfactory.75
74Moreover, on this view, events are the paradigmatic entities that possess causal efficacy.
75Here, one could object as follows. The foregoing account of events is unsatisfactory. It assumes
that there is only one type of events—events qua particulars (John’s flicking his finger at noon on
September 15, 2016; Mary’s riding her bicycle tomorrow morning). But this assumption is false.
Besides events qua particulars, there are also what might be called “generic events”—events such
as finger-flicking and bicycle-riding.
Is this objection successful? It is based on the idea that “generic events” are events. Yet this
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Thus, neither answer to the question “Why think that there are sentences that
(a) require abstracta to be capable of standing in causal relations but (b) cannot be
paraphrased away?” is satisfactory. At the same time, there are no other potentially
satisfactory answers to this question. Given this, the first of the objections under
consideration is unsubstantiated and, hence, fails.
The second objection also fails. It assumes that the claim that it is possible to
paraphrase away our ordinary talk that requires abstracta to be capable of standing
in causal relations cannot be substantiated. However, this assumption is false. Here
is how the mentioned claim can be substantiated. There is a good inductive reason to
hold that it is possible to paraphrase away our ordinary talk that seems to require
idea is not obvious. For it seems more natural to treat “generic events” not as events but as entities
that are instanced by events—types of events.* In light of this, the question posed above should, I
think, be answered in the negative.
But what if “generic events” are events? Should we then accept the foregoing answer to the
question “Why think that there are sentences that (a) require abstracta to be capable of standing
in causal relations but (b) cannot be paraphrased away?”? No. If by “events” is meant only events
qua particulars or both generic events and events qua particulars, then this answer falsely assumes
that events are abstract (for, clearly, events qua particulars are not abstract). If, on the other
hand, by “events” is meant only generic events, then another assumption of this answer—that
sentences reporting causal interactions between events cannot be paraphrased away—is false (for
such sentences can always be paraphrased away in terms of instances of these events—namely,
certain events qua particulars).
* On this construal, finger-flicking is the type of event that is instanced by events such as John’s
flicking his finger at noon on September 15, and bicycle-riding is the type of event that is instanced
by events such as Mary’s riding her bicycle tomorrow morning.
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abstracta to be capable of standing in causal relations. The reason is that it is
possible to provide numerous examples of paraphrasing away this talk (a number
of such examples have been given above). At the same time, there are no reasons
to believe the opposite—that paraphrasing away our ordinary talk that seems to
require abstracta to be capable of standing in causal relations is impossible.76 In
light of this, it is reasonable to believe that it is possible to paraphrase away our
ordinary talk that requires abstracta to be capable of standing in causal relations.
Thus, given what has been said, it is clear that there is at least one good reason
in favor of the thesis that abstracta cannot stand in causal relations. But if this is
so, then one of the assumptions of the above response to the Creation Objectionit
is false, and, hence, this response fails.
Conclusion. Our analysis has shown that none of the foregoing responses
to the Creation Objectionit is successful. Meanwhile, there are no other potentially
successful responses to this objection. Given this, the view that a novel is an initiated
type cannot be accepted.
6.1.5 A Novel as a Historical Individual/an Abstract Artifact
There are two abstractionist views left. One of these views, advanced and de-
fended by Rohrbaugh (2003), is that a novel is “a historical individual”—something
76Presumably, there would be reason to believe this only if there were a satisfactory
counterexample—a sentence that (a) requires abstracta to be capable of standing in causal re-
lations but (b) cannot be paraphrased away. But, so far as I am concerned, there is no such
counterexample.
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that is (a) abstract and, hence, external (nonmental) and nonspatial; (b) modally
flexible, or such that at least some of its intrinsic properties could have been dif-
ferent; (c) temporally flexible, or such that it is “subject, in principle, to change in
[its intrinsic] properties over time” (Rohrbaugh, 2003, 186); (d) temporal, or such
that it comes into and goes out of existence; and (e) ontologically dependent on cer-
tain concreta—namely, “embodiments,” or, in other words, concreta that ground
its essential properties. According to the second view, advanced and defended by
Thomasson (1999, 2004), a novel is “an abstract artifact,” where the latter is very
similar to a historical individual: Like a historical individual, it is abstract (in the
sense of being nonmental and nonspatial), modally and temporally flexible, tem-
poral, and ontologically dependent on certain concreta;77 its only difference from
a historical individual is that unlike the latter, it ontologically depends not only
on its embodiments but also on certain other concreta—for example, a particular
language, linguistic capacities required to be able to understand this language, and
knowledge of relevant background information.78
77According to Thomasson (1999), an abstract artifact can be characterized as anything that
(a) is “abstract in the sense of lacking a spatiotemporal location” (Thomasson, 1999, 38), (b)
depends for its existence and essence on contingent entities (Thomasson, 1999, 38), and (c) is “not
timeless but instead [is] created at a particular time in particular circumstances, can change, and
can once again cease to exist even after [it has] been created” (Thomasson, 1999, 38). Meanwhile,
this characterization entails that an abstract artifact is abstract (in the sense of being nonmental
and nonspatial), modally and temporally flexible, temporal, and ontologically depends on certain
concreta.
78See Thomasson (1999, 11).
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Is either of the foregoing views acceptable? Clearly, both of them face objec-
tions analogous to the Creation Objectionit. Can these objections be successfully
countered by a proponent of the view that a novel is a historical individual or the
view that a novel is an abstract artifact? From a theoretical perspective, both pro-
ponents are in no better position than a proponent of the view that a novel is an
initiated type. They would be in a better position only if they were not committed
to the abstractness of novels. But they are committed to that: Both the view that a
novel is a historical individual and the view that a novel is an abstract artifact entail
that a novel is an abstractum. Given this as well as the critical analysis provided in
the previous subsection, the answer to the foregoing question is “No.” As a result,
both the view that a novels is a historical individual and the view that a novel is an
abstract artifact are at least as problematic as the view that a novel is an initiated
type. Therefore, neither view can be accepted.79
6.2 Concretist Views
Thus, none of the abstractionist views examined above is acceptable. Let us
now turn to the concretist alternatives mentioned at the beginning of this chapter:
79A view similar to the views discussed here has been provided by Ingarden (1973). According to
it, a literary work “is a ‘purely intentional formation,’ derived from the sentence-forming activities
of its author(s), and founded on some public copy of these sentences, and also depending for its
existence and essence on a relation to certain ideal meanings attached to the words of the text”
(Thomasson, 2008). However, Ingarden (1973)’s view is unacceptable. The reason why this is so
is analogous to the reason why the views discussed in this section are unacceptable.
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the view that a novel is an embodiment of this novel and the view that a novel is a
mereological sum of embodiments of this novel.
6.2.1 A Novel as a Particular Embodiment
Consider first the view that a novel is an embodiment of this novel.80,81,82
One reason against this view is as follows. Suppose some novel N is one of its
embodiments—namely, embodiment E. Now, a question arises: Why is N (identical
to) E, and not Ealt, where the latter is some embodiment of N other than E?
One could say that N is E, and not Ealt, since E has all the relevant artistic
properties of N. But this explanation is unsatisfactory, as nothing stops us from
supposing that Ealt also has all of these properties.
Alternatively, one could try to explain why N is E, and not Ealt, by saying
that E is the first embodiment of N to come into existence (the original manuscript
created by N ’s author). But this explanation is also unsatisfactory. First of all,
80Recall that by “an embodiment of a novel” is meant a concrete singular entity that possesses
all, or at least sufficiently many, of the relevant artistic properties of this novel.
81Proponents of this view are Collingwood (1958), Mag Uidhir (2013), and (arguably) Sartre
(2004), among others.
82One might object that since the existence of an embodiment of a novel implies that this novel
exists independently of this embodiment, the view that a novel is an embodiment of this novel
is incoherent. However, this objection fails. It assumes that the existence of an embodiment of
a novel implies that this novel exists independently of this embodiment. But this assumption is
false. An embodiment of a novel is just a concretum that has particular textual properties (and
perhaps is appropriately related to the author). And, surely, such a concretum can exist even if
the corresponding novel exists only qua an entity identical to this concretum.
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it depends on the assumption that E comes into existence before Ealt. However,
this assumption can be rejected in favor of the assumption that E and Ealt come
into existence simultaneously. Furthermore, according to the explanation being
discussed, what explains the fact that N is E, and not Ealt, is a particular purely
temporal and/or logical difference in the order of coming into existence between E
and Ealt. But why is such a difference sufficient to explain this fact? Whether x is
N (or some other novel) depends solely on what artistic properties x has. However,
neither the temporal nor the logical property of coming into existence after or before
some embodiment is, in itself, an artistic property. (To see this, imagine that E and
Ealt are correctly produced in the same way and in the same relevant cultural-
historical context but at different times. In this case, E and Ealt differ in the
temporal and logical properties related to the order of E ’s and Ealt’s coming into
existence. However, there is no reason to ascribe different artistic properties to E
and Ealt.) So the fact that E and Ealt differ in the order of coming into existence is
not sufficient to explain why N is identical to E, and not Ealt.
Thus, neither explanation can be accepted. Meanwhile, there is no other
potentially acceptable explanation of why N is E, and not Ealt. As a result, the
thesis that N is E is essentially ungrounded. But if this is so, then, since this thesis
is a direct consequence of the view that a novel is an embodiment of this novel, this
view is itself essentially ungrounded.
Here is another consideration against the view that a novel is an embodiment
of this novel. Suppose Moby-Dick is one of its embodiments—say, some embodiment
E. Suppose next that E is completely destroyed. In this case, Moby-Dick is also
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completely destroyed. However, this result is problematic. Surely, if x is not the
only embodiment of a novel, then destroying x cannot be sufficient to destroy this
novel. Meanwhile, E is not the only embodiment of Moby-Dick (in fact, there are
many other embodiments of Moby-Dick). So destroying E cannot be sufficient for
the destruction of Moby-Dick. Thus, Moby-Dick cannot be E. But if this is so, then
the view that a novel is an embodiment of this novel is false.
Yet another objection to this view is as follows. Suppose Moby-Dick is one
of its embodiments—say, some embodiment E. Suppose next that E is modified
in some way—say, by tearing a number of pages out of it (if it is an inscription),
or by forgetting some of its text (if it is a mental entity), or by mispronouncing
some of its text (if it is a reading). Then Moby-Dick is itself modified. However,
this consequence is unacceptable. The foregoing modification of E cannot affect
the artistic properties of Moby-Dick and, hence, cannot cause Moby-Dick to be
modified.83 Thus, Moby-Dick cannot be E. But then the view that a novel is an
embodiment of this novel is false.
Finally, this view faces the following objection. If a novel is an embod-
iment of this novel, then Moby-Dick can be touched/smelled/tasted—by touch-
ing/smelling/tasting the embodiment Moby-Dick is identical to. But this result is
wrong. A novel (as opposed to, say, a text of this novel printed on paper) cannot be
touched/tasted/smelled—by touching/tasting/smelling its embodiments or by any
83Of course, under certain circumstances, a novel can be modified by modifying its embodiment.
For example, a novel can be modified in this way if the modification has the form of editing and
is carried out by the author(s) of the novel.
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other means.84 So the view that a novel is an embodiment of this novel is false.
There seems no way for a proponent of the view that a novel is an embodiment
of this novel to plausibly respond to the foregoing objections. In light of that, this
view cannot be accepted.
6.2.2 A Novel as a Mereological Sum of Embodiments
Let us now turn to the view that a novel is a mereological sum of embodiments
of this novel.85,86,87 One objection to this view is as follows. Suppose a novel is a
84Here, it is assumed that mental entities amount to certain physical states of the brain. If
this assumption is rejected and mental entities are taken to have a special, nonphysical nature (of
the sort that precludes such entities from being touched, tasted, or smelled), then the objection
being discussed does not apply to one version of the view that a novel is an embodiment of this
novel—the version according to which a novel is a particular mental entity.
85Although, to my knowledge, this view has not been defended by anyone, a similar view on
the nature of a musical work has recently been defended by Alward (2004), Caplan and Matheson
(2006, 2008), Tillman (2011), and Tillman and Spencer (2012).
86Note that the view that a novel is a mereological sum of embodiments of this novel is essentially
different from the view that a novel is a set of embodiments of this novel.* According to the latter
view, a novel is an abstractum. For, on this view, a novel is a set, and, as is generally agreed, sets
are abstract. According to the former view, however, a novel is a concretum. The reason for this
is that on this view, a novel is a mereological sum of concreta (namely, of certain embodiments of
this novel), and any mereological sum of concreta is a concretum.
* The view that a novel is a set of embodiments of this novel has been discussed in Section 6.1.1.
87One might object that since the existence of a mereological sum of embodiments of a novel
implies that this novel exists independently of this sum, the view that a novel is a mereological
sum of embodiments of this novel is incoherent. However, this objection fails. The explanation of
why this is so is analogous to the explanation of why the objections discussed in Footnotes 10 and
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mereological sum of embodiments of this novel. Then a complete apprehension of a
novel requires an apprehension of all the embodiments that make up the mereological
sum with which this novel is identified. But this consequence is false. To fully
apprehend a novel, it is sufficient to properly apprehend just one of its embodiments
(provided that this embodiment is correct). As a result, the view that a novel is a
mereological sum of embodiments of this novel is false.
Here is another objection to this view. Consider the following principle: For all
x, if x ’s part is modified at t, then x is modified at t. This principle is uncontroversial.
Thus, suppose that a part of a table is modified at t—for example, by making a
crack in its top. Then it seems right to say that the table itself is modified at t.
Likewise, if John’s part is modified at t—for instance, by means of a surgery—then
it is natural to say that John himself is modified. Suppose now that a novel is a
mereological sum of embodiments of this novel. Then, given the foregoing principle,
whenever one modifies an embodiment of Moby-Dick at t, one modifies Moby-Dick
at t. But this consequence is false. Modifying an embodiment of Moby-Dick does
not entail modifying Moby-Dick itself. So the view that a novel is a mereological
sum of embodiments of this novel is false.
Here is yet another consideration against this view. Suppose a novel is a mereo-
logical sum of embodiments of this novel. Then whenever one touches/smells/tastes
an embodiment of Moby-Dick, one touches/smells/tastes a part of Moby-Dick. But
this consequence does not seem right. Intuitively, no part of a novel can be touched/smelled/tasted—
by touching/smelling/tasting an embodiment of this novel or in some other way.
82 fail.
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Thus, the view that a novel is a mereological sum of embodiments of this novel is
false.
Additionally, the “touch” version of the foregoing objection can be strength-
ened as follows. It seems uncontroversial that when we touch an object, we often
do not (and cannot) touch it in its entirety but, at the same time, can truthfully
say that we touch it, and not just one or more of its parts. For instance, when we
touch an apple, we touch its part, and not all of it. Nevertheless, we can truthfully
say that we touch it, and not just one of its parts. This suggests that the following
principle is true: For all x, to touch x, it is sufficient to touch a part of x. Suppose
now that a novel is a mereological sum of its embodiments. Then, given the fore-
going principle, Moby-Dick can be touched by touching its embodiments. But, as
mentioned above, this consequence seems unacceptable.88 Given this, the truth of
the view that a novel is a mereological sum of embodiments of this novel is far from
obvious.
There is little doubt that the foregoing objections cannot be plausibly replied
to a proponent of the view that a novel is a mereological sum of embodiments of
this novel. Given that, this view cannot be accepted.
88Here, it is assumed that mental entities are certain physical states of the brain. If this assump-
tion is rejected and mental entities are considered to be certain nonphysical entities, then the last
two objections apply to all versions of the view being discussed except the version according to
which a novel is a mereological sum of certain mental embodiments.
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6.3 Eliminativism
Thus, neither the abstractionist nor the concretist views stand up to criticism.
Given this as well as the fact that the abstract/concrete distinction is exhaustive,
one might want to adopt eliminativism, or the view that there are no novels. But
can this view be adopted?
Here is a powerful reason to answer this question in the negative. Since elimi-
nativism contradicts one of our strongest artistic intuitions—that novels exist—there
is a strong prima facie reason against it. At the same time, there are no good reasons
in its favor (after all, why think that novels do not exist?). Given this, eliminativism
should be rejected. Call this “the Existence Objection.”
Response to the Existence Objection (1). Following Hazlett (2012), a proponent
of eliminativism could respond to the Existence Objection as follows. This objection
is successful only if there is no real reason in favor of eliminativism. However, there
is, in fact, such a reason. Consider repeatable artworks, or artworks that have more
than one instance. If such artworks exist, they must be abstracta. Meanwhile, no
abstractum has accidental intrinsic properties. So if repeatable artworks exist, then
none of them has such properties. However, repeatable artworks do have at least
one accidental intrinsic property. So there are no repeatable artworks.89 Meanwhile,
if this is so, then, since novels are repeatable artworks, eliminativism is true.
This response is based on the thesis that repeatable artworks must be ab-
stracta. But why think that this thesis is true?
89See Hazlett (2012, 162).
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Here is the answer given by Hazlett (2012): Repeatable artworks must be
abstracta, since (a) such artworks have instances, but (b) “no concrete object has
instances” (Hazlett, 2012, 163). Is this answer satisfactory? Although Hazlett (2012)
is right that repeatable artworks have instances, his claim that no concrete object has
instances is puzzling. Given the account of instances of artworks defended in Chapter
2,90 there is no conceptual barrier to treating some concreta—say, paintings—as
capable of having instances. Perhaps Hazlett (2012) uses some other account of
instances of artworks. But he does not explicate this account, and it is unclear what
90In a nutshell, this account is as follows:
Instancee: For all x, x an instancee of some artwork A if and only if x is either:
• a well-formed instancee of A—an entity that manifests all the primary properties that
must be experienced to fully appreciate A; or
• a non-well-formed instancee of A—an entity that (a) manifests sufficiently many, but
not all, of the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate A and
(b) could, in principle, manifest all sensory kinds of these properties.
Instancep: For all x, x an instancee of some artwork A if and only if x is either
• a well-formed instancee of A—an entity that (a) manifests all the primary properties
that must be experienced to fully appreciate A and (b) stands in an appropriate
historical-intentional relation to A; or
• a non-well-formed instancee of A—an entity that (a) manifests sufficiently many, but
not all, of the primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate A; (b)
could, in principle, manifest all sensory kinds of these properties; and (c) stands in an
appropriate historical-intentional relation to A.
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this account could possibly be.
Given what has been said, Hazlett (2012)’s answer cannot be considered sat-
isfactory. At the same time, there are no other alternative answers that could be
potentially satisfactory. Thus, the thesis that repeatable artworks must be abstracta
is unsubstantiated. Meanwhile, if this is so, then the foregoing response to the Ex-
istence Objection is itself unsubstantiated and, hence, fails.
Response to the Existence Objection (2). A proponent of eliminativism could
also respond to the Existence Objection with the help of Cameron (2008)’s account
of existence-entailing claims. Before examining how exactly she could do that, let
us first clarify what this account is.
The key idea behind Cameron (2008)’s account of existence-entailing claims
is that at least some of our common sense claims entailing that there are particular
entities are not ontologically committing with regard to these entities. This idea
can be illustrated with the following example. Consider the claim that there are
statues. It is a common sense claim that entails that there are statues. However, this
entailment does not necessarily imply that there are, in fact, statues. Put otherwise,
it is possible that the truth of the claim that there are statues is compatible with
there being no statues in the actual world.
In light of what has been said, a natural question arises: By virtue of what
are common sense claims that (a) entail that there are certain entities but (b) are
not ontologically committing with regard to these entities true? Cameron (2008)
answers this question as follows: Such claims are true by virtue of the corresponding
facts about the world. Thus, the claim that there are statues is true by virtue of the
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fact that the world contains “entities [namely, certain enduring simples] that, for at
least some portion of their life, are arranged into a statue shape (and are arranged
thus because of the actions of an intentional agent)” (Cameron, 2008, 299).91
One might wonder whether Cameron (2008)’s account is consistent: For how
can (a) a common sense claim entailing that there are certain entities and (b) the
claim that there are, in fact, none of these entities be true at the same time?
Cameron (2008) replies to this in the following way. A common sense claim en-
tailing that there are certain entities and the claim that there are, in fact, none
of these entities belong to different ways of describing the world, or different “lan-
guages”: The former claim is part of the language of “common sense” (or “ordinary
English,” as Cameron (2008) calls it)—the language that is intended to reflect our
intuitive view of the world and does not necessarily describe how things really are;
the latter claim is a claim of “Ontologese—the language we use to describe how
the world is at its fundamental level”92 (Cameron, 2008, 300–301). Given that our
intuitive view of the world and our view of how the world actually is differ, claims
of the language of “common sense” and claims of Ontologese do not always have
the same truth conditions. A claim of the language of “common sense”—call it
“‘p’”—is true just in case p. However, “p” is not necessarily true just in case p
(where “p” is a claim of Ontologese); “p” can be true even if it is not the case that
91Although Cameron (2008) endorses the view that the claim that there are statues is true by
virtue of the mentioned fact, he leaves open the possibility that this claim could be true by virtue
of some other fact.
92According to Cameron (2008), x exists at the fundamental level just in case x is part of our
ontology (or, in other words, has being) (see Cameron (2008, 303)).
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p. For example, the claim of the language of “common sense” “There are statues”
can be true even if there are no statues (where “there are statues” is a claim
of Ontologese). Thus, the simultaneous truth of (a) a common sense claim entailing
that there are certain entities and (b) the claim that there are, in fact, none of these
entities is unproblematic (provided that the truth conditions of the former claim do
not presuppose the actual existence of these entities, or, in other words, the truth
of the claim that there are these entities).
Using Cameron (2008)’s account of existence-entailing claims, a proponent of
eliminativism could respond to the Existence Objection as follows. The intuition
that there are novels amounts to the common sense claim that there are novels.
Meanwhile, according to Cameron (2008)’s account of existence-entailing claims,
this claim can be true even if there are, in fact, no novels. Thus, the intuition
that novels exist does not necessarily contradict eliminativism. Does this intuition
actually contradict eliminativism? The answer is “Yes” only if the common sense
claim that there are novels is true, at least in part, by virtue of the fact that novels
really exist. However, this claim is not true by virtue of this fact; it is true by
virtue of the fact that there really are certain abstract eternally existing linguistic
structures that are not novels but that are appropriately related to them.93 Thus,
there is no contradiction between the intuition that novels exist and eliminativism.
But if this is so, then, contrary to what the Existence Objection states, eliminativism
93This thesis is analogous to Cameron (2008)’s thesis that the common sense claim that there
are musical works is true not by virtue of the fact that musical works exist but by virtue of the
fact that there are certain abstract eternally existing sound structures.
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accords with this intuition.
This response involves the following assumption: (a) There really are certain
abstract linguistic structures, but, although these structures are appropriately re-
lated to novels, they are not novels; (b) in fact, novels do not exist. Consider now
the following alternative to this assumption: (b*) Novels actually exist; (a*) they
are identical to certain abstract eternally existing linguistic structures. Which of
the mentioned assumptions is preferable? The alternative assumption is supported
by the intuition that novels exist. The assumption involved in the response under
consideration is supported by the intuition that novels do not exist eternally. Now,
it seems a lot easier to accept the claim that novels exist eternally rather than the
claim that they do not exist at all. Given this, it is reasonable to hold that the
intuition that novels exist overrides the intuition that they do not exist eternally.
But if this is so, then the support of the assumption of the response being discussed
is weaker than the support of the alternative assumption—and, hence, the question
posed above should be answered as follows: The latter assumption should be pre-
ferred to the former one. Meanwhile, if this answer is correct, then the response
being discussed is unsatisfactory.
Conclusion. Thus, neither response to the Existence Objection is successful.
Meanwhile, there are no other potentially satisfactory responses to this objection.
Therefore, eliminativism is unacceptable.
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6.4 Toward a Satisfactory Ontology of Novels
Our analysis has shown that a novel cannot be identified with:
• a set of embodiments of this novel
• a property
• a pure type
• an initiated type
• a historical individual
• an abstract artifact
• an embodiment of this novel
• a mereological sum of embodiments of this novel
At the same time, according to our analysis, denying the existence of novels is
untenable. But what is then a novel, ontologically speaking? What basic sort of
entity can it be identified with?
Prima facie, if a novel is a concretum, then it is either a particular embodiment
or a mereological sum of embodiments. However, given what has been said above,
a novel is neither. Should we then conclude that a novel is not a concretum? No.
For there is, I think, a concretum with which a novel can be identified. Here, of
course, the following questions arise: (a) What exactly is this concretum? and (b)
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Why think that a novel can be identified with it? Answers to these questions are
provided in the next chapter.
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Chapter 7: An Ontology of Novels
Introduction
In the previous chapter, I have suggested that a novel can be understood
as a concretum of a particular kind. My goal in this chapter is to expound this
suggestion. I begin by arguing that a novel can be regarded as what I call a concrete
type (Section 7.1). Next, I examine potential objections to identifying a novel with
such a type, arguing that none of these objections stands up to criticism (Section
7.2). Then I turn to an examination of the essential elements of the concrete type
to which a novel is identical (Section 7.3). Finally, I summarize the view defended
in this chapter (Section 7.4).
7.1 A Novel as a Concrete Type
As has already been said, a novel can be understood as a concretum, or, in
other words, an entity that has at least some of the following properties: (a) being
in space and/or time, (b) being causally efficacious (= being capable of causally
affecting something and of being causally affected by something), and (c) being
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modally flexible (= having some intrinsic properties1 nonessentially2). But what
kind of concretum is a novel? To answer this question, it is necessary to answer the
following questions:
1. What spatial and/or temporal regions does a novel occupy?
2. How does a novel occupy them?
3. What is a novel constituted by?
4. What exactly is the constitution relation between a novel and whatever con-
stitutes this novel?
Let us answer the first of these questions. It is natural to suppose that if an
artwork occupies any spatial or temporal regions, then these regions are those that
are occupied by instances of this work. Now, given what has been said in Chapter
4, instances of non-visual novels are readings, while instances of visual novels are
mereological sums (hereafter: “sums”) of readings and graphic elements.3 In light of
what has been said, question (1) can be answered as follows: If a novel is non-visual,
1As mentioned previously, “an intrinsic property” can be defined as follows: For all x and for
all y, x is an intrinsic property of y just in case x is a property possessed by y “in virtue of the
way [y ] itself, and nothing else, is” (Lewis, 1983, 112). For a detailed analysis of the expression
“an intrinsic property” (as well as the related expression “an extrinsic property”), see Weatherson
and Marshall (2014).
2As mentioned previously, “an essential property” can be defined as follows: For all x and for
all y, x is an essential property of y just in case if x is a property of y and if y is deprived of x,
then y goes out of existence.
3Recall that a novel is non-visual just in case its primary properties that must be experienced
to fully appreciate it are certain (a) sonic properties and (b) experienceable properties that provide
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then it occupies those spatiotemporal regions that are occupied by its readings; if a
novel is visual, then it occupies those spatiotemporal regions that are occupied by
sums of its readings and certain graphic elements.
Let us now turn to question (2) (“How does a novel occupy the spatial and
temporal regions it occupies?”) Before answering this question, we first need to clar-
ify how an object simpliciter (not necessarily a novel) can occupy a spatial/temporal
region. Following Tillman (2011), we can identify the following ways of occupying
a spatial/temporal region by an object:
• An object can pertend a spatial/temporal region it occupies, where x pertends
a spatial/temporal region y iff x occupies y and x has a proper part at ev-
ery proper spatial/temporal subregion of any spatial/temporal region that x
occupies (roughly: an extended object with parts at every spatial/temporal
region).
• An object can span a spatial/temporal region it occupies, where x spans a
spatial/temporal region y iff x occupies y and does not have a proper part at
any proper spatial/temporal subregion of x ’s path, or, in other words, of the
fusion of spatial/temporal regions occupied by x (roughly: an extended object
without proper parts).
• An object can be multiply located (hereafter: “multilocated”) at a spatial/temporal
experiential access to the semantic content; a novel is visual just in case its primary properties
that must be experienced to fully appreciate it are certain (a) sonic properties, (b) experienceable
properties that provide experiential access to the semantic content, and (c) visual properties.
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region it occupies, where x is multilocated at a spatial/temporal region iff x
occupies two disjoint spatial/temporal regions and does not occupy their fu-
sion (roughly: a part-but-not-path occupier of an extended spatial/temporal
region).4
Does a novel span the spatial/temporal regions it occupies? Suppose the an-
swer is “Yes.” Then, according to the foregoing account of “spanning,” a novel
does not have proper parts. However, this consequence seems unacceptable. For
suppose it is true. Then it is unclear how novels, being spatiotemporal, can have
certain properties that, from an intuitive viewpoint, they doubtless have—say, the
properties of being short/long and having one or several chapters (sections, para-
graphs). Given what has been said, there is reason to answer the above question in
the negative: A novel does not span the spatial/temporal regions it occupies.
In light of the foregoing result, there are four potentially acceptable options:
1. A novel pertends the spatial regions it occupies and is multilocated at the
temporal regions it occupies.
2. A novel pertends the temporal regions it occupies and is multilocated at the
spatial regions it occupies.
3. A novel pertends both the spatial and temporal regions it occupies.
4. A novel is multilocated at both the spatial and temporal regions it occupies.5
4See Tillman (2011, 17).
5Cf. Zemach (1970)’s “four ontologies.”
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Which of these options reflects the actual state of affairs? According to the ac-
count of “pertending” provided above, if x pertends a spatial region, then x has a
proper spatial part at every proper spatial subregion of any spatial region that x
occupies. So if the first option reflects the actual state of affairs, then, given that
novels occupy the spatiotemporal regions occupied by their instances (readings or
sums of readings and graphic elements), a novel has a proper spatial part at every
spatial region occupied by instances of this novel. However, this consequence is
problematic. For suppose a novel has a proper spatial part at every spatial region
occupied by instances of this novel. Then to completely apprehend a novel, all of its
instances must be apprehended. However, as pointed out in Chapter 6,6 a complete
apprehension of a novel requires apprehending just one of its instances (assuming
that this instance is well-formed, of course), not all of them.7
Consider now the second option. According to the foregoing account of “per-
tending,” if x pertends a temporal region, then x has a proper temporal part at
every proper temporal subregion of any temporal region that x occupies. So if the
second option reflects the actual state of affairs, then, given that novels occupy the
spatiotemporal regions occupied by their instances, a novel has a proper temporal
part at every proper temporal subregion of the temporal regions occupied by in-
stances of this novel. However, this consequence is problematic. Suppose a novel
6See Chapter 6, Section 6.2.2.
7Furthermore, if a novel has a proper spatial part at every spatial region occupied by instances
of this novel, then a complete apprehension of an overwhelming majority of novels is impossible
(for, in most cases, some or all of the instances have already ceased to exist). However, this result
seems wrong. Intuitively, most novels can be fully apprehended.
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has a proper temporal part at every proper temporal subregion of the temporal re-
gion occupied by this novel. Then a novel has the property of having the duration
equivalent to the sum of the durations of all of its readings. But, prima facie, this
result is wrong.
Consider now the third option. It entails that a novel pertends both spatial
and temporal regions occupied by instances of this novel. However, as is clear from
what has been said about the previous two options, this entailment has at least
two problematic consequences—(a) that a novel must have a proper spatial part at
every spatial region occupied by instances of this novel and (b) that a novel has the
property of having the duration equivalent to the sum of the durations of all of its
readings.
Finally, let us consider the fourth option. According to it, and given the fact
that novels occupy the spatiotemporal regions occupied by their instances, a novel
is multilocated at each of the spatial and temporal regions occupied by instances of
this novel: In the temporal case, a novel occupies the times at which its instances
exist without occupying their fusion; in the spatial case, a novel occupies the spatial
regions occupied by its instances, without occupying their fusion. This option does
not face the problems of the options discussed above. Furthermore, it does not
encounter any other problems. In light of this, the best answer to the question
“How does a novel occupy the spatial and temporal regions it occupies?,” I think, is
this: A novel occupies the spatial/temporal regions it occupies by being multilocated
at these regions.
Let us now address question (3) (“What is a novel constituted by?”). As has
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been established above, a novel is multilocated where each of its instances is wholly
located. In light of this, there is good reason to answer question (3) as follows: A
novel is constituted by its instances; in particular, a non-visual novel is constituted
by its readings, whereas a visual novel is constituted by sums of its readings and
graphic elements.
This brings us to question (4) (“What exactly is the constitution relation
between a novel and whatever constitutes this novel?”). Let us first say what the
constitution relation between a novel and whatever constitutes this novel is not.
There is no doubt that this relation can be neither the relation of identity simpliciter
nor a combination of the relation of identity and some other relation or relations.
Suppose the constitution relation between a novel and whatever constitutes this
novel is the relation of identity. Then a novel is identical either (a) to each of its
instances or (b) to a mereological sum of its instances. Suppose now that the first
possibility is true. Then, by the transitivity of identity, instances of a novel must
be identical to each other. But, obviously, this result is false. Suppose, on the
other hand, that a novel is identical to a mereological sum of its instances. Then:
(a) a novel cannot be fully apprehended unless all the instances that compose the
mereological sum to which this novel is identical are apprehended, (b) modifying an
embodiment contained in the mereological sum to which the corresponding novel is
identical entails modifying this novel, and (c) whenever one touches/smells/tastes
one of these instances, one touches/smells/tastes a part of this novel. However, as
shown in Chapter 6,8 these consequences are problematic. The first consequence is
8See Chapter 6, Section 6.2.2.
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problematic, since a complete apprehension of a novel does not require apprehending
all of its instances. The reason why the second consequence is problematic is that
in an overwhelming majority of cases, modifying an embodiment of a novel does not
entail modifying this novel. Finally, the third consequence is problematic because
it seems impossible to touch/smell/taste a part of a novel (as opposed to a physical
instance of this novel)—by touching/smelling/tasting its instances or by any other
means.
Now, suppose that the constitution relation between a novel and whatever
constitutes this novel is a combination of the relation of identity and some other
relation or relations. Then the only plausible option seems to be this: A novel is
identical to one particular instance of this novel and is related to the other instances
in a way that does not presuppose being identical to them. Is this option tenable?
As is clear from the previous chapter,9 there is good reason against identifying a
novel with a particular instance of this novel. First of all, there is no satisfactory
explanation as to why a novel is identical to the instance to which it is considered
to be identical, and not some other instance of this novel. Furthermore, identifying
a novel with a particular instance of this novel contradicts our intuitions regarding
destroying, modifying, and experiencing novels. Given this, the question posed
above should be answered in the negative.
Thus, the constitution relation between novels and their instances cannot be
the relation of identity simpliciter ; nor can it be a combination of the relation of
identity and some other relation or relations. Now, what about treating the con-
9See Chapter 6, Section 6.2.1.
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stitution relation between novels and their instances as the relation that a whole
bears to its proper parts? Is this suggestion tenable? No. If the constitution rela-
tion between novels and their instances were the relation that a whole bears to its
proper parts, then to fully appreciate a novel, we would have to appreciate all of its
instances. However, this consequence is problematic, since, as already mentioned,
a complete apprehension of a novel requires apprehending only one of its instances
(assuming, of course, that this instance is well-formed), not all of them.
So what is then the constitution relation between a novel and its instances?
As is clear from what has been said, a novel (a) is wholly located where each of its
instances is wholly located but (b) is neither identical to any one of these instances
or their mereological sum nor related to them in the way in which a whole is related
to its proper parts. In light of this, the foregoing question can, I think, be answered
as follows: The constitution relation that holds between a novel and its instances is
the relation of coincidence, where the latter is defined in the following way:
Coincidence For all x and for all y, x coincides with y just in case x (a) is wholly
located where each y is wholly located but (b) is neither identical to y or a
mereological sum that contains y nor related to y in the way in which a whole
is related to its proper part.
It is worth stressing that the relation of coincidence, as defined above, is nei-
ther strange nor unnatural. In fact, this relation accords perfectly with common
sense. Consider a clay statue. If someone smashes it into multiple pieces, it will be
destroyed, but the clay that constitutes it will survive. So the statue is not identical
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to the clay. Furthermore, the statue does not seem to be identical to a mereological
sum that contains the clay (after all, what could this sum be?). Finally, the statue
is not related to the clay as a whole is related to its proper part. For suppose the
opposite is true. Then if the clay is eliminated, there must remain something else—
something that could serve as another proper part of the statue (for, otherwise, the
clay cannot be a proper part of the statue). It is clear, however, that nothing will
be left if the clay is eliminated.
Thus, the statue is neither identical to the clay or a mereological sum con-
taining the clay nor related to the clay as a whole is related to its proper part. At
the same time, the statue is wholly located where the clay is wholly located. Thus,
in this case, the conditions of Coincidence are satisfied. As a result, it is quite
natural to characterize the statue as coincident with the clay.
Let us now return to the question posed at the beginning of this section: What
sort of concretum is a novel? As is clear from what has been said above, novels fall
under the category of concreta that (a) are capable of spatiotemporal multilocation
(that is, can occupy several disjoint spatiotemporal regions without occupying their
fusion) and (b) coincide with their instances (that is, are wholly located where each
of their instances is wholly located but are neither identical to any of them or a
mereological sum of them nor related to them in the way in which a whole is related
to its proper parts). Let us call this category “concrete types.” In light of this, the
foregoing question can be answered as follows: A novel is a concrete type.10
Before proceeding further, three remarks are worth making. First, the term
10A similar view on the nature of properties is advocated by Armstrong (1978).
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“type” is used here in a way that does not commit its referents to being abstract.11
Second, the category of concrete types does not imply that all existent types are
concrete; it is compatible with the idea that certain entities—such as various math-
ematicalia like numbers, functions, and pure sets—could be abstract types. Finally,
the category of concrete types should be distinguished from the category of types in-
troduced by Zemach (1970, 1992). This is not to say, of course, that these categories
do not have anything in common. According to Zemach (1970, 1992), types—that
is, entities such as the Taxpayer, the Lion, the American Woman, and the Letter
A—are not abstract; rather, they “are particulars recurring both at many different
times and in many different places” (Zemach, 1992, 7):
Mr. Jones is a material thing, a particular, although he can be, all of
him, in two distinct spatiotemporal locations (e.g., in his office at 9 AM
and at home at 8 PM). Similarly, the type-entity The Cat is, all of it, in
many distinct spatiotemporal locations. . . It is the same type-entity The
Cat which is seen first on the mat, then on the couch, and at the same
time climbing a tree in the yard. (Zemach, 1992, 7)
Thus, Zemach’s category of types implies that whatever falls under this category is
concrete and can be multilocated at both spatial and temporal regions. Meanwhile,
that is exactly what is implied by the category of concrete types. So in this regard,
these categories are similar. Yet there is a crucial difference between them. The
difference concerns the interpretation of the relation that holds between an entity
11Although such ontologically neutral usage is not orthodox, it is not uncommon. Thus, it is
adopted by Peirce (1931), Davies (2012), and Wollheim (1971), among others.
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falling under each of the corresponding categories and whatever constitutes this
entity. According to Zemach (1992)’s category, the relation that holds between
types and what constitutes them is that of nesting : Types are nested in what
constitutes them (where y is nested in x iff every essential property of x 12 is also
an essential property of y (Zemach, 1992, 148)). On the other hand, the category
of concrete types does not require an entity falling under this category to be nested
in its constituents; an entity can fall under this category even if it is not nested in
its constituents—provided that it is coincident with them.
7.2 Some Objections
Let us now examine possible objections to the view that novels are concrete
types.
Objection 1. Consider the following principle:
Localization Principle: For all x, if x is concrete, then x cannot be spatially multi-
located.
This principle is supported by our intuition: Intuitively, concreta—both objects
(tables, people, trees, animals, etc.) and events (dances, musical performances,
fights, etc.)—cannot be wholly located at two distinct places at the same time.13
12Here, by “an essential property of x” is meant a property that x has “at any time, place, or
possible world where [x] exists” (Zemach, 1992, 148).
13Thus, suppose we see John wholly present at two different places at the same time. In this
case, most likely, we will not believe what we see; that is, we will not believe that John is, in fact,
at two different places at the same time.
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So there is a good reason in favor of the Localization Principle. Meanwhile, this
principle entails that novels cannot be concrete types. For suppose it is true. Then
there can be no object that is concrete and capable of spatial multilocation. But
concrete types are, by definition, concrete and capable of spatial multilocation. So
there can be no such types. But if this is the case, then, of course, no novel can be
a concrete type.
Response. Let us distinguish between two kinds of possibility: logical and
physical. Logical possibility can be defined as follows:
Logical Possibility : For all x, x is logically possible iff x does not violate the law of
non-contradiction (¬(A ∧ ¬A)).
Here is the definition of physical possibility:
Physical Possibility : For all x, x is physically possible iff x does not violate any
physical laws.
Which of these kinds of possibility is used in the Localization Principle? Suppose
it is logical possibility. Then the Localization Principle entails that if x is concrete
and spatially multilocated, then x violates the law of non-contradiction. However,
this entailment is false. Suppose that, with the help of a time machine, John,
currently located in 2017, travels to the past—say, to 2011. Then, in 2011, there
are John’s younger body and John’s older body. Now, what about John himself?
What is his spatial location in 2011?14
14It can be objected that this example is meaningless, as backwards time travel is logically
impossible. Is this objection successful? The answer is “Yes” only if there is a compelling argument
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There is little doubt that in 2011, John cannot be spatially located just where
his younger body is located. For, in that case, he would not be spatially located
where his older body is spatially located in 2017, which contradicts one of our
assumptions.
One might say that in 2011, John is spatially located solely where his older
body is spatially located. But this answer is problematic. If it is true, then the
person who is wholly spatially located where John’s younger body is spatially located
is not John—and, hence, in 2017, it is false that John was younger in 2011. However,
this consequence is doubtless false.
Another possible answer is that in 2011, John is (a), in part, spatially lo-
cated where his younger body is spatially located and (b), in part, spatially located
where his older body is spatially located. But this answer is also problematic. For
suppose it is correct. Then in 2011, John amounts to the mereological sum of his
instances—his younger body and his older body—(or to whatever is constituted
by these instances) and, as a result, has two completely independent minds. How-
ever, no person (as opposed, perhaps, to a human being) can have two completely
independent minds.
Presumably, the best answer to the question “What is John’s spatial location
against the logical possibility of backwards time travel. However, there seems to be no such
argument (for an exposition of the most promising arguments against the logical possibility of
backwards time travel—including the arguments put forward by Lewis (1976)—as well as a critique
of these arguments, see Smith (2016)). Given this, the question posed above can, I think, be
answered in the negative.
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in 2011?” is that in 2011, John is spatially multilocated: He occupies the spatial
regions occupied by each of his instances—namely, his younger and older bodies—
and does not occupy their fusion. (Note that this answer does not face the problem
of the previous answer. According to that problem, the previous answer has an un-
palatable consequence—that in 2011, John has two completely independent minds.
However, the answer being discussed does not have this consequence. According to
this answer, it is not true that in 2011, John is, (a) in part, spatially located where
his younger body is spatially located, and (b), in part, spatially located where his
older body is spatially located. Rather, this answer states that in 2011, John is
multilocated, or, in other words, is wholly present both where his younger body is
spatially located and where his older body is spatially located. Meanwhile, if this is
so, then, according to this answer, in 2011, John has a single mind (which is wholly
present where each of John’s bodies is wholly present).)
Taking into account what has been said, let us agree that in 2011, John is
multilocated. Is the law of non-contradiction violated in this case? There seems
no real reason to think so. John’s multilocation is easy to imagine. So, assuming
that conceivability entails logical possibility,15 John’s multilocation is possible and,
hence, non-contradictory. Furthermore, presumably, to get a contradiction in the
given case, we should accept that in 2011, John does not occupy either the spatial
region occupied by his younger body, or the spatial region occupied by his older
body, or both of these regions. But we do not have to accept that. The fact that
15This assumption is, of course, controversial. For reasons to endorse it as well as responses to
potential objections, see, e.g., Chalmers (1996, 2002, 2009).
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in 2011, John is multilocated at the spatial regions occupied by his younger and
older bodies does not entail that he is not spatially located at each of these regions.
Meanwhile, this is the only fact that is relevant in the given case.
Thus, in 2011, John does not violate the law of non-contradiction. Meanwhile,
as already mentioned, John is multilocated in 2011. Furthermore, there is no doubt
that he is concrete. So the implication of the Localization Principle—that if x is
concrete and spatially multilocated, then x violates the law of non-contradiction—is
false. As a result, the Localization Principle is itself false.
Suppose now that the Localization Principle employs the concept of phys-
ical possibility. Is this principle true in this case? If the answer is “Yes,” then in
2011, John—as well as any other multilocated concretum—violates at least some
physical laws. But there seems no real reason to think that in 2011, he violates any
such laws. Meanwhile, the Localization Principle entails that if a concretum is
multilocated, then this concretum violates at least some physical laws. In light of
what has been said, there is good reason to consider this principle false.
One could defend the Localization Principle employing the physical con-
cept of possibility (hereafter: “the Localization Principlep”) by saying that this
principle is intuitively correct and, hence, should be regarded as true by default
unless a satisfactory reason against this principle is provided. This defense is suc-
cessful only if there is no satisfactory reason against the Localization Principlep.
However, there is, in fact, such a reason. Suppose the Localization Principlep is
true. Then any spatially multilocated concretum must violate at least some phys-
ical laws. Put otherwise, the physical world cannot contain spatially multilocated
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concreta. However, this consequence can be rejected. It is reasonable to hold that
the physical world can—and, in fact, does—contain spatially multilocated concreta.
Consider, for instance, the plague. It is a concretum present in the physical world.
But it may well be treated as capable of spatial multilocation. Thus, imagine that
at the same time, some disjoint spatial regions A and B are affected by the plague.
Where is the plague in this case? It seems odd to say that a part of the plague is
spatially located at A and a part of the plague is spatially located at B. Intuitively,
the plague is wholly spatially located at both A and B—and, hence, is multilocated.
The same kind of reasoning that has been applied to the plague is applicable
to many other concreta, for example, water, gold, beer, steel, wood, air, etc. Thus,
it is reasonable to hold that the physical world does contain spatially multilocated
concreta. But if this is so, then, given that the Localization Principlep entails
that no spatially multilocated concretum can be present in the physical world, this
principle can be rejected.
Objection 2. The view that novels are concrete types forces us to add a rad-
ically new ontological category to our ontology—that of concrete types. However,
adding this category to our ontology is unjustified.
Response. Objection 2 assumes that the category of concrete types is radically
new. Is this assumption true? Recall that a concrete type is an entity that is
capable of spatiotemporal multilocation and is coincident with its instances (where
x is coincident with y just in case x (a) is wholly located where what constitutes x is
wholly located but (b) is neither identical to what constitutes x nor related to x as
a whole is related to its proper parts). Given this, a concrete type has the following
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features. First, it can be spatiotemporally multilocated. Second, it is wholly located
where what constitutes it is wholly located. Third, it is neither identical to any of
its instances or their sum nor related to them in the way in which a whole is related
to its proper parts.
Consider now ordinary concreta. They share most of the mentioned features.
First, ordinary concreta are capable of temporal multilocation. Thus, my desk
has been temporally multilocated since it came into existence: Since that time, it
has occupied several disjoint temporal regions without occupying their fusion (for
example, it was wholly located at a particular moment on March 12, 2012, when it
was created, and then at all subsequent moments until the present moment). Second,
ordinary concreta are wholly located where what constitutes them is wholly located.
A statue, which is constituted by a lump of clay, is wholly located where this lump
is wholly located. Likewise, my desk, which is constituted by some wooden matter,
is wholly located where this matter is wholly located. Third, ordinary concreta are
neither identical to what constitutes them nor related to it in the way in which a
whole is related to its proper parts. Thus, a cat is not identical to the matter that
constitutes it, since this matter existed before the cat came into existence and will
exist after the cat dies. Nor is a cat related to its constitutive matter as a whole is
related to its proper part. If a cat were related to this matter that way, then after
eliminating the matter, some other part of the cat would remain. But, surely, no
part of a cat will be left if the cat’s matter is eliminated.
Given the mentioned similarities between concrete types and ordinary conc-
reta, it seems unreasonable to characterize the category of concrete types as radically
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neasatiw. Meanwhile, if this is so, then there is reason against Objection 2.
Here, however, one might object as follows. Although ordinary concreta and
concrete types are similar, there are at least two essential differences between them.
First, ordinary concreta can have just one instance, whereas concrete types can
have more than one instance. Second, ordinary concreta are incapable of spatial
multilocation, whereas concrete types can be spatially multilocated. In light of this,
contrary to what the above response states, characterizing the category of concrete
types as radically new is justified.
Is the foregoing objection successful? Assuming that backwards time travel
is possible,16 every ordinary concretum—a statue, a desk, a cat, a person, etc.—
can, in principle, be transported into the past. Meanwhile, if this is so, then every
such concretum (a) can be spatially multilocated, or, in other words, can be wholly
spatially located where its younger instance is spatially located and wholly spatially
located where its older instance is spatially located, and (b) can have more than
one instance. So if backwards time travel is possible, then the mentioned differences
between ordinary concreta and concrete types are nonessential—and, hence, the
objection being discussed fails.
The above response depends on the possibility of backwards time travel. But
what if such time travel is impossible? Can Objection 2 be defused in this case?
16This assumption is, of course, controversial. However, it is not untenable. True, there are
a number of seemingly strong arguments against the possibility of backwards time travel (one of
them is the well-known Grandfather Paradox (Lewis, 1976)). But there is good reason to hold
that each of these arguments can be plausibly defused (see Smith (2016)).
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The answer to this question, I think, is “Yes.” Objection 2 assumes that adding
the category of concrete types to our ontology is unjustified. Is this assumption
true? Perhaps it would be true if by adding the category of concrete types to our
ontology, we could account solely for the ontological status of novels. But, in fact,
doing this can help us elucidate the ontological status of many other concreta—such
as the plague, gold, water, air, beer, and sand. In light of this, as well as the fact
that the category of concrete types is relatively transparent (especially, compared to
the rather obscure categories of initiated types, historical individuals, and abstract
artifacts17), adding this category to our ontology is justified. Meanwhile, if this is
so, then Objection 2 contains a false assumption and, hence, fails.
Objection 3. Suppose there is a reading of some novel, say, Moby-Dick, that
came into existence at 11 am and went out of existence at 9 pm on June 13, 2017. If
novels are concrete types, then Moby-Dick is constituted by this reading. Meanwhile,
any concretum inherits all the properties of what constitutes this concretum. So if
novels are concrete types, then Moby-Dick inherits the properties of the foregoing
reading, including the properties of having come into existence at 11 am on June
13, 2017 and of having gone out of existence at 9 pm on June 13, 2017. But, of
course, Moby-Dick did not come into existence at 11 am on June 13, 2017; nor did
it go out of existence at 9 pm on June 13, 2017. So novels are not concrete types.
Response. Objection 3 assumes that any concretum inherits all the properties
of what constitutes this concretum. Put otherwise, according to this objection, the
following principle is true:
17For an analysis of these categories, see Chapter 6.
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Inheritance: For all x and for all y, if (a) x and y are concreta and (b) x is constituted
by y, then x inherits y ’s properties.
But is Inheritance true? Consider a clay statue. It is constituted by a lump of clay.
So if Inheritance is true, then, since both the statue and the clay are concrete,
the statue must inherit all of the properties of the clay. However, in fact, the statue
does not inherit all of these properties. Thus, the clay came into existence before
the statue came into existence. Furthermore, the clay can survive the destruction
of the statue. Thus, Inheritance is false. But if this is so, then the objection being
discussed fails.
Here, one might object as follows. Suppose a novel does not inherit its prop-
erties from what constitutes it—its instances. But why, then, does a novel have
the properties that it has? Until a proponent of the view that novels are concrete
types provides a satisfactory answer to this question, this view cannot be considered
acceptable.
The foregoing objection assumes that the view that novels are concrete types
cannot be accepted unless there is an explanation of why novels have the properties
that they have. However, this assumption seems too strong. Clearly, an explanation
of why novels have the properties that they have is necessary in order for the view
that novels are concrete types to be complete. However, the absence of such an
explanation is not a reason to consider this view unacceptable. After all, we may
know what nature an entity has without knowing why this entity has this nature.
But let us agree, for the sake of argument, that the foregoing assumption is
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correct: The view that novels are concrete types cannot be accepted unless there
is an explanation of why novels have the properties they have. Can the objection
being discussed be defused in this case? Yes. This objection is successful only
if there is no way to plausibly explain why novels have the properties they have.
However, there is, in fact, such a way. According to it, novels inherit their properties
from the corresponding canonic embodiments (say, inscriptions), or embodiments
that manifest or encode the correct textual properties of these novels.18 Thus,
War and Peace inherits its properties—having the title “War and Peace,” being in
Russian, being authored by Leo Tolstoy, etc.—from a canonic embodiment of War
and Peace.19
Objection 4. Suppose novels are concrete types. Then the existence of a novel
depends on the existence of a reading of this novel: A novel exists when, and only
when, its reading exists. Meanwhile, if this is so, then (a) there can be no novel that
has never been read aloud and (b) a novel has discontinuous existence: It comes
into existence when one starts reading it aloud, goes out of existence when one
stops reading it aloud, and comes into existence again when one resumes reading it
aloud.20 But are (a) and (b) true?
18For a defense of a similar explanation concerning musical works, see Tillman and Spencer
(2012, 257–258).
19The thesis that novels inherit their properties from the corresponding canonic embodiments
does not imply that novels inherit all of the properties of these embodiments. So although War
and Peace does inherit certain properties from its canonic embodiment, it does not inherit all of
these properties from this embodiment (for instance, it does not inherit the property of being made
of something).
20That (a) follows from the thesis that a novel exists when, and only when, its reading exists is
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Suppose someone creates a manuscript of some novel N. Suppose next that N
has never been read aloud. Does N exist? Yes—or so it seems. But if N exists,
then there can be a novel that has never been read aloud—and, as a result, (a) is
false.
Now what about (b)? Suppose there is a manuscript of some novel M. Suppose
next that M has been read aloud but is not being read aloud now. Does M exist
now? Again, the answer seems to be “Yes.” Meanwhile, if this answer is correct,
then a novel does not necessarily go out of existence when one stops reading it
aloud—and, hence, (b) is false.
Thus, both (a) and (b) are false. But if this is so, then novels cannot be
concrete types.
Response. Objection 4 assumes that the view that novels are concrete types
has two problematic consequences—that (a) there can be no novel that has never
been read aloud and that (b) a novel comes into existence when one starts reading
it aloud, goes out of existence when one stops reading it aloud, and comes into
existence again when one resumes reading it aloud. Is this assumption true?
Before addressing this question, let us first clarify the expression “to exist.”
uncontroversial. Suppose this thesis is true. Then a novel exists only when its reading exists. So if
a novel has never been read aloud, it has never existed. Similarly, there is no doubt that (b) follows
from the thesis that a novel exists when, and only when, its reading exists. Suppose this thesis
is true. Then each time a reading of a novel occurs, this novel exists, and each time a reading of
a novel does not occur, this novel does not exist. As a result, a novel comes into existence when
one starts reading it aloud, goes out of existence when one stops reading it aloud, and comes into
existence again when one resumes reading it aloud.
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As mentioned in the previous chapter, there are two senses of this expression: the
presentist and the ontological. According to the presentist sense, x exists (hereafter:
“existspr”) at t just in case x is present at t ; according to the ontological sense,
x exists (hereafter: “existso”) at t just in case x is in the domain of our most
unrestricted quantifier.21 But besides these senses, there is another sense of the
expression “to exist”—the possibilist. According to this sense, x exists (hereafter:
“existspo”) at t just in case there is a (correct) embodiment (that is, an entity that
manifests or encodes the relevant properties of the object it is an embodiment of)—
say, a set of instructions or a recording—that can be used to bring x into existencepr.
Thus, Beethoven’s Symphony No. 7 existspo now even if it is not being performed—
since there is an embodiment of it (say, a correct copy of its score) that can be used
to bring it into existencepr. At the same time, if all embodiments of Beethoven’s
Symphony No. 7 were destroyed (say, as a result of some global catastrophe), then
it would not existpo.
22
21As mentioned in the previous chapter, in light of Quine (1948)’s view on the univocality
of “exist,” it might be more accurate to speak of different uses, rather than senses, of “exist.”
However, for the sake of convenience, I speak of different senses of “exist.” If the reader finds my
talk of different senses of “exist” inappropriate, she is free to paraphrase it in terms of uses of
“exist.”
22Here, one could object as follows. Take a (healthy) human sperm and a (healthy) unfertilized
human egg. If the sperm fertilizes the egg, then, under appropriate circumstances, a particular
human being—call this being “John”—will come into existencepr. Now, can it be said that John
exists—in the possibilist, or any other, sense—before the fertilization occurs? Of course not!
However, the foregoing account of “exist” forces us to give an affirmative answer to this question.
For, on this account, an entity existspo if there is an embodiment of this entity that can be
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So does the view that novels are concrete types entail that (a) there can be
no novel that has never been read aloud and that (b) a novel comes into existence
when one starts reading it aloud, goes out of existence when one stops reading it
aloud, and comes into existence again when one resumes reading it aloud? Let us
first consider whether this view entails that there can be no novel that has never
been read aloud. Clearly, it entails this only if a novel that (a) is a concrete type
and (b) has never been read aloud cannot exist. However, in fact, such a novel can
exist—if the expression “to exist” is used in the possibilist or the ontological sense.
Take some novel N. Suppose N is a concrete type. Suppose next that N has never
been read aloud. Finally, suppose that there is an inscription that can be used to
bring N into existencepr. Then N existspo. For, according to the definition of “to
existpo,” if there is an embodiment that can be used to bring x into existencepr, then
x existspo. And, by assumption, there is, in fact, at least one embodiment that can
used to bring this entity into existencepr. Meanwhile, in the case under consideration, there is
an embodiment of John—the mereological sum of the sperm and the unfertilized egg—and this
embodiment can be used to bring John into existencepr.
This objection assumes that the mereological sum of the sperm and the unfertilized egg is an
embodiment of John. Is this assumption true? If the answer is “Yes,” then the mereological sum of
the sperm and the unfertilized egg must encode or manifest the relevant properties of John (qua a
particular biological organism). However, this sum neither encodes nor manifests these properties.
It would do that only if it contained John’s DNA. Yet, unlike the fertilized egg, it does not contain
his DNA (the DNA’s contained in the sperm and the unfertilized egg are essentially different from
John’s DNA). Thus, the foregoing question should be answered in the negative. Meanwhile, if this
is so, the the objection being discussed contains a false assumption and, hence, fails.
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be used to read N aloud and, hence, to bring N into existencepr.
Furthermore, N existso. Since it existspo, it is in the domain of our most
unrestricted quantifier. And according to the definition of “to existo,” if x is in this
domain, then x existso.
Thus, the claim that unread novels cannot exist is not a consequence of the
view that novels are concrete types. Now, what about the claim that a novel comes
into existence when one starts reading it aloud, goes out of existence when one
stops reading it aloud, and comes into existence again when one resumes reading
it aloud? Is this claim entailed by the view that novels are concrete types? The
answer is “Yes” only if a novel that (a) is a concrete type and (b) is not being
read aloud cannot exist. But is it true that such a novel cannot exist? Take some
novel M. Suppose M is a concrete type. Suppose next that M is not being read
aloud. Finally, suppose that there is an inscription of M. Then M existspo. For, by
assumption, there is at least one embodiment that can be used to read M aloud
and, hence, bring M into existencepr. And, as mentioned already, if there is an
embodiment that can be used to bring x into existencepr, then x existspo.
Furthermore, M existso. The explanation of why this is so is analogous to the
foregoing explanation of why N existso.
Given what has been said, the question posed above should be answered in
the negative: That a novel comes into existence when one starts reading it aloud,
goes out of existence when one stops reading it aloud, and comes into existence
again when one resumes reading it aloud is not entailed by the view that novels are
concrete types.
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Thus, contrary to what Objection 4 assumes, the view that novels are concrete
types entails neither that (a) there can be no novel that has never been read aloud
nor that (b) a novel comes into existence when one starts reading it aloud, goes out
of existence when one stops reading it aloud, and comes into existence again when
one resumes reading it aloud. As a result, this objection fails.
A proponent of Objection 4 could respond as follows. Perhaps the foregoing
response to Objection 4 is successful. But let us assume that the sense of “to exist”
employed in Objection 4 is presentist. In this case, the foregoing response does not
apply, and, at the same time, there seems no other potentially plausible way to
respond to Objection 4.
Is this defense of Objection 4 successful? Suppose Objection 4 employs the
presentist sense of the expression “to exist.” Then according to this objection, it
is false (a) that a novel that has never been read aloud cannot existpr and (b)
that a novel comes into existencepr when one starts reading it aloud, goes out of
existencepr when one stops reading it aloud, and comes into existencepr again when
one resumes reading it aloud. However, the falsity of (a) and (b) is far from obvious.
If a novel has never been read aloud, then has it ever been present, assuming that an
inscription or some other embodiment other than a reading of this novel has been
present? Answering this question in the negative seems right, especially given the
fact that being present does not amount to being existent simpliciter. Meanwhile,
if novels that have never been read aloud have never been present, then, since, by
definition, being present is equivalent to being existentpr, they cannot existpr—and,
as a result, (a) is true.
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Consider now (b). It does not seem unnatural to hold that a novel becomes
present when one starts reading it aloud, disappears (though does not go out of
existence simpliciter) when one stops reading it, and becomes present again when
one starts reading it aloud again. Meanwhile, if a novel becomes present when one
starts reading it aloud, disappears (though does not go out of existence simpliciter)
when one stops reading it, and becomes present again when one starts reading it
aloud, then, since, by definition, being present is equivalent to being existentpr, (b)
is true.
Thus, if the presentist sense of the expression “to exist” is used in Objection
4, then this objection involves a questionable claim—that (a) a novel that has never
been read aloud can existpr and (b) a novel does not come into existencepr when
one starts reading it aloud, go out of existencepr when one stops reading it aloud,
and come into existencepr again when one resumes reading it aloud. Meanwhile,
according to the response being discussed, this sense is, in fact, used in Objection
4. So this response cannot be considered successful.
7.3 The Essential Elements of the Concrete Type to Which a Novel
Is Identical
Thus, a novel can be understood as a concrete type—a concretum that is
coincident with each of its instances, or, in other words, that (a) is wholly located
where each of its instances is wholly located but (b) is neither identical to any of
its instances or a sum of them nor related to them in the way in which a whole
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is related to its proper parts. Now, a natural question arises: What exactly is the
concrete type to which a novel is identical? In particular, what are the essential
elements that compose this type?
Let us first clarify the expression “an essential element of x.” This expression
can be defined as follows: For all x and for all y, x is an essential element of y just
in case if y is deprived of x, then y goes out of existence. Thus, suppose that a
particular shape is an essential element of some figure F1. Then, according to the
foregoing definition, if F1 is deprived of this shape, then F1 goes out of existence.
On the other hand, suppose that some figure F2 is deprived of a particular shape
but does not go out of existence. Then the foregoing definition entails that this
shape is not an essential element of F2.
So what essential elements does the concrete type to which a novel is identical
have? As demonstrated in Chapter 3,23 the artistic value of a novel depends on the
sound of this novel. So the sonic properties of a novel are essential to this novel: If
a novel loses some of its sonic properties, then (even if these properties are minor
ones) it goes out of existence. Meanwhile, if the sonic properties of a novel are
essential to it, then the sonic element is an essential element of a novel and, hence,
of the concrete type to which this novel is identical.
Thus, one of the essential elements of the concrete type to which a novel is
identical is the sonic element. Another such element is the semantic one. There is
no doubt that the artistic value of a novel depends primarily on what the novel tells,
or, in other words, on its content. Meanwhile, the content of a novel is constituted
23See Chapter 3, Section 3.1.2.
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by certain semantic properties. So the artistic value of a novel depends on the
semantic properties of this novel—and, as a result, such properties are essential to
novels. Meanwhile, if this is so, then the semantic element is an essential element
of a novel and, hence, of the concrete type to which this novel is identical.
Are there any other elements that are essential to the concrete type to which
a novel is identical? Consider the following quote from Moby-Dick :
S: “I thought so. All right; take a seat. Supper?—you want supper?
Supper’ll be ready directly.” (Melville, 1922, 18)
Suppose now that the first instance of the question mark is deleted, while the second
instance is replaced with a period:
Smodified: “I thought so. All right; take a seat. Supper—you want
supper. Supper’ll be ready directly.”
Clearly, the foregoing change causes S and, hence, Moby-Dick to acquire new seman-
tic and sonic properties (Smodified does not mean the same as S and has a different
sound). Meanwhile, this change is purely syntactic. So the semantic and sonic
properties of Moby-Dick depend on certain syntactic properties.
Now, arguments analogous to the argument given above can be made with
regard to any novel. Therefore, the syntactic properties of a novel determine some
of its semantic and sonic properties. Meanwhile, as already mentioned, the semantic
and sonic properties of a novel determine, in part, the artistic value of this novel.
So the artistic value of a novel depends on the syntactic properties of this novel.
But then the syntactic properties of a novel are essential to this novel. As a result,
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the syntactic element is an essential element of a novel and, hence, of the concrete
type to which this novel is identical.
Now, what about the visual element? Is it an essential element of the concrete
type to which a novel is identical? An answer to this question depends on whether
the novel in question is visual or non-visual. Consider a visual novel, or a novel whose
primary properties24 that must be experienced to fully appreciate it are certain (a)
sonic properties, (b) experienceable properties that provide experiential access to
the semantic content, and (c) visual properties. As pointed out in Chapter 4,25 the
artistic value of such a novel depends on certain visual properties. As a result, at
least some visual properties of a visual novel are essential to it. Meanwhile, if this
is so, then the visual element is an essential element of a visual novel and, hence, of
the concrete type to which this novel is identical.
At the same time, the visual element is not an essential element of the concrete
type to which a non-visual novel is identical. Consider a non-visual novel, or a novel
whose primary properties that must be experienced to fully appreciate this novel
amount to certain (a) sonic properties and (b) experienceable properties that provide
experiential access to the semantic content. As noted in Chapter 4,26 the artistic
value of such a novel does not depend on any visual properties. Meanwhile, x is an
24As might be recalled from Chapter 2, primary properties are those through which the primary
content—or, in other words, the set of “those contentful properties that may be the ground of other
contentful properties but which are not themselves grounded in contentful properties” (Davies,
2010, 411)—of an artwork is articulated.
25See Chapter 4, Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
26See Chapter 4, Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
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essential element of an artwork only if the artistic value of this work depends on the
properties possessed by this element. So, given that visual properties are the only
relevant properties possessed by the visual element, this element is not an essential
element of a non-visual novel and, therefore, of the concrete type to which such a
novel is identical.
Besides the essential elements mentioned above, the concrete type to which a
novel is identical has another essential element—the contextualist one, or the one
concerned with certain essential contextual properties, primarily the property of
being created by a particular individual or individuals in a particular cultural con-
text. Why think that this is the case? This question can be answered with the
help of the following variation of the thought experiment offered by Currie (1991).27
Consider Jane Austen’s Northanger Abbey. It was written “in 1803 as a burlesque
on the Gothic novel” (Currie, 1991, 328). Imagine now that “a hitherto unknown
manuscript by Anne Radcliffe, entitled Northanger Abbey (circa 1793), and word
for word the same as Austen’s, turns up in the attic, that we conclude (never mind
on what evidence) that this is in fact a coincidence, that Austen had no knowledge
of Radcliffe’s work, and that, far from being a satire, Radcliffe’s Abbey was meant
as a serious contribution to the genre” (Currie, 1991, 328). Given what has been
said, there is little doubt that Austen’s and Radcliffe’s novels have different artistic
values. But how can this difference be explained? Presumably, a difference between
the artistic values of two novels can be explained by appealing to the difference
between the syntactic, sonic, semantic, visual, and/or contextualist elements of one
27See Currie (1991, 328).
339
of these novels and the respective elements of the other novel. However, in the case
under consideration, the syntactic, sonic, semantic, and visual elements of Austen’s
novel do not differ from the respective elements of Radcliffe’s novel—for, (a) by
assumption, these novels have the same text and, hence, the same syntactic, sonic,
semantic, and visual properties, and (b) if two novels have the same syntactic, sonic,
semantic, and visual properties, then the syntactic, sonic, semantic, and visual ele-
ments of one of these novels and the respective elements of the other novel are the
same. Thus, the fact that Austen’s and Radcliffe’s novels have different artistic val-
ues can only be explained by appealing to the difference between the contextualist
elements of these novels. In light of this, the answer to the foregoing question is
as follows: Austen’s and Radcliffe’s novels have different artistic values because the
contextualist element of Austen’s novel and the contextualist element of Radcliffe’s
novel are different.
Here, one might object that the foregoing answer is unsatisfactory, since it
involves a false claim—that the contextualist elements of Austen’s and Radcliffe’s
novels are different. Is this objection successful? Austen’s novel has the property
of being a satire on the genre of Gothic novel and does not have the property of
being a serious contribution to this genre, whereas Radcliffe’s novel has the latter
property and does not have the former one. Meanwhile, both of these properties are
contextual, as they are grounded in the context in which Austen’s and Radcliffe’s
novels came into existence, rather than in the non-contextual, structural features
of these novels. Thus, contrary to what the objection being discussed states, the
contextualist element of Austen’s novel and the contextualist element of Radcliffe’s
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novel are different: The former has the property of being a satire on the genre of
Gothic novel and does not have the property of being a serious contribution to this
genre, whereas the latter has the latter property and does not have the former one.28
As a result, this objection fails.
Thus, Austen’s and Radcliffe’s novels have different artistic values because the
contextualist element of Austen’s novel and the contextualist element of Radcliffe’s
novel are different. But if this is so, then the artistic values of these novels depend
on certain contextualist properties—and so these properties are essential to these
novels. Meanwhile, if the contextualist properties of a novel are essential to it, then
the contextualist element is an essential element of this novel. As a result, the
contextualist element of Austen’s novel and the contextualist element of Radcliffe’s
novel are essential elements of these novels and, hence, of the concrete types to
which these novels are identical.
Clearly, argumentation analogous to the one provided above can be applied
to any other novel. So the following general thesis must be true: The contextualist
element is essential to a novel and, hence, the concrete type to which this novel is
identical.
Are there any essential elements of the concrete type to which a novel is
identical, besides the ones examined above? The answer to this question, I think,
is “No.” Thus, given what has been said, the question posed at the beginning of
this section can be answered as follows: The essential elements of the concrete type
28For a powerful defense of the idea that contextual properties are relevant to the artistic value
of an artwork, see Levinson (1980, 2007).
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to which a non-visual novel is identical include the sonic, semantic, syntactic, and
contextualist elements; the essential elements of the concrete type to which a visual
novel is identical include all of the mentioned elements and the visual element.
7.4 The Ontological Status of a Novel
Our analysis has shown that:
1. A novel can be treated as a concrete type—a concretum that (a) is capable of
spatiotemporal multilocation (that is, can occupy several disjoint spatiotempo-
ral regions without occupying their fusion) and (b) coincides with its instances
(that is, is wholly located where each of its instances is wholly located but is
neither identical to any of them or a mereological sum of them nor related to
them in the way in which a whole is related to its proper parts).
2. The essential elements of the concrete type to which a novel is identical include
the sonic, semantic, syntactic, and contextualist elements if this novel is non-
visual, and the sonic, semantic, syntactic, contextualist, and visual elements
if this novel is visual.
Given this, from an ontological point of view, a novel can be regarded as a concrete
type that, depending on whether this novel is non-visual or visual, is composed
of (a) the sonic, semantic, syntactic, and contextualist elements or (b) the sonic,
semantic, syntactic, contextualist, and visual elements.
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